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EDITORIAL

AT A meeting held in London on 25 October 1956 an Association of British Theological and Philosophical Libraries came formally into existence. Its aims, as stated in its constitution, are "to promote the interests of libraries, scholars, and librarians" in the fields of theology and philosophy.

Its foundation membership ranges from large academic libraries to modest society libraries, as well as a number of individuals, and no doubt its numbers will grow as its usefulness becomes increasingly clear. It hopes to help members by the provision and interchange of information, and by undertaking, among other things, projects of bibliographical value. A bulletin will be issued three times a year, about the middle of each university term. This will be sent free to all members of the Association; non-members will be able to subscribe to it.

The Hon. Secretary/Treasurer is Miss J. Ferrier (c/o Church Missionary Society Library, 6 Salisbury Square, London, E.C.4). The Editor of the Bulletin will be Mr R. J. Hoy (School of Oriental and African Studies Library, University of London, London, W.C.1).

Theology Today (Princeton, N.J.) devotes its October number (1956) to an appraisal of Karl Barth. The fundamental concern of his teaching is judged to be the integrity of Christian theology and, in particular, its independence of philosophy. The possibility of the knowledge of God does not reside in any capacity inherent in man but solely in God himself and in his readiness to make himself known to man. The stark dualism which Barth once emphasized between God and man has now apparently been modified and transferred to the Trinity, for in the Incarnation mankind was taken into God. Thus his theology is now strongly Christocentric. The decade 1928-38 saw the great change. "My new task", says Barth, "was to think through again and express everything I had said before in a different way, as a theology of the grace of God in Jesus Christ." Hence the elaborate tomes which are now appearing

and against whose vast size Dr Mascall has entered a despairing protest. Others besides Dr Mascall may find themselves breathing rather heavily.

Those Englishmen who become a little wearied in following the kaleidoscopic changes of continental theology may be thankful for what someone has recently described as the "silent pressure of the organic Church with its directive sense of continuity". Barth himself when asked to explain why his work did not sell better in this country is said to have exclaimed, "Ah, the English, they are incurably Pelagian". Perhaps there is something in that too.

The London and Middlesex Archaeological Society has recently completed a project that must commend itself without reservation to all lovers of churches. This is nothing less than a survey of the structures and furnishings of all the parish churches in the county. The work was done by a team of amateurs under the skilled guidance of Mr Michael Robbins. A questionnaire was drawn up with great care and distributed to the 25 members, who with the help of their friends made themselves responsible for the survey in each local government district. Everything possible was done to keep the members working *pari passu* in their several areas. So successful was the effort that it has been well worth while to publish a summary of the findings in book form as a commemoration of the Society's centenary year. This book does not attempt to list all the findings, but it enumerates the churches, indicates precisely where they are, states their plan, building history, and features of special note, and it adds in the briefest detail references to their documents and the printed sources for further information. It can readily be realized how valuable such a survey must be in the metropolis, where churches can with surprising ease be lost to general sight and knowledge in a vast wilderness of bricks and mortar. But we believe that a similar survey might be valuable in every county. In any case its compilation must be a source of great interest and of abundant information to all those who take part in it. We commend the example of Middlesex to all who are trying to interest any group of people in ecclesiological and historical studies.

The Church has lately been attracting the attention of the financial papers. It is satisfactory to note that the articles are both well-informed and complimentary. In a factual statement the *Financial Times* of 20 October 1956, showed that the income of the Church of England has been steadily rising for the past eight years and is now "probably some 30 per cent higher than in 1948/9". With regard to expenditure "it is estimated that over 40 per cent of income from all sources is spent on stipends of the clergy, about a quarter on the maintenance of buildings and services, and 15 per cent on missions of one sort or another. Most of the remainder is spent on Sunday Schools and Church education, training of candidates for the ministry and general administration."

The Economist (20 October 1956) introduces a more human note into the discussion. It concentrates on the bench of bishops and describes the pattern of rule of the 41 diocesans among the 110 bishops of all types as "feudal, under the sovereign". The writer understands the importance of the Prime Minister's patronage secretary, designating his job as "obscure, anachronistic and, one suspects, rather fun". He appears to agree that the type of man appointed to a bishopric consists of "upperclass intellectual only and conformers at that". Forty-five per cent of the diocesans are sons of clergy and the great majority of all bishops went to a public school. Oxford educated 52 per cent of diocesans and Cambridge 35 per cent. Forty per cent of diocesans have been officers (chaplains or combatants) in the armed forces and "the extraordinarily high proportion of one-fifth of all present bishops were decorated". What is found possibly disturbing is that 55 per cent of diocesans have spent a large part of their active lives as schoolmasters or dons. This is regarded as a more valid ground for criticism than the suggestion that bishops are drawn from a single social stratum. In any case "those who criticise the method of appointment have never really been able to suggest a better one; any change that is required is almost certainly in mood rather than in mechanisms".

In view of the widespread discussion of the Church's legal machinery we are particularly glad to publish (without comment) the article, which follows immediately, from the Bishop of Exeter.

ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS

THE BISHOP OF EXETER

THE purpose of this article is to offer some reflections on the Report of the Commission on Ecclesiastical Courts. The main recommendation of the Commission is that a clear distinction should be drawn between charges brought against the morals of a clergyman and charges brought against his orthodoxy, and that a different kind of court should be set up for dealing with each of the two types of charges. With this I have no quarrel. Indeed, I think it is a very good recommendation which will greatly benefit the Church.

There are, however, certain details in the Commission's recommendations which I view with some misgiving. First, as concerns the cases dealing with heresy, ritual, and ceremonial, which the Commission calls "reserved cases". Two recommendations are made which, taken together, are, I think, highly dangerous. The Commission recommends that the episcopal veto be abolished, and that all costs of the "Convocation Court of Enquiry" and of the defendant clergyman be paid by the Church Commissioners. I am afraid lest frivolous and malicious complaints may impose heavy expense on the Church and disturb her peace. It is true that the complainant would be liable for his own costs. It is also true that the new canons will establish beyond question the legality of certain practices now technically illegal. But the canons will not, for some time, cover all doubtful points. There will be nothing to stop complaints about, for example, the use of incense, a sanctus bell, or Reservation. Any three adult communicants on the electoral Roll, or one churchwarden, may make a complaint. And a complaint once made must go before the Convocation Court of Inquiry which must enquire into it, having powers for that purpose of examining the complainant and witnesses on oath. It is true that at this stage a complaint may be thrown out on the grounds of its triviality. But already much damage has been done in the parish and not inconsiderable expense has been incurred. I urge strongly that some veto on proceedings of this kind be retained at their very inception.

If the retention of the veto by the Bishop is felt to be objectionable, I suggest that it be entrusted to the Dean and Chapter.

The Commission recommends the abolition of any right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. This provoked a lively debate in the Church Assembly, in the course of which it was strongly urged that the appeal should be retained for "Reserved Cases". I have given this matter much further thought since the debate and have somewhat changed my opinion. The root of the objection to the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Privy Council is that it gives the final authoritative judgement on what is the authentic teaching and practice of the Church of England to an outside body. And this body, just because it is an outside body, cannot command the spiritual allegiance of Church people. This objection seems to me to be in principle unanswerable. But there is another way of looking at the matter.

The Queen is the Governor of the Church. She is under oath to protect the Church and it falls to her to ensure that the teaching and practice of the Church is "as the Lord hath commanded and as this Church and Realm hath received the same". The idea of the Godly Prince was firmly written into the Constitution of the Church of England at the Reformation, and we cannot get rid of it without upsetting the Establishment altogether. But, of course, "Godly prince" meant the sovereign in person, who being a devout lay member of the Church, ruled the Church as the final appellate authority, either alone or after taking such advice as he thought fit. The idea fits ill with a constitutional monarchy wherein the monarch can act alone in hardly anything and where, in nearly everything, the monarch is required to take the advice of advisers appointed according to the Constitution. Yet it remains true, that in theory, the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council are the decisions of the "Godly prince " taken after receiving advice. The position would, I believe, be considerably eased if it could be provided that the advisers to the "Godly prince" in ecclesiastical matters must always themselves be ecclesiastical persons. In matters of law the Crown is now advised not by the Privy Council as a whole but by certain members of the Privy Council who are legal experts. Could it not be arranged that in ecclesiastical matters the Crown should be advised by certain members of the Privy Council who have knowledge of ecclesiastical affairs? In other words, I suggest that from Church Courts an appeal should lie, not to the Judicial Committee

of the Privy Council but to "The Ecclesiastical Committee of the Privy Council"—a Committee appointed from among such members of the Privy Council as are Bishops or communicant lay members of the Church of England. I do not, at present, see how there could be any objection in principle to such an arrangement as this which would not at the same time and equally be an objection to the whole concept of "the godly prince".

I have already pointed out that it will be some time before new canonical legislation declares explicitly the legality or illegality of certain practices which are widely current but are the subject of adverse and disputed nineteenth -century Privy Council judgements. Would it not be wise, when setting up a new system of Church Courts, to provide that these new courts should not be bound by earlier Privy Council judgements but shall have full liberty to decide all issues *de novo* and on their merits?

I pass now to a consideration of the Commission's proposals for the hearing of charges against a clergyman's morals. The Commission rightly criticizes the present Discipline Measures. They are cumbrous and unworkable. Yet the Commission thinks that the principles contained in the Measures ought to be preserved. I think this is a mistake, and I am afraid that it results in the Commission's own proposals being equally cumbrous and unworkable.

The underlying principle of the Discipline Measures is that any complaint against a clergyman should first be sifted by a "Ministerial" Committee and then determined by a special court, each containing persons who have experience of a clergyman's life from the inside and who are therefore able to determine in the light of their own experience the reality or gravity of a charge. Now the reason for this arrangement was chiefly that the Measures provide for charges, not only or mainly of specific acts or crimes, but of "negligence or unbecoming conduct". It was right and proper to hold that the most fitting and competent body to determine what is or is not negligence or unbecoming conduct is a body largely drawn from the clergy themselves. But with the passing of the new canons, prescribing more exactly the duties of the clergy, vague charges of negligence will become increasingly unnecessary. It should be possible to state precisely wherein the alleged negligence consists. The need, therefore, for Ministerial Committees should tend to decrease.

But however this may be, the Commission's own proposals are

frightening in their complexity. They suggest first that there should be an investigating Committee composed of a chairman, three clergymen, and three laymen: the chairman shall be legally qualified. This committee is to decide whether there is a *prima facie* case—and for this purpose it is to have power to examine complainant and witnesses on oath and to order the production of documents. The accused may make a written answer to the charges if he wishes. The Committee is also to decide whether the charge, if proved, would amount to unbecoming conduct or neglect. When all this has been done, the Commission proposes that the charges be formulated and brought before a Consistory Court strengthened by the addition to the Chancellor of two clergymen and two Justices of the Peace.

My objection to these proposals is two-fold. First, it is going to be very difficult indeed for the average diocese to find enough clergy and qualified laymen willing to take part in this unpleasant work. This difficulty, under the present Measures, is notorious. The Commission's proposals add to the difficulties. Secondly, the exhaustive nature of the inquiry to be undertaken by the Investigating Committee very nearly constitutes in itself a trial. Indeed, it might be said that you have but to add to the accused's written answers his personal appearance and examination and you have a trial. If, after this careful inquiry, the Investigating Committee decides that there is a case and that it amounts to unbecoming conduct or neglect, it hardly seems worth the accused's while to defend the case in court later on.

However, I fully appreciate the force of the reasoning which led the Commission to strengthen the composition of the Investigating Committee, to increase its powers and to enlarge the scope of its enquiry. And if these proposals for the Investigating Committee win general approval I should not press my objections beyond this—that the more you strengthen the Investigating Committee, the less need you have to strengthen the Consistory Court. A competent Investigating Committee has ruled that the charges, if proved, would amount to unbecoming conduct or neglect. All that is left to the Consistory Court is to determine whether the charges are proved or not. And in that duty what need has the Chancellor (or his deputy)—who, the Commission suggests, is always to be "a barrister of not less than seven years standing with judicial experience, e.g. a Recorder or a Chairman or Deputy Chairman of Quarter Sessions"—

of the assistance of two clergymen and two Justices of the Peace? In my opinion the proposals of the Commission would have been immeasurably enhanced if, after establishing their Investigating Committee, they had been content to leave the ancient Consistory Court as it is and to refer all conduct cases to it. And I greatly hope that the Measure which is being framed to implement the Commission's report will do this. Alternatively, if there is a strong desire to strengthen the Consistory Court, the Investigating Committee should be abolished, and a single lay lawyer appointed in its place in each diocese to hold a preliminary inquiry and to formulate the charges.

The Commission very properly proposes to retain the provision by which conviction in a temporal court shall be conclusive in the Consistory Court, and there shall be no re-trial of the facts. But it wishes also to retain and extend the provision by which conviction in a temporal court is followed automatically by a sentence of deprivation and incapacity to hold preferment. I greatly question the wisdom of this and believe it would be much better to allow the Bishop or the Consistory Court some discretion in the matter. It could happen that a man be divorced by his wife on the technical ground of desertion, whilst in fact the wife was the guilty party. The whole parish might be solidly behind the incumbent in a conviction of his innocence, and would be shocked and aggrieved by his automatic deprivation; whilst his inability to hold any preferment would be a cruel injustice. Apart from such an extreme case as that, many instances occur where it is right for a man to be deprived of his present benefice, but where he ought, in a comparatively short time if not at once, to be licensed to a curacy or even instituted to a benefice elsewhere. The machinery for removing a declaration of incapacity to hold preferment was not designed for such cases as these. Whilst, therefore, I agree with the Commission that some revision is necessary in the list of cases for which sentence is automatic, I believe that the revision should be in the direction of creating greater discretionary powers.

Finally, it is to be hoped that the Measures now being framed will contain clear definitions of the nature and extent of the various punishments which may be inflicted upon a clergyman. Comparatively few people seem to understand the difference between deprivation and incapacity to hold preferment: fewer, the difference between that latter and deposition; and fewer still the

difference between deposition and degradation. Indeed I am very doubtful if I understand this last difference myself. I believe that it amounts only to this—that degradation is a sentence of deposition solemnly carried out, i.e. with some token and ceremonial stripping of the outward signs of clerical status. I should be grateful for correction, if I am wrong. Further, I believe that neither deposition nor degradation infringe upon the permanent "character" conferred by Holy Orders; they withdraw from the clergyman the privileges and status of Holy Orders. But perhaps here also I am wrong.

CHARLES GORE AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH [1]

JOHN R. H. MOORMAN

A STORY has been told that at a meeting of bishops a discussion once took place as to whether or not they should attempt to forbid people to genuflect before the Sacrament. Gore, who was then Bishop of Birmingham, was sitting with his head buried in his hands, making no contribution. At last the Archbishop asked him to give his opinion, to which Gore replied: "I have genuflected since I wore black velvet breeches, and I shall genuflect until I die."

Gore was, by nature, training, and conviction, a child of what is called the Oxford Movement; and I propose, in this lecture, to try to place him in his historical environment, to show how, by his teaching and by his example, he carried out the principles for which the Tractarians had fought and how perfect an example he is of the kind of Churchman which they wished to produce.

The theological discussions and debates which stirred the Oxford common-rooms in the 1830's and 40's have led to great and in some ways unexpected changes in the religious life of this country and of the Anglican communion overseas. It would indeed be hard to find a parish church in England which does not bear some trace of this—in its furnishings and decorations, in the way its services are conducted, in the tenets and teaching of its clergy. That there has always been a thin stream of High Church teaching and practice from the days of Laud onwards is well known; but it made little difference to the life of the Church as a whole. But from the middle of the nineteenth century the whole life of the Church began to change. Every one of us to-day is different because of those changes.

I wonder whether this is always sufficiently realized. The "Oxford Movement" sounds such a local and academic affair; but its name belies it. In so far as it led to the revival of much that had been abandoned in the sixteenth century it might almost be called a "Counter-Reformation". As such it would certainly be regarded by some people to-day. But this is to mistake the object of its leaders, which was not to undo the Reformation, but rather to get back to

[1] The Gore Memorial Lecture, 1956.

the true Reformation principles of basing the Church upon what was Scriptural and Primitive. The aim of the Tractarians was to show the Anglican Church what its true nature was—a conception which had been understood by the Reformers but lost under Puritan and foreign pressure during the century which followed the breach with Rome.

Now, the fact that your vicar nowadays wears a coloured stole, or a chasuble, when celebrating the Holy Communion, or that candles are burnt in broad daylight on the altar of your parish church, may seem to have very little to do with the doctrine of the Church. But of course there is a connection. The Tractarians were not in the least interested in these external things. Even the learned doctor Pusey was once heard to say: "Will someone tell us what *is* a cope?" What they were interested in was the theology of the Church and Ministry and the question of where the Church of England stood in Christendom. And yet all the *external* changes, which caused so much bother in the second half of the nineteenth century (and still do) all stem from the theological teaching of the Tractarians. Once you have convinced people that the Church of England is the Catholic Church in this country, that it has just as much claim to catholicity as any other Church, that its priests are catholic priests, within the Apostolic Succession, and its worship catholic worship, that its Articles, far from being a charter of Protestantism, are in fact capable of bearing a fully catholic interpretation—once you have done all this you can hardly be surprised if changes begin to take place in the appearance of the churches and in the ceremonial of the liturgy.

But the important thing is the doctrine of the Church, and it is at this point that Gore played such an important part in developing, both by his teaching and by his practice, the doctrines laid down by the Tractarians.

Early in the nineteenth century an obscure country clergyman, Thomas Sikes, Vicar of Guilsborough in Northamptonshire, uttered a remarkable prophecy:

> Wherever I go about the country (he said) I see amongst the clergy a number of very amiable and estimable men, many of them much in earnest and wishing to do good. But I have observed one universal want in their teaching, the uniform suppression of one great truth. There is no account given anywhere, so far as I can see, of the one Holy Catholic Church . . .

> The doctrine is of the last importance, and the principles it involves of immense power; and some day, not far distant, it will judicially have its reprisals . . . We now hear not a breath about the Church; bye and bye those who live to see it will hear of nothing else.

This prophecy was abundantly fulfilled. Twenty-five years later the Tractarians had started on their work with great vigour, and the doctrine of the Church was beginning once again to be preached with fervour. Not that it had ever been wholly ignored, as Thomas Sikes seems to have believed. The teaching of men like William Law and that remarkable Irishman, Alexander Knox, had kept alive a true understanding of what the Church is. But the Tractarians gave the issue a new power.

This they did by concentrating upon two main subjects—the Apostolic Succession and the concept of a Visible Church. The *Apostolic Succession* was an idea which appealed not only to the mind but also to the imagination; and I have often thought that the success which the Tractarians gained at this point owes a good deal to the Romantic Movement. It certainly cut right across the generally accepted view of the function and status of a bishop. The eighteenth and early nineteenth century picture of a bishop was that of a rich and noble prelate, a high official of the State Church, living for most of the year in London and attending regularly at the House of Lords, while in the summer months (when Parliament was not sitting and the London season was over) he would repair to his palace in the country from which he would set forth from time to time in his carriage to visit a few of his parishes and to confirm huge swarms of rustic children, but would otherwise devote his attention to his library, his estates, and to entertaining the nobility and gentry of his diocese.

It was against this kind of background that the Tractarians began to preach the doctrine of the Apostolic Succession. The Bishops, they said, were men chosen by God to carry on the work originally entrusted to the apostles themselves by Christ. As generation succeeded generation this mystic authority had been faithfully preserved and systematically handed on. There was no doubt about this. The Apostolic Succession was an historical fact. As Newman said with startling confidence in Tract VII: "Every link in the chain is known, from St Peter to our present metropolitans." Think of it! St Peter . . . St Gregory the Great . . . St Augustine . . . St Anselm . .

Becket . . . Cranmer . . . Laud . . . Yes, right down to the pious and estimable Dr William Howley who, having been enthroned Archbishop of Canterbury by proxy in order to avoid the inconvenience of leaving London, lived in considerable splendour at Lambeth Palace where he is said to have walked about preceded by flunkeys carrying flambeaux!

The Apostolic Succession was one point in the Tractarian teaching about the Church; the other was the doctrine of the *Visible Church*. It is always tempting to think that only God can know who form the company of the elect—"the blessed company of all faithful people"—and that none of us can claim to say who is in the Church and who is out of it. The eighteenth century had had to face this question by the Wesleyan movement and the disastrous drift of a large number of people away from their parish churches to dissenting tabernacles. How did these people stand in God's plan for the world? Archdeacon Daubeny thought that he had answered this question in his *Guide to the Church* (1798); but his confident boasting was no contribution to Church doctrine, but merely a defence of Churchmanship against every form of dissent and nonconformity.

The Tractarians naturally made much of the doctrine of a Visible Church, the Church founded by Christ, or (as Newman phrased it in one of his sermons) "the gift which Christ let drop from Him as the mantle of Elijah, the pledge and token of His never-failing grace from age to age". To many this doctrine was more important than that of the Apostolic Succession. *That* was romantic and imaginative; but the doctrine of the Visible Church raised problems which are very much with us to-day. *Who* constitute the Visible Church of Christ and who must be regarded as not within the covenant?

Newman tried to answer this, but it was William Palmer in his *Treatise on the Church of Christ* who painted in such clear colours the picture of the Catholic Church with its three "branches"—Roman, Eastern, and Anglican—but who had no interest whatever in any other group of believers. As Brilioth says: "He is content to ignore the existence of all other shoots, almost in mild surprise at the master of the garden's omission to purge away this vegetation so flatly contrary to programme."

The *Tracts* came to an end in 1841. In 1845 Newman went over to Rome, and the "Oxford Movement" was virtually over. But it had stirred men's minds: it had given people some idea (however vague this may at first have been) of what the Church really was—its ministers, its worship, its teaching, its status in the sight of God. And in the generation which succeeded the work of the Oxford reformers changes began to take place in the ordinary lives of the parishes. Scott Holland once remarked that "there are few moments more dramatic in our Religious History than the recovery in the slums by the Oxford Movement of what it had lost in the University". The scene now shifts from Oxford to Pimlico and St Peter's-in-the-East, to St Saviour's, Leeds, and to Miles Platting in Manchester. Men were now fighting, not so much for the doctrines for which Newman and Pusey had fought at Oxford, as for the right to put these principles into practice. The 1850's were therefore a decade of strife and tumult, of the formation of parties, of stones and imprisonments.

This was the world into which Charles Gore was born on 22 January 1853. His parents were conventional erastians, but at the age of eight (when, presumably, the black velvet breeches were being worn) Charles appears to have adopted a "catholic" standpoint from which he never swerved. As soon as he was old enough he began to attend those churches in London where a rich and elaborate ceremonial had been introduced and to identify himself with the new movement. His mind was dominated by the idea of the Church; he swallowed the teaching of the Tractarians with the utmost relish, and delighted in all the new forms of worship and of devotion which the more "advanced" churches could offer. But romantic though he was, his feet were firmly on the ground, the ground of a carefully thought-out and powerfully defended doctrine of the Church—its faith, its place in the divine economy, its authority, its function in the world.

From the very first, Gore was anxious to proclaim to the world his convictions, and he first burst into print in 1878 at the age of 25 with a pamphlet on *The Nature of Faith* which was privately printed. What strikes us most about this work is its astonishing maturity. We see here the full man—well-read, convinced, with a mind fully made up, prepared to defend his position with learning and courage. As G. L. Prestige says: "Gore was extraordinarily mature. He sprang almost full-armed to the stature of his powers.

He made up his mind amazingly early about almost every question of importance, and this by no means because of any failure to consider, and consider deeply, the problems of religion and human life. His convictions were so clear cut and so firmly grounded that he seldom found cause to revise them in any essential particular." Moreover his powers of working—his speed, memory, and application—were quite extraordinary. It was once said of Mr Gladstone that if the energy of a normal man were reckoned at one unit, Gladstone would have to be regarded as possessing at least five units. I do not know how Gore would come out on such a calculation, but certainly pretty high. For the writing of his first work of scholarship —a book about St Leo the Great—he allowed himself one month. And that at the age of 27!

Gore's first published (as distinguished from "printed") book was on *The Clergy and the Creeds* (1879). In 1880 came the book about St Leo, and in 1881 Gore came into print again—this time in an attack on the vague and sentimental ramblings of Dr Hatch. In this year Dr Hatch had published his Bampton Lectures on *The Organization of the Early Christian Church*. This book gives the appearance of much learning and a close study of early Christian literature. But its conclusions are such as no one of Gore's way of thinking could possibly accept. For, to Dr Hatch, the Church was in no way instituted by Christ to continue his work, but was a natural society of believers which owed its origin largely to their need for financial support. The early Christians, he said, formed themselves into societies for mutual help. But there was no need for them to have done so. It all came about under the natural laws of providence and by no special operation of grace. Thus the Church struggled into existence, and Hatch maintained that the "union of believers" was never then proclaimed as an article of faith but only as an element of Christian practice.

Gore was immensely shocked by all this, and attacked the book in a long review in the *Church Quarterly* which he subsequently published in a developed form in 1882 as *The Church and the Ministry: a Review of the Reverend E. Hatch's Bampton Lectures*, a book which was to have a number of revisions before Gore had finished with it. Gore's criticisms are devastating. Although at the time he was only 28 his knowledge is phenomenal, and he writes with the self-confidence and conviction of a man twice his age.

In December 1883 Gore sailed for India on a visit to the newly

founded Oxford Mission to Calcutta. While there he gave a series of lectures which were printed in the *Indian Churchman* in 1884. Five years later Gore issued these in revised form as a book which he called *Roman Catholic Claims*.

Roman Catholic Claims is perhaps rather a bad title for what is really a very good book on the Anglican position. Gore has, of course, to criticize certain aspects of Roman teaching, especially the claim to be the only Catholic Church; but the book is neither negative nor polemic. It is a statement of what the Church of England thinks about itself, as this appeared to a child of the Tractarian movement. In this book we meet various phrases and themes which were to occur many times in Gore's subsequent writings and which were fundamental to his doctrine of the Church. Two of these are of special significance: the Church as the "Christ-bearer" and the Church as "the Extension of the Incarnation". Gore is so certain that the Church to which he belonged was the nearest approximation on earth to what Christ would wish that he feels bound to criticize other Churches—Rome for being exclusive, imperial, and secularized; the Eastern Church for degenerating into "aimless theological accuracy"; and Protestantism for having allowed itself to be dominated by personalities, what he called "those masterful individualities and uncatholic wills which helped the foreign Reformations down different roads of heretical defection".

Meanwhile, in the previous year, 1888, Gore had published his new and fuller edition of *The Church and the Ministry*. This dealt, not with the Church of England, but with the nature of the Church as a whole, and Gore used the opportunity for stating his convictions upon the two fundamental truths about the Church—its Visibility and its dependence upon the Apostolic Succession. In the preface to the first edition in 1888 he declared his book to be "an apology for the principle of the Apostolic Succession"; and in the preface to the fourth edition of 1899 he stated that, so far as the Doctrine of the Church was concerned, four questions were at issue: whether Christ gave the Church its officers in the apostles; whether the apostles felt that they must hand on authority as they had received it; whether an Apostolic Succession is an element in the Church that we cannot dispense with; and whether any but bishops have power to pass on such authority. To the first three of these questions Gore proceeds to

give a strong affirmative, and to the fourth an equally strong negative.

Thus, by the year 1889 Gore, though only 36, had a number of volumes to his credit; and all of them had been concerned more or less directly with the Doctrine of the Church—its nature and its authority. But while engaged on this work Gore had been growing more and more interested in the theology which lies behind any doctrine of the Church. The Church may be the "Christbearer" and "the Extension of the Incarnation": but who is Christ, and what does the Incarnation mean?

For the next few years Gore was largely concerned—so far as the immense pressure of work and interest would allow him—with the doctrine of the Incarnation, and *Lux Mundi* (which Gore always wished to be called *The Religion of the Incarnation*) was largely concerned with this question. Gore wrote about the Holy Spirit, and had much to say about the Church as the sphere in which the Spirit does his work; but his mind was more and more absorbed by the doctrine of the Incarnation; and when, in the same year, he was invited to deliver the Bampton Lectures in 1891 he knew that that must be his theme.

Ten years later, Gore was appointed Bishop of Worcester and so was given the opportunity to show what the Apostolic Succession in a Visible and Incarnational Society should mean in actual practice.

The Incarnation: the Extension of the Incarnation: the Christbearer. This sequence is the basis of Gore's teaching about the Church; and it was this which brought him into conflict with so many of his contemporaries, who either could not or would not think of the Church in this way at all. To some it was the religious aspect of the life of the nation: to others a Society for the promotion of good behaviour; to others the guardian of morality; to others a club for the enjoyment of various sorts of liturgical fancies. All these conceptions or assumptions were ultimately based on the belief, so strongly maintained by Dr Hatch, that the Church is a man-made society for mutual support and satisfaction. But Gore would have none of this. To him the Church was no other than the mystical Body and Bride of Christ, charged to carry on his work and to dispense his gifts to his people. As such it was under the control

of certain principles which, since they were not man-made but God-given, were inviolable.

In Gore's mind the marks of the Church were three: Holiness, Righteousness, and Authority; and I propose now to say only a few words upon the first two of these, but to devote most of what remains of my time to the third.

Holiness. "The Church on earth", wrote Gore, "is but the visible portion of a great invisible whole, bound all together in the same order of supernatural life." The Church is essentially concerned with the supernatural and the eternal. Holiness must, therefore, be the chief mark not only of the Church as a whole, but of each member of it. Worship, dependence upon the grace of God mediated through the Sacraments, prayer as an employment in its own right—all these form an essential part of Gore's teaching.

The mystical and ascetic element had been introduced into the teaching of the Tractarians largely by Pusey. It found a ready supporter in Gore. It was this which led to the foundation of the Community of the Resurrection. It was this which inspired that rich little book, *Prayer and the Lord's Prayer*. It was this which governed Gore's life and thought at every stage. There is a story told of him that once, walking along a corridor in some institution, he stopped to look at a photograph of a group of men. He looked at it tenderly for some time, and then slowly sank to his knees on the floor. This tiny incident is typical. The supernatural was always very near to the mind and heart of Charles Gore.

Righteousness. The Church, though mainly occupied with things eternal and supernatural, has its part to play in the affairs of the world. *Thou art my strong rock and my castle* (says the Psalmist): *be thou also my guide and lead me for thy name's sake*. The Church was not just an ivory tower to which to flee in order to escape from the world; it was also a place *from* which the Christian must go forth, with Christ at his side, to do battle against the wickedness and injustices of the world.

Gore was deeply conscious of the evils in the world—evils in industry and commerce, in our social life, in the conditions in which men lived and worked. Christ could not look on all this and be unmoved: no more could the Christbearer. *When he saw the city he wept over it*. Charles Gore was always weeping over the cities of this world, with their avarice, their ruthlessness, their forgetfulness of God.

It was Gore's intense feeling of the Church's responsibility to the world which led to the Community of the Resurrection finding its permanent home not in Oxfordshire but in the heart of the industrial North. As Christ stood looking down with compassion upon the city, so the mother house of the Community was to look down on the factories and railway-yards, the smoke and bustle of men intent upon making money.

All this is typical of Gore's belief. The first mark of the Church is holiness; but holiness does not depend upon retreat from the world. Monastic houses tended to seek out lonely and peaceful places where their members could contemplate the mysteries of God undisturbed by human interference. But this would not do for Gore who, in his ideas, owed as much to St Francis as to St Benedict. The Church, even the religious house, must be in the very heart of human sin and suffering, of human success and failure, of human push and vigour and ambition.

All these ideas of Christian responsibility Gore took with him to Birmingham where he immediately became a leader to be reckoned with. The union in him of the ideals of Holiness and Righteousness soon made its mark upon the city, and many social workers and idealists who were alarmed at the prospect of a High Churchman, a scholar, and an aristocrat as their first bishop were staggered to find that he not only shared their ideals but was often far ahead of them.

Authority. The Church, in Gore's mind, was fully endowed with authority by Christ. The basis of this authority was the Apostolic Succession which makes known the historical continuity and visible unity of the Church and guarantees the validity of its Sacraments. To this Church Christ had committed authority *to bind and to loose* —the authority of "prohibition and sanction"—and the seat of this authority was the episcopate. Gore was very fond of the text in the Fourth Gospel which says that Christ "*did not commit himself unto men . . . for he knew what was in man*". Instead, Christ had concentrated on the few, the little band whom he could train and prepare, the nucleus of the visible Church. Gore had no doubt whatever that episcopacy was of the *esse* of the Church—a phrase which he uses in his pamphlet on *The Basis of Anglican Fellowship* (1914) —and he was convinced, from his study of Church History, that the episcopate has been, throughout, the force which has held the Church together. Without such authority—not man-made but God-

given—the Church would disintegrate into what he called "the welter of Christian bodies".

But Authority implies discipline, and Gore was a strict disciplinarian both with himself and with all those who came under his jurisdiction. Throughout his life he fought a long battle for discipline and that on three fronts: Faith, Worship, and the Sacraments.

Gore's first published work was a pamphlet on *The Clergy and the Creeds* (1879) in which he faced the problem of liberalism—the attempt to adapt the Christian faith, the faith of the historic Church, to the supposed needs of what was called the "cultivated modern man" with the view of winning over to the Church a small number of rather conspicuous doubters and unbelievers. To Gore, the Christian faith was a treasure committed to the safe keeping of the Christian Church. Towards the faith, three attitudes were possible, those of belief, disbelief, and doubt. All these were honest. But now a *fourth* had appeared, the claim to be eclectic, to pick and choose, and while publicly reciting the Creeds in full, to accept only parts of them as true. Gore's sense of discipline was profoundly disturbed by the thought of people—clergy or laity—being content to declare, in the most solemn rites of the Church, their belief that the Christ was incarnate "by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary" while at the same time making it generally known that they believed no such thing. No Church could survive this sort of thing for long. The end of such dishonesty must be disintegration and death. As Gore wrote, as early as 1887: "Christ our adorable master has given us no guarantee that His Faith will not be rejected by Englishmen, as it was once by the Jews; but He has given us a pledge that, though the gates of death may seem to engulf the Church they shall not prevail against it; and meanwhile as He sits in the glory of God who on earth was the Faithful Witness, He asks one thing of the stewards of His mysteries—that a man be found *faithful*."

Such Faithfulness was equally necessary in the field of Worship. Gore was always a High Churchman, but whatever his inclinations he regarded worship as subject to discipline just as much as belief. The Church to which he belonged, had, he believed, certain principles upon which its worship was based, and these were inviolable. As he once said in discussing some of the vagaries of the "Romanesque" party in the Church: "What I am appealing for is a return to *principle* all round."

Anglican worship must be controlled by the two great principles

of Scripture and Antiquity. To go beyond that was just as dishonest and intolerable as to play fast and loose with the Creeds. This can be illustrated from his attitude towards the practice known as "the Invocation of Saints". Gore himself confessed that to invite the prayers of the saints had been a joy of his own devotional life for a great many years; but he could not allow it to become a part of the public worship of the Church. Since there is no authority for this practice either in Scripture or in the Primitive Church, it must be regarded, not as an article of faith, but as a pious opinion; and since public worship is based not on pious opinions but on an authoritative doctrine and liturgy the Invocation of Saints "cannot be, with us any more than with the Ancient Church, a feature of our public worship". It was this conviction which made him oppose the *English Hymnal* and forbid its use in his diocese. "This hymnal represents", he wrote, "among other, and those excellent qualities, a deliberate intention of reintroducing invocations, and direct requests for the prayers, of the saints into our public services through the medium of hymns." I give this example, partly because we have just been celebrating the jubilee of this book, but mainly as an example of Gore's sense of discipline.

The third point at which discipline was necessary was in the use of the Sacraments by the laity. "The Church", wrote Gore, "is the household in which Christ's stewards dispense the food of God." Such food he believed to be vital to man's spiritual health. The Sacraments were not (as many believed then, and still do) "extras": they were the essentials of the spiritual life. To be a regular and frequent communicant was not only the privilege but also the *duty* of every member of the Christbearing Church. This, to Gore's mind, was how Christ intended that the Church should act and progress be made. Those who failed to do this, through ignorance or pride or any other cause, were scarcely within the "household" at all—like wayward adolescent children who consistently fail to turn up to family meals. The idea, therefore, that a Christian layman could be *excused* from participation in the sacramental worship of the Church and still be thought as good a Churchman as anyone else, was abhorrent to Gore. It denied the very basis of his faith—that Incarnational Religion demanded both a Visible Church and Sacramental Worship.

When, therefore, in 1919, the question of lay representation in the new National Assembly of the Church was being discussed,

Gore had no shadow of doubt that the only right qualification for the franchise, that is to say, the test of a responsible Churchman, was that a man should be a communicant, and such was indeed recommended by the Selborne Committee. But the majority of the bishops were against this, and the Representative Church Council, by a considerable majority, substituted Baptism for Confirmation. Gore was in despair. It cut the ground from his feet. All that he had stood for in regard to the necessity of a *Sacramental* Religion seemed to be sacrificed in favour of a *national* religion; the Church was no longer to be regarded as the Extension of the Incarnation, obedient to Christ in the dispensing of his gifts and in the observing of his commands, but as little more than a man-made society for mutual support and moral progress. In other words, Dr Hatch was coming into his own, and all that Gore had taught was being ignored.

So deeply did Gore feel about this that he felt he must resign his bishopric.

But Gore did not fail. It is true that he failed to carry the Church with him on this point; but, in other ways his influence was deep and lasting.

I began with the Oxford Movement and its Doctrine of the Church. But the Oxford Movement, having laid the foundations, needed strong and wise men to continue the rebuilding which they had begun. At first it seemed as if the initiative was to be taken only by the "ritualists" who were so passionately keen on reform of worship that they were prepared to go to prison rather than give up their ideas and ideals. What was needed was a leader who would be able to take up the teaching of the Tractarians and present it to the next generation with increased force and persuasion. This the Church was given in Charles Gore; and whatever we may think of his doctrine we can hardly fail to pay tribute to his sincerity, his courage, and his strength. And when the religious history of the last hundred years can be seen in its true proportions I have no doubt that the greatness of Charles Gore will be recognized and proclaimed.

THE MORAVIAN COMMUNITIES IN BRITAIN

W. H. G. ARMYTAGE

"THEY are more like the Primitive Christians than any other church now in the world, for they retain both the faith, practice and discipline delivered by the Apostles. They live together in perfect love and peace. They are more ready to serve their neighbours than themselves. In their business they are diligent and industrious, in all their dealings strict and conscientious. In everything they behave themselves with great meekness, sweetness and simplicity." So in 1738 Benjamin Ingham, an inquisitive, wealthy, and conscientious Yorkshire clergyman, described Herrnhut. He was not the only one to be impressed. James Hutton, a bookseller of Temple Bar, was too. Both were friends of John Wesley. Ingham had travelled to Georgia with him five years before and Hutton had met him at Oxford and acted as host to him before he went to Georgia. Hutton met Ingham and then Zinzendorf, the founder of Herrnhut, together with Boehler who, as much as anyone, turned Wesley into an evangelist.

Boehler came to see Hutton and drew up rules for his "society" on 1 May 1738, enabling it to become a self-governing democratic body where "everyone without distinction, submitted to the determination of his brethren". It flourished and Hutton was obliged to hire a Baptist House known as the Great Meeting House in Fetter Lane to accommodate the members.

In the following year, another Moravian, John Toelschig, paid a brief visit, at Ingham's invitation, to Yorkshire. He was followed by Spangenberg who made his headquarters at Smith House, near Halifax, where, every Saturday, Yorkshire Moravians would meet for a midday meal or "love feast". Three years later, in February 1743, the great Zinzendorf arrived.

2

Zinzendorf founded the first Moravian community in England. He was visiting the sick child of a Moravian missionary at Pudsey when

he found himself looking over a rough briar-covered tract known as Lamb's Hill. The vista impressed him. He told Ingham, who bought it in January 1744, giving part for buildings and part on a yearly rent for cultivation (later he granted it to the community for five hundred years). The site was consecrated in 1746 and a chapel built, together with a house for a minister. Snetzler, at that time the most eminent organ-builder in England, built an organ for it. In five years a labourers', a sisters', and a brethren's house were built, and on Easter Day 1753 several thousand persons gathered together at Lamb's Hill for a ceremonial opening. As it was being built, the Fulneck settlement was visited by John Wesley who, ten years before, had been a member of the Moravian community at Fetter Lane Chapel, London. (The membership he retained for two years, leaving them only when he established the "Methodist" society.) In his diary Wesley wrote: "It is on the side of a hill, commanding all the vale beneath, and the opposite hill. The front is exceedingly grand, though plain, being faced with smooth white stone. The Germans suppose it will cost by the time it is finished about three thousand pounds. It is well if it be not nearer ten. But it is no concern of the English brethren. They are told (and patently believe) that 'all the money will come from beyond the sea'."

Wesley's discription was quite accurate—the brethren from beyond the sea did contribute. The German branch sent money, and the Norwegians sent timber.

Fulneck was a real community. A clothing-business was begun in 1748, followed by a worsted and glove factory, a farm, a tailor's shop, and a shoemaker's, operated by the men of the community. The sisters helped with needlework and hosiery. Each trade was called a diacony. It was Herrnhut in England and its organization bears some examination. At Fulneck business and trade were conducted by diaconies for the benefit of the whole congregation. Thus James Charlesworth, a single brother, was appointed manager or "deacon" of a cloth weaving factory which not only kept a number of other single brothers actively employed but did a great trade with Portugal and Russia. Other diaconies were organized in the shape of a bakery, a glove factory, an inn, and a general store. The profits from these diaconies (for all engaged in them only received a salary) went to augment the funds of the congregation. Even single sisters made the community famous by their needlework and their marble-paper.

If its economic law was rigid, its moral law was frigid. Elders alone could allow a member to spend a night away from the community. Single brothers slept in one dormitory, rose at the same hour, and said prayers before breakfast. Single sisters all wore the same uniform of black, grey, or brown, with a white three-cornered shawl. A single brother wishing to marry a single sister could not lift an eye, much less a hand, to the other without permission of the elders.

These elders were the ministers, three "labourers", one single brother, one single sister, and a widow. In their monthly meetings they supervised the morality of the congregation by Christian precept or, where that was ambiguous, by "the lot". This "lot" was an old custom of the Moravians dating back to 1467, when they nominated their first synod by slips of paper placed in a vase. It was regarded as the authentic voice of God and was only abolished in 1857. It had been used by Zinzendorf when, on 7 January 1731, he had placed two texts in a box, 1 Cor. 11. 21 and 2 Thess. 2. 15, as to whether or no the Moravian church should be renewed. The lot, as used at Fulneck, consisted of a box of Christian texts presented to the questioner, who thus selected the authentic, divine ruling on a moral problem.

Zinzendorf believed in it so firmly that he always carried around with him a little green book with detachable leaves, each inscribed with a text, so that in a dilemma he could pull out a leaf at random for guidance.

Below the elders in the hierarchy were the choir elders, an advisory body. These consisted of members of the "choirs" also established by Zinzendorf. Each choir had its separate age and status group: married people, widowers, widows' choir, single brethren, single sisters, youths, great girls, little boys, little girls, and infants in arms. The "choirs" of the womenfolk were distinguished by the ribbons in their caps: blue for married women, white for widows, pink for young women, and red for girls under eighteen. These choirs supplanted in many respects a normal family. All premises and finances were managed by a third body, the elective congregation committee. Descending the hierarchy from this came the large helpers' conference, consisting of the committee, the elders' conference, and others. Finally came the congregation council, elected by the congregations. Needless to say all elections were confirmed by "the lot".

3

Meanwhile, the Fetter Lane Society under Hutton and Charles Wesley was thriving. John Wesley, though he originally delighted in it, soon became disgusted, partly because he himself was refused communion, partly because he disliked the tone of the preaching. Zinzendorf tried to reconcile him, but failed.

Zinzendorf was determined to "settle" the London congregation, and on 20 April 1750 he bought Lindsey House, the property of the Duke of Ancaster, and the adjoining Beaufort House, signing the contract with Sir Hans Sloane eight days later. A chapel and a minister's house were built, the mansion itself renovated, and a cemetery laid out. Plans were laid to establish a settlement with choir houses and other dwellings, and over £12,000 was spent so that it soon became a busy Moravian headquarters. Aptly enough it had once belonged to Sir Thomas More, whose *Utopia*, published two hundred and thirty-four years before, might well have provided the Brethren with a historical precedent.

From Chelsea Zinzendorf launched a campaign for the imposition of discipline, as opposed to religion, on would-be Moravians in England. He published a *Consolatory Letter to Members of the Societies that are in Some Connection with the Brethren's Congregation* in 1752, pointing out that he would not accept converts who refused to join Moravian communities. Moravians, he said, could only receive brothers with caution, and could not accept converts from other churches who would not observe the strict socio-religious code he had prescribed.

Zinzendorf had to fight a campaign, for the Moravians were coming under fire. The communistic nature of their communities perplexed even the open-minded Earl of Shelburne, that detached figure who was known to his age as the "Jesuit of Berkeley Square". Invading Germans with their strange names were obvious targets for the xenophobic sniper and it was not long before accusations of treachery were levelled against them. At Fulneck, Gussenbauer was arrested; he was tried at Wakefield and imprisoned in York Castle. At Broadoaks in Essex, where a Moravian school had been established, the brethren were accused of being adherents of the Young Pretender and of housing barrels of gunpowder; a mob from nearby Thaxted soon surrounded the Moravian school and tried to force an entry. Their communal meals or "love feasts" were regarded as immoral; their conventual lives as Catholic aberrations. They were

PLATE III
MORAVIAN BUILDINGS IN & NEAR LONDON.
LONDON
PLAN OF THE PROPOSED MORAVIAN SETTLEMENT AT CHELSEA. (LINDSEY HOUSE, ASTRE'S HOUSE & 1760)
LINDSEY HOUSE AS RESTORED IN 1753
THE THAMES

also accused of kidnapping single women for their settlements and of proselytizing either for the Papacy or for a pope of their own.

Charges against them had been made in the House of Commons in 1749. It was said that they were antinomians who dismissed "duties" as immaterial and regarded "faith" alone as a necessary justification of life. One M.P. pointed out how dangerous it was to have Moravians discouraging their converts from bearing arms.

For those whose opinions were shaped by theological pamphlets, the charge of antinomianism was a severe one. Wesley particularly pressed it home in two pamphlets, *A Short View of the Difference between the Moravian Brethren, lately in England and The Rev. Mr John and Charles Wesley* and *A Dialogue between an Antinomian and his Friend.*

Luckily, however, the industry and piety of the Moravians had already won them the support of great national figures like General Oglethorpe and, with the support of certain Anglican bishops, restrictive legislation on their activities in the colonies was removed.

Criticism, however, was relatively unimportant to the disaster that occurred in 1752. The English diaconies had invested £67,000 with a Portuguese Jew called Gomez Serra who in 1752 suddenly stopped payment. This loss, coupled with an existing debt of £30,000 incurred in their heavy building programme, led the great preacher Whitefield to accuse Zinzendorf of robbery and fraud, and his followers of practising rites which had no sanction in the New Testament.

Zinzendorf rallied magnificently. Not only did he pledge himself for the whole amount, but his followers, inspired by his example, rallied round him and proved Whitefield to be wrong.

Of the many anti-Moravian pamphlets, that of Lavington, the Bishop of Exeter, was most violent. In *The Moravians Compared and Detected* (1754) he compared them to swine. To Lavington the feasts of the Moravians appeared as debauches of the worst kind. He was followed by John Wesley who, in *Queries to Count Zinzendorf* (1755), issued a clear challenge to Zinzendorf to explain himself. This Zinzendorf now did. So did Hutton. In eight pamphlets they disposed of the charges of forgery and debauchery. They also published a hymn book, an important addition to Christian worship (since the Anglicans only sang psalms), which certainly had its effect on its day and age, and stressed the adoration of Christ in Christian worship. They also published the rules of their order, *Statutes: or*

the General Principles of Practical Christianity, extracted out of the New Testament (1755). This pocket guide to souls for walking in the life of the Spirit was a necessary astringent. It marks the high tide of Moravian influence in England.

4

This high tide floated two more Moravian communities, one in Ireland and one in Lancashire.

In 1755 a congregation of brethren settled at Gloonen in Northern Ireland where Cennick, a Methodist turned Moravian, had been active for nine years. Unfortunately the lease was a short one, and three years later, when Brother Horne got the opportunity of a long lease of 200 acres from Charles O'Neill, he took it. The families on the site withdrew on 20 November 1759, and the Moravians came in and began to build with great energy. A house for the single brethren was built first and by 7 November 1760 was occupied by brethren from Gloonen. This new site was renamed Gracehill.

At Gracehill the land was levelled for larger buildings. A cemetery was laid out in 1761, and a minister's house and chapel were built in 1765. In good weather on 12 March 1765 a special liturgy was held at Bally Kennedy where the assembled choirs sang "Oh how amiable thy habitations are!" and the healing beams of the Sun of Righteousness were the theme of the address. A house for the single sisters followed in 1766, which held fifty sisters and two overseers.

Expansion was rapid. The original house for the single brethren proved inadequate, and a fresh one was built by 1768 to house thirty brethren. A congregation shop was finished by 1783; it succeeded so well that it was enlarged after seven years and after another seven had to find larger premises. Day schools were built in 1788, a girls' boarding school in 1790 (exempt from window tax), and in 1805 a boarding school for boys was built by Hartley and Montgomery. In 1819 a third larger building was erected for the single brethren.

The community was housed in a large square, with cross-roads north and south from and to the open country. The centre was planted with shrubbery, bounded by beds with forest trees at intervals and gravelled walks. It existed as such from 1777, and became such an integral part of the landscape that it escaped pillage in the 1799 rebellion.

But its very success as a community was fatal to the cause of

Moravianism, for, as an unnamed, but friendly, historian of the settlement wrote:

> As soon as Gracehill began to assume the form and to establish the institutions of a Moravian village, the supervision, practical utility, and religious purpose of the plan and its agencies very much engrossed the attention of the clerical faculty, and there was a partial collapse of that gospel spreading instrumentation which had brought the true light and God's saving health to the north of the Island.

A second and less ambitious English community had been tentatively begun in 1743, at Dukinfield, near Manchester, when "choirs" were organized in private houses. This *ad hoc* arrangement continued for fourteen years, when a house for single brethren was obtained. The settlement prospered, and in 1758 a single brethren's and single sisters' house was first built, then enlarged. A trombone band was formed, a school for girls built in 1760, and another for boys in 1766. By 1771 more land was necessary.

Unfortunately, however, the brethren at Dukinfield had the same trouble as their brethren at Gloonen: the land was leasehold and on a precarious life-lease at that. It was therefore decided to settle elsewhere. Various sites were inspected, and in 1779 Bishop Watteville bought a fifty-three acre farm at Droylsden. Joseph Saxon and his family moved in, measures were taken to level the land, brick kilns were built, and Brother John Lees of Ashton undertook to be the inspector and paymaster of the work. The brethren of Dukinfield contributed generously, and seemed reconciled to the fact that their settlement was a gathering place preparatory to the accomplishment of the Lord's place elsewhere.

On 9 June 1784 the foundation stones of the chapel and the choir houses were laid by Benjamin de la Trobe in the presence of a large crowd of spectators. The settlement, consisting of the chief buildings, burial ground, and thirteen (later seventeen) private houses, was completed in May 1785. So the great exodus from Dukinfield to the new community could take place two months later.

The new community was called Fairfield and cost £6,000, which was borrowed from Herrnhut. In addition to this, several members built houses on their own account. Two-thirds of the cost was taken in by the chapel and choir houses. It was worth it, for it housed 110 communicant members, 22 single brethren, and 45 single sisters. At its formal consecration on 17 July of that year, a great divine service was held with two bands, one from Fulneck, the other from Fairfield.

We are fortunate in having a description of this community as it appeared in 1795, from Dr Aitkin:

> Though established within these ten years, it has the appearance of a little town. There is a large and commodious chapel with an excellent organ. The ground plot is laid out with great taste and judgement; it forms a large square. The chapel and some large dwelling houses well-built of brick form the front. On each side of the chapel are two deep rows of dwelling houses; on the back front, behind the chapel, is a row of elegant large houses. These, with the chapel, form a large square mass of buildings, round which is a broad paved street, and the whole is flagged round. On the other side of the street is another row of excellent buildings, which surround the whole, except the front; at a short distance from which is a fine row of kitchen gardens, and opposite to the chapel, a large burying ground, the whole divided and surrounded with quickset hedges. One of the houses is a convenient inn with stabling, etc., for the accommodation of those who frequent the place. The neatness of the whole has a very pleasing appearance, and the place is frequented by numbers from Manchester . . .
>
> The cotton manufacture forms a principal part of the employment of the inhabitants, including spinning, weaving, etc. Tambour and fine needlework is carried to a great pitch of perfection and is chiefly sent to London; there are also in this settlement, tailors, shoemakers, bakers and a sale shop for most articles, as well as for the convenience of the settlement as for the neighbourhood. The Manchester, Ashton, and Oldham canal (completed 1794) comes close to this place, which will be of infinite advantage to it, as well for the carrying of goods to and from Manchester and Ashton, as for procuring a supply of coals nearly as cheap as at the port.

At Fairfield schools grew. A boys' school was built in 1790, Sunday schools in 1793, a girls' boarding school in 1796. The first and third obtained new buildings in 1871 and 1876. Day schools established in 1796 persisted till 1854 when they and the Sunday schools shared a new building.

As for the former settlement at Dukinfield, Dr Aitkin remarked, "It now looks like a deserted village", adding:

> Between the lodge and the Dissenters Chapel lies a neat chapel belonging to the Moravians, furnished with an organ, adjoining it is a very extensive range of buildings, once inhabited by an orderly and industrious colony of that fraternity, who carried on a variety of trades and occupations, erected at great expence under promises that leases would be renewed.

Yet at Dukinfield a boys' boarding and day school was built, and

thanks to Charles Hindley, later M.P. for Ashton, they obtained new buildings in 1844, whilst the chapel was twice rebuilt, in 1825 and in 1860.

6

Fulneck, Gracehill, Fairfield: these three were the only communities which survived into the nineteenth century. Chelsea, for which Zinzendorf had such a grand design, was, with the exception of the chapel, minister's house, and burial ground, sold in 1774. Zinzendorf had by then been dead for fourteen years.

Chelsea was in a very real sense the graveyard of Moravian hopes. There, Cennick, Hutton, Boehler, and La Trobe lie buried.

When Zinzendorf died in Chelsea in 1760, it was Benjamin de la Trobe who succeeded him. La Trobe was manager of the Brethren's English finances for the next twenty-one years. His writings and his friendships healed the breaches between Moravians and Methodists. As a friend of Dr Johnson, Rowland Hill, John Newton, Charles Wesley, Hannah More, and Bishop Porteous, he made Moravianism respectable, but in doing so he cauterized its further growth by insisting, with the German brethren, on Communitarianism—or the principle of "United Flocks".

The nuclei, like Fulneck, Fairfield, and Gracehill, were Ockbrook (for the Midlands), Bedford (for the South Midlands), Haverfordwest (for Wales), Ayr (for Scotland), and Tytherton (for the West of England). Each of these latter five were aborted communities. Yet they irradiated their regions and a number of preaching places were established. Had these preaching places developed into congregations, the Moravian church might have had a history comparable with that of other dissenting denominations. But the Brethren refused to abandon community ideas. All full members of the church had to sign a "Brotherly Agreement" not to proselytize from any other denomination, to do all in their power to help the Anglican Church, and to submit to the full discipline of the communities. Marriage, education, social welfare, and business were, for Moravians, to be under the control of the elders. The rules were to be read aloud to them once a year, and all who did not obey them were to be expelled. The "lot" was retained, even for ascertaining whether or no a person had a vocation.

Ingham had long since separated from them. He took with him about eighty congregations, who henceforward called themselves

Inghamites. In 1755 he had attended the annual conference of the Wesleys at Leeds. While Charles Wesley was willing to accept his followers, John was not agreeable and the idea was rejected. Ingham died in 1772, having seen many of his followers become Sandemanians.

7

The most developed Fulneck, became an educational rather than economic community. At Fulneck the boys' school prospered. In 1818 it was extended and in the following year the inn was given up as a business. The cloth manufacturing was abandoned in 1837, the bakery business in 1846, and in 1869 the bakehouse and adjoining block were removed. And it was as a school that its characteristics were transmitted to posterity through its pupils. James Montgomery (who entered in 1777) was one of the great hymn writers in the English language; Richard Oastler (who entered in 1798) did much to secure the passage of the Ten Hours Bill in 1847. Christian Ignatius La Trobe, elder son of the Benjamin who had inaugurated the Fulneck Community, provided William Wilberforce with the facts and figures to be used in the campaign against slavery, whilst his younger brother Benjamin Henry La Trobe has been credited by Talbot Hamlin recently with having "almost single-handed" created in the United States "the true professional attitude in the art of building".

The art of building communities too, was another legacy of the Moravians to the nineteenth century. For, when John Minter Morgan, the real founder of the Christian Socialist movement, launched his scheme for "self-supporting villages" under the "superintendence" of the Established Church, he looked to the Moravians as an exemplar. And it was one of his recruits, James Silk Buckingham who, at a meeting of the Church of England Self-Supporting Village Society on 27 May 1846 said: "The benefits resulting, in the Moravian settlements, from a more intimate connection between secular and religious affairs . . . encourage a well-grounded hope that associations of the unemployed poor, under the direction of intelligent members of our own pure and reformed church . . . would realise advantages still more important." Every student of the town-planning movement knows that James Silk Buckingham gave to the world, two years afterwards, the first complete and concrete scheme for a garden city, a scheme

which exercised in its turn a profound influence over Ebenezer Howard, the instigator of Letchworth (1903) and Welwyn Garden City (1919). Continuing the chain of influence, one could say that the New Towns Act of 1947 marks the acceptance of these ideas by the government.

Thus Fulneck, Gracehill, and Fairfield, regarded from the comfortable hindsight of the Welfare State, were gallant social gestures. As such, they deserve as much consideration as some of the other, less reputable if more imposing, memorials of the eighteenth century.

ETHICS AND REASON

IAN RAMSEY

PROFESSOR GINSBERG'S lecture[1] is concerned with the relation between the empirical and rational elements in ethics, the relation between "experience" and "reason" in moral behaviour. If this distinction seems bewildering, the reader can take heart from the candid confessions he will find on pages 7 and 11. Not only are "the words 'reason', 'rationalist', 'rational', like the word 'positivism', highly ambiguous and emotion-laden", but "even in the more technical philosophical discussions" the terms are "far from clear". Can we find any other way, then, of describing Professor Ginsberg's endeavour; can we find any clearer way of expressing his theme?

When I say to someone, "You ought to do so-and-so", or when I describe some situation as "good", or "valuable", Professor Ginsberg would rightly distinguish at least four questions that we could ask in regard of such an assertion:

1. How far does it gather together certain instincts, attitudes, feelings, or desires?

2. How far does it arise from a "direct and immediate apprehension" centred on the particular situation in question?

3. How far does the assertion follow from general principles which have somehow or other been "intuited" or seen as "self-evident"?

4. How far have I reached my assertion as a result of a reasoned argument not only about the possibility and suitability of various "means", but even about the particular "end" in question?

It is such questions as these which any discussion of the relations between reason and experience in ethics inevitably raises. Those who have been called "rationalists", those who have wished to emphasize the place of reason in ethics, have been those who have concerned themselves either with question 3 or (more generally) with question 4. Some "rationalists" have even gone further and urged that "the knowledge of right and wrong" is *itself* "capable of

influencing, if not necessarily determining, action" (p. 9). The "empiricist", on the other hand, eager to emphasize the close dependence of ethics on "facts" of one kind and another, would be concerned certainly with question 1 and (quite often) with question 2 as well.

No moral philosopher has been, or indeed could have been, entirely "rationalist" or "empiricist", and, as Professor Ginsberg shows by reference to Lord Russell, "those who hold that reason has nothing to do with the choice of ends" may nevertheless, before they finish, have evolved "a rationalism of their own". Professor Ginsberg points out that though Russell thinks "that the ends of action are given by desire, and that the basis of moral judgements is to be found in emotions of approval and disapproval and the feeling of enjoyment, he claims, nevertheless, that it is possible to build up a theory of ethical propositions which are true (or false) in the same sense as if they were propositions of science". In short, if Lord Russell's interests begin with question 1, he concludes by giving an answer to question 4, and indeed such an explicit answer as would say that ethical argument is at its best scientific. There is, of course, no necessary criticism of Russell here; what the example shows is how difficult it is to divide moral philosophers into "rationalists" and "empiricists", and criticism, if criticism be deserved, would centre on that distinction and not on Russell.

In this kind of way, then, we have to recognize from the outset that while the four questions we have formulated show the kind of issue that Professor Ginsberg's lecture is concerned with, the questions are by no means separate. Indeed, the whole lecture argues for a particular view of their inter-relation—certainly the inter-relation of questions 1 and 4. Much less is said about questions 2 and 3.

Professor Ginsberg spends some time, at the beginning, with a form of rationalism which, while having a necessary basis in facts, has nevertheless, and indeed for that very reason, been suspect. This is the view that moral assertions are given to us as scientific generalizations of one kind or another, a view with close similarities to that of Russell's which we have mentioned above. Against such a view, Hume and Poincaré (to take the two examples Ginsberg gives) both claim that no one can legitimately argue from "judgements of fact", to "judgements of value", from "is" to "ought". Or, as Poincaré says, from the "principles of science" we "will never

obtain a proposition which says, 'do this', or 'do not do that'; that is a proposition confirmed or contradicted by morality". There is on the one hand sociology and the natural sciences; on the other hand ethics, with no logical bridge across the gulf. Now if one begins with an absolute distinction between "facts" and "values", if we begin with such a dichotomy, we certainly *never* will legitimately argue from one to the other. But is there, after all, any very plain demarcation? Does not every *situation* have *both* its "facts" *and* its "values", so that no matter how differently these can be talked of or treated, there must, *since they belong to the one situation, be some kind of connection between them*? There is a road accident, and the doctor living nearby leaves his game of bridge to minister to the wounded. Here is an exceedingly complex group of facts: a pattern extending over drawing room and road, cards and bandages, coffee and blood. Each in its own way exerts a certain "value-claim" on us. But to the doctor (supposing he leaves, not with a thankful relief to be saved from a boring game, but in response to a genuine "call of duty") the maximum value claim is exerted by certain complex sub-group centering on a "person" on the road, rather than the bridge-party. On the other hand, if the doctor were playing bridge because of its therapeutic value on a player-patient who (as a scientific fact) might have a relapse if the game were suddenly terminated, then the maximum value-claim might lie elsewhere. And so on . . .

In ways like this, and within *one situation*, values and facts are inextricably linked. Whether we "ought" or "ought not" depends very much on what a thing "is" or "is not". *Is* and *ought*, science and ethics, while being distinguishable, are also connected. In short, I have myself never been over-awed by Hume's claim which was the outcome of an empirical theory of knowledge where "facts" were supposed to be no more than cosmic tiddly-winks with "values" housed somewhere else if (and the alternative is significant) housed anywhere at all. To separate "facts" from "values" may lead to a high view of ethics: it may equally lead to no ethics at all.

I am a little alarmed, then, when Professor Ginsberg uses the phrase *sui generis* of ethics, which might well imply a logically unbridgeable gulf between facts and values. This, however, I am glad to say, he for the most part denies, allowing only to Hume the point that rational enquiry cannot "create morality or derive the moral from the non-moral", where the important words are

"create" and "derive". No one can ever reasonably expect to begin with purely indicative assertions and end with moral ones. But this does not mean that the kind of assertions ethics deals with are not *in part* indicative and *in part* valuational. I agree wholeheartedly with Professor Ginsberg when he says that there can be no criticism of ethics which takes moral judgements as it finds them, "to elicit the assumptions latent in them, and the categories employed by them, and to discover whether any fundamental principles can be formulated, whereby actual morality might be made more coherent and systematic". Further, since moral judgements relate to and talk about certain specific situations, i.e. certain groups of facts, then "a knowledge of the relevant facts is of the greatest importance for the study of morality". It is obvious, though that is not to say that it is not often overlooked, that if anyone is to make a moral judgement about a situation it is of the first importance for him to know the "facts" of that situation as clearly as ever he can. Often "we need fuller knowledge than we possess of human needs and potentialities, and in particular of the ways in which the means to their fulfilment, including the modes of distribution, are likely to affect the ends and ideals aimed at". Far too frequently are the facts involved in moral decision "taken for granted" and Professor Ginsberg takes as a special example the morality of sex. He shows that even the intuitionists (and he takes Dean Inge as an example of them) cannot away with certain psychological and sociological circumstances. After all, intuitions terminate in the facts of certain situations; and no intuition belonging to a situation S^1 can be unaffected by the fact (if fact it be) that S^1 belongs to and is part of a wider situation S^2, which includes more "relevant" facts. Professor Ginsberg's conclusion of this discussion is, it seems to me, immensely important: "I am not suggesting that ethical differences would necessarily all disappear when the relevant facts are better known. But I have no doubt that the area of disagreement would be reduced and that, at the very least, there would be a better chance of discovering what the disagreements are about." Here is implied both the possibility and necessity of checking "intuitions".

So far then, Ginsberg has been urging that ethics must, more than has sometimes been realized, gather together by the help of biology, psychology, sociology, and the rest, more and more details of the situations whose "facts" are also value-bearing—in this way ethics

must have a strong "empirical" bias. On the other hand, Ginsberg believes that when this empirical gathering together has been done, ethics will be sufficiently "rational" to detect some conformity, some similarity of pattern, between all the situations it calls "good", all duties which it claims "ought to be done". But this of course is to bring us at once up against the variability of moral judgements from age to age and from civilization to civilization. Allowing for all the variety and variability of moral judgements, can we ever hope to detect rationally a uniform pattern that we could legitimately call, for example, moral improvement or moral development?

Ginsberg believes that we can, and most of the second half of this lecture is concerned with enumerating "five closely related but distinguishable criteria" by which moral systems can be compared. In other words, the more the pattern of a moral judgement exhibits features in accordance with these criteria, the "better"—the "more developed"—will it be. The five criteria are as follows:

1. Any morality is so much the better the more it sees "goodness (as) self-sustained and independent of external sanctions".

2. Any moral judgement is the better the more it can be "universalized".

3. A moral system is all the "higher" if it can allow for what Ginsberg calls "comprehensiveness", but what we might call "flexibility" or "synthesis of opposites". His point is that "the higher systems find room for spontaneity and control, self-fulfilment and self-denial, personal and social good. Richer in content, they are more sensitive and differentiated in response". They hold together "conflicting claims and diverse interests . . . rebel and innovator".

4. Any moral judgement is the better the more it belongs to a system showing "coherence" and "systematic connectedness". At the same time, Ginsberg is anxious not to overstress the importance of systematic connectedness so far as to look for logical unification in a deductive scheme. There can be, as Mill said of Comte, "an inordinate desire for unity". But after all, there has to be a broad consistency and a measure of coherence between various moral judgements.

5. A moral system which shows "capacity for self-criticism and self-direction" is better than one which does not. A moral system is all the better the more "impartial investigation of the

facts and critical scrutiny of the ends to be pursued is allowed to shape public policy".

Professor Ginsberg rightly notes that "advance as estimated by one of the criteria . . . does not necessarily imply advance in the direction of the others". For example "a system may be internally coherent, but narrow and exclusive, and thus fail in universality. Again, a system may be comprehensive in the sense of covering a wide variety of needs and interests, but rely on coercion and other external sanctions, and thus fail to satisfy the criterion of differentiation." Even so, for Ginsberg it is important that the various criteria can be rationally elucidated at all, and in their very emergence is a justification of what he calls later "the rationalist assumption". This assumption "is that such comparison and evaluation of the forms of life is logically impossible, and that despite the diversity of moral codes, general principles are discoverable which are implicit in all of them, and which come to be recognized as universally binding in the course of development". In this connection, he notes that reason has also a three-fold function in relation to "ideals". These it can "clarify and define", "show their relations to each other", and formulate "the conditions . . . upon which they depend for their realization". Once again, we come back to an earlier theme when we recognize how much of this work is at the same time "factual", requiring, as it does, the aid of the social and natural sciences.

So Professor Ginsberg can claim both a certain sympathy with Comte and an important difference from him. In so far as Comte believed "that ethics has to be firmly rooted in our knowledge of human nature and human history", and in so far as he held that morality must be "self-authenticated"—depending on no external sanctions, Ginsberg would go with him. But he would criticize Comte in so far as he does not allow for any distinctiveness about value judgements (I think it is better to put the matter in this way rather than to speak of the *sui generis* character of ethics) and—something which is another aspect of the same point—is guilty of precisely that form of argument from indicative to moral assertions which Hume and others would rightly attack.

Looking back over the lecture, and besides the various points that we have already raised, there are for the Christian moralist one or two questions of perhaps special significance which I might here set out:

1. We can surely agree that *moral judgements* must inevitably benefit from the knowledge that sociology and the natural sciences can supply. At any rate, such knowledge is certainly a *necessary* condition for making a reliable moral judgement.

2. But equally certainly such knowledge is *not* of and in itself *sufficient*. Will it be enough, in making a moral judgement, to see the sociological and psychological details of a situation clearly? No: for a moral judgement is distinctive in being concerned with the *values* which these facts, whose relevance is revealed by the social and natural sciences, exhibit. But those who grasp the *same* facts, will they inevitably intuit in the particular situation the same value-claim? It seems to me that the presupposition of any ethics which is "rational" in any sense whatever, depends on an affirmative answer being given to this "empirical" question. In this sense Comte would be both a good rationalist and a good empiricist when he suggests that "if we were more intelligent we should also be more moral, and if we were more moral, we should also be more intelligent". But this does *not* imply that we would give an affirmative answer to another related but different question: Does an appropriate *moral response* follow from every recognized value-claim? On the contrary, the Christian has always recognized the situation so notably expressed by St Paul: "The good that I would, I do not." And the question "Why?" is fearfully important. Even the irreligious must presumably take account of the disturbing influence exerted by all kinds of "non-rational" factors, and no discussion of the place of facts and reasoning in the moral life can overlook this stubborn feature of everyone's behaviour.

3. Has morality need of "supernatural sanctions"? Both Comte and Professor Ginsberg would say "No". "A command, whether it emanates from God, society, or ourselves, has to be justified, and the justification cannot lie in the mere fiat of anyone's will . . . There is no doubt an element of virtue in submission or abnegation. But to emphasize this element is to ignore the other and possibly the more important, of liberation and fulfilment." For my own part (though the story would be a long one) I would in the end agree with Ginsberg, and I would further admit that Christian ethics have sometimes been interpreted in a way that is open to the kind of objection he makes. But to deny that morality has need of "a supernatural sanction" does *not* deny that morality has some close links with religion.

What if a situation, besides having "facts", was not wholly exhausted even when these facts were seen to be "value-bearing"? Then, just as the social and natural sciences might give us important truth about the universe on which moral "insight" could build, so it might be argued that what ethics tells us about the situation could be set within an even wider scheme. The kind of principles which Professor Ginsberg would find implied by moral judgements, might even prove to include religious ideas, the kind of system we detect may prove to be in pattern theistic. In this way, without at all invoking theology in a way which Professor Ginsberg would reject, morality might nevertheless and inextricably be bound up with religion.

4. Certainly, I think Professor Ginsberg's view suggests a somewhat novel answer to the old question "What are Christian ethics?" In brief, this answer would say that for Christian ethics those situations which the Bible and Christian doctrine speak of, and which centre on the facts of Jesus of Nazareth, are brought alongside any particular situation as it has been portrayed in terms of the natural sciences, sociology, and the rest. In other words, Christian ethics would supplement the factual aspect of any situation we judge. Here would be a supplementary basis of "fact", and from the whole we would intuit a certain value-claim.

Further, as for "principles", Christian ethics might claim that the resulting moral judgements not only fit the general kind of five-fold pattern Professor Ginsberg elucidates, but a pattern which also involves categories of a theological kind, though I recognize that this theology could not then be sanctions-theology. Nay more: such a Christian ethics might well provide *some* kind of answer to the problem we raised under question 2—it might well inform moral behaviour with that power which *enables* appropriate action, moral *responses*, to follow moral *judgements*. Indeed, in so far as the Christian faith is based (and in however complex a fashion) on certain "facts", its power to influence action would, I should say, be that much stronger than the power which might be exercised, for example, by a fable. But that is to touch on other questions, affecting morality and religion, which contemporary philosophy is raising.

[1] *Reason and Experience in Ethics* (August Comte Memorial Trust Lecture). By Morris Ginsberg. Cumberlege. 6s.

REPARATION

The Sevenfold Pattern of Redemption

G. W. C. THOMAS

IT IS notorious that theories of the Atonement have divided thinkers more than they have united them.

To-day there is much unity of spirit among those engaged in the debate, though unity of doctrine seems as far to seek as ever. The ancient cleavage between Satisfaction theories on the one hand, and Moral (or Humanist) interpretations on the other, still stands. Meanwhile new interpretations and re-interpretations multiply on either side of the divide, and the need to grasp some cardinal concept, comprehending and uniting them all, becomes ever more insistent. Let it be granted that men are saved by the Cross of Christ, with or without any coherent idea of its meaning, just as men ate, drank, and were nourished before ever there was a theory of dietetics. Such an admission does not make either theology or dietetics superfluous. What the science of nutrition accomplished during the war was to ensure that the maximum benefit reached the maximum number from the food resources available. The task of theology is analogous. If it fails, some will still be saved in spite of the failure; but many will suffer spiritual malnutrition, many will starve. A fundamentalist theology of Atonement may bring some to the point of conversion, but it will achieve this at the cost of bewildering and frustrating many more. It raises more problems than it solves. A unified doctrine of the Atonement, coherent in all its parts, would be the greatest gift that theology could make to evangelism in our time. Is this asking the impossible?

I think not. So much exploratory work has been going on during the past fifty years that the time now appears ripe for such an attempt to be made. Our approach to the question which we have propounded will be analagous to that of Jesus in answer to that other cardinal question: "Which is the Great Commandment in the Law?" Just as in the marriage of two ancient precepts, "Love God and your neighbour", he discerned "the whole law and the

prophets", so may we, in the conjunction of two truths, made familiar to us by modern studies, discern the meaning of the Atonement.

These two truths, which like the twin poles of the Great Commandment down to the time of Jesus, have often been examined without reference to the direct relation between them, are (i) that sin is self-will, and (ii) that the essence of sacrifice is self-giving. The conjunction of the two gives us the clue to a doctrine of Reparation, or Restitution, in terms of value. "Reparation"[1] was the word used by Dr Kirk in *Essays Catholic and Critical* (1929). While paying high tribute to Moberley's theory of Christ as the Representative Penitent of humanity, Dr Kirk was equally emphatic that sin demands more than sorrow or apology. Even if we dismiss the concept of satisfaction as punishment, as many besides Moberley have done, we are bound to own that satisfaction in some other kind is due to those whom we have wronged, no matter how forgiving they may be. But in what kind? I believe that if we can define what Dr Kirk and subsequent enquirers left undefined, we shall at the same time discern the point at which all the widely divergent interpretations of the Cross meet and are reconciled.

Such an inquiry must begin, or begin anew, from God's purpose in creation, and the nature of the evil that has befallen it. Briefly then, the things which are seen exist to embody the values which are not seen, and "the greatest of these is Love". Men were created to love God and one another, but by their fall into selfishness[2] they have repudiated the very purpose for which they are and were created. (For, whatever the truth about evil in the cosmos at large, there is general agreement, to use Professor Hodgson's phrase, that sin is the "hard-core"[3] of it so far as man is concerned.) Once this is grasped it should begin to be apparent that the only "fit" restitution to the Creator for the self-will of the world, would be some act of self-giving, victorious over self-will at all points and reproducing itself at all points where man and nature are infected by evil. Such an act of reparation would put an end to the separation between creature and Creator and would therefore regenerate all that sin had ruined. No sooner do we state the need and the remedy in this way than we begin to think of Calvary, the one true, pure, immortal Sacrifice for the world's self-will. Redeeming Love overlays the irritant of evil with the Pearl of Great Price.

This concept of the Cross as satisfaction in terms of new values

for old, embodied in new deeds for old, and ultimately new worlds for old, has been obscured throughout history by theories of the Cross as punishment, inflicted and endured. Alike by those who propose and by those who oppose such theories, it has been generally accepted, (i) that satisfaction means the suffering of a penalty, and (ii) that all penalty means ultimately judicial punishment, even when it follows as result of the ordinary operations of cause and effect. There are mistakes in both these premisses. To take the second first: if I strike my head against a wall, I pay the penalty for my folly, but that is not the same thing as the penalty which the magistrate may later require of me for breaking the law of the land, and damaging someone else's property. Again, thrashing a child may afford satisfaction to some people, but a penitent child's little efforts to "make up" for its wrong-doing are satisfaction of another sort. We shall not understand the Atonement unless these distinctions are kept in the forefront of the mind, and every attempt is resisted to obscure them.

Indeed, in our fresh approach to the Atonement we do well to banish for a moment all imagery derived from the law courts, and begin again "as little children". To do this, as Professor Grensted once warned his Oxford students, we must not think of little children as if they were "little adults", as both Scholastic and Reformation divines were prone to do. Still less, shall we add, should we think of them as "little lawyers". A child's mind is much occupied by Love, as a lawyer's is by Law. When a law is broken the legal mind immediately tries to assess the situation in terms of crime and punishment. When a child's loving intimacy with its parent has been interrupted by selfishness, the little penitent is inspired to behave exactly as if it knew that selfishness creates a kind of spiritual deficit which can only be repaid by some fresh inventive work of love. It runs off on errands of its own devising; it brings fresh posies with words of contrition. Our little unfledged philosopher acts as though it discerned truths that are hidden from the wise: (i) that you cannot satisfy a law, no matter how much you may try to talk yourself into thinking that you are doing so, for a law is an abstract, impersonal thing as indifferent to us and our works as wood and stone; (ii) that what needs satisfying is the person whose law it is,[4] and what satisfies one will not satisfy another—money debts are repaid in money, spiritual debts incurred through selfishness can be repaid only in the currency of self-giving;

(iii) that satisfaction as punishment, and satisfaction as recompense, are incompatible. Punishment may correct, control, or modify evil conduct. But it cannot create new values or a new heart within us. And God can be satisfied with nothing less. Punishment is negative; Reparation is positive. Need we say more?

Our illustration from family life will take us one step further before we leave it. It is not an uncommon experience that the defection of one member of a family may be repaid by the devotion of another. Sir Walter Scott was under no obligation, legal or moral, to pay off the debts in which others had involved the family estate. Yet he did so. The Elder Brother in the Parable of the Prodigal Son felt under no sort of obligation to seek out the younger, or to offer any redress for the wrongs which the father had endured. But he would have been a truer son of his father had he done so, and the family unity would have been re-established and made stronger than before. God's will would have been done on earth as it is in heaven.

So much for the wrongs committed within the family circle. But who shall offer restitution for the selfishness of the whole world, so insidious, so all-pervading, ubiquitous, and immense that not one of us can of ourselves escape from it, let alone make amends for it? "We have no power of ourselves to help ourselves." The initiative passes to God. "God so loved that he gave his only begotten Son". The Son so loved that he came. His self-giving all the way from Bethlehem to Calvary is both the recompense for our self-will, and the foundation on which the New Order will be built. For Calvary is the very apex, the Alpha and Omega, of an age-long redemptive process which stretches right back to the beginning of the world, and forward to the consummation of all things. Every little victory of love or duty over selfishness prepared the way for it; the self-giving of the Beloved Community is the extension of it throughout history. It perfects and is perfected in them all. The Cross stands in time, but is the supreme decisive Act of the Love which is eternal, through which we enter into the Life which is Eternal. I cannot here forbear relating to Calvary in particular what Royce wrote so discerningly of the nature of atonement in general:

> No baseness or cruelty so deep shall enter our human world, but that loyal love shall in due course be able to oppose to just that traitorous deed its fit deed of Atonement. The new deed is so ingeniously conceived, so concretely practical in the good that it

accomplishes, that when you look down on the world after this new creative deed has been done in it, you say, first "this good deed was made possible by that treason", and second "the world as transformed by that creative deed is better than it would have been, had all else remained the same".[5]

Here is something more than the oft reiterated truth that God can bring good out of evil. Here, in germ, though Royce does not elicit it, is a doctrine of reparation, the pattern of redemption. Good and Evil are terms of value, and out of the collision between the two, as out of the collision between two stars, a new creation is born. The principle invites statement in the terms of Hegelian dialectic: Thesis, Good; Anti-thesis, Evil; new and higher Synthesis, some better thing than was there before the collision occurred. The same principle is even better expressed in terms of Love and its opposite; "Thesis, Love; Antithesis, selfishness; new and higher Synthesis self-giving", or new values for old. The self-giving that emerges in the struggle between Love and selfishness, is Love's recompense for the selfishness. The fact that this glorious atoning deed has to be done for me by another, before through Love I can claim and make it my own, makes it even more Love's handiwork than had I done it myself. The self-giving of the Second Adam is the only fit reparation for the self-will of the first. Indeed:

> There was no other good enough,
> To pay the price of sin.

His charity covers the multitude of our sins. On the Cross he claims us, and when we yield to his claim, we make him and all that he is and does our very own.

The Liturgy gives perfect expression in worship to this drama of redemption. The words of administration: "Take, eat this is my Body . . . this is my Blood", are answered with the words of oblation: "Here we offer and present unto thee, ourselves, our souls and bodies". We give ourselves to him who gave himself for us. Reparation, in the sense of restitution for our selfishness, is accompanied by reparation in another sense: the breach between man and God is repaired, the separation caused by selfishness is healed. The practical good that emerges in the event is seen not only in the inward realm of personal and spiritual values, but in the transformation of the material order through which the values are expressed. "The whole Creation groaneth and travaileth together in pain until now," wrote St Paul, "but shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children

of God." Nature and human nature alike are involved in the common redemption from their common ruin.

There are limits to all correspondences between things human and things divine. Our illustration from family life has been pressed as far as it will go, and must now be dropped. For a breach between parent and child, though serious enough in all consequence, does not involve nearly such dire consequences as a breach between man and his Maker. For God is not only Love: he is also Being. In him to love is to be, and to be is to love. Loving and Being are indivisible. What follows? If to love is to be, then to be selfish is to perish. It is not in spite of God's Love, but because he is Love, that selfishness spells self-destruction. This is a matter not of divine choice, but of divine necessity; it is something which God himself cannot alter without altering his own unchanging nature. With sin came death, says St Paul. Professor Quick and others have carefully weighed the difficulties posed by this religious conviction of the affinity between sin and death.[6] Death is universal. It reigned in creation before ever man appeared; and yet Professor Quick remains even more convinced after the inquiry than before that the self-will of men and rebel angels has something to do with it somewhere, at any rate in the forms in which we experience it. It is possible that death in a sinless world would be something different—the blissful migration of souls from terrestrial to celestial spheres. That would be "a consummation most devoutly to be wished". Death in the frightful forms with which we are but too well acquainted is another thing altogether. One of the blessings of redemption is that it changes the hideous face of mortality, and inspires the beauty which we even now behold in the deaths of the saints.

No one has lent more emphasis to what we may term the "organic" relation between sin and death than Professor Leonard Hodgson.[7] When he interprets divine wrath as divine revulsion against sin we agree without demur. Love and selfishness cannot mix; they can only fight it out with each other on their own terms, with their own choice of weapons, and at whatever cost. But what does Professor Hodgson mean when he writes: "If the created universe is so constructed that sin produces pain, this may be taken as an expression of God's wrath against sin"?[8] Does he suggest that God could possibly have constructed a universe in which sin did not produce pain, had he chosen so? Such a speculation summons to mind Dr C. S. Lewis's warning, in another context, against the

dangers of speculating that reality could be other than reality is, or could do other than reality does.[9] If, as we have recognized, in God Life and Love are ontologically one and indivisible, then selfishness will inevitably produce pain and death, whether God "chooses" it so or not, whether he likes it or not. Words like "wrath" and "punishment" have their place in the religious vocabulary, but unless we are constantly on guard they will prove extremely misleading when applied to the operations of spiritual cause and effect. Professor Hodgson recognizes this, for he qualifies his view of the relation between wrath and pain, by interpreting wrath further as the disorder which follows on God's dissociation of himself from our disobedience.[10] Luther, once the thought has been extracted from the Teutonic thunder by Dr Aulén, appears to have meant much the same thing. Wrath is one moment being represented as the righteous indignation of God against sin,[11] and the next as one of the enemies over which Christ gains the victory.[12] By divine antinomy God's eternal mercy gets the victory over his passing wrath, once he himself has borne our "punishment" upon the accursed tree. But why the antinomy? I utterly dissociate myself from the disobedience of my child who has just rushed across the road in defiance of orders, and been struck down by a passing bus. But let us never forget that the disaster, like the disobedience which led to it, is the child's doing, and not the expression of anybody's "wrath against disobedience", God's or mine. Likewise it is no limitation of God's freedom to confess that the disorder which we behold in creation is due to our misuse of ours. God is not the author of this anarchy; he endures it and cures it. He well knew, when he created man and made him free, exactly what he was doing, and what the consequences of the abuse of that freedom would be, not least to himself. Knowing this, humanly speaking, he decided the risk was worth the taking, and took it. "There has been a Cross in the Heart of God from the beginning." Life and Love are indivisible, so are sin and death. In fact, Luther nowhere comes nearer the truth than in those parts of his argument in which he envisages sin, suffering, and death as forming what we may call an unholy trinity of their own. The only way to stop that would be for God to turn himself into a different kind of God, which as Luther would say "is impossible". "Though we are faithless, he abideth faithful; for he cannot deny himself." That is why Sin is suicide.

To attribute to God's wrath the havoc which sin makes of his

creation, then forces an antinomy where none is required. It raises even graver problems over the sufferings of the innocent. Of these Professor Hodgson writes: "The impossibility of correlating actual pain with actual sin, is part of the distortion of God's creation, due to its infection by evil."[13] Now this qualification sounds like special pleading. If some suffering is due to the distortion of God's creative work, why not all suffering? Is not the suffering no less than the sin part of the evil distortion? Even when the scripture speaks of God as using and subduing evil, there is but one place where it even remotely suggests that he invented it; and this was written at a time when men still attributed to the direct act of the Almighty the chaos which we create for ourselves (Isa. 45. 7; cf. Amos 3. 6). There is no other challenge at all to the triumphant conviction of Genesis that "God saw all that he had made, and behold it was very good". Look at the world situation in that light, and it still remains true that sin produces suffering (as it obviously does). It still remains true that God turns both selfishness and pain into material to feed his self-giving. It still remains true that the pain which is the self-inflicted punishment of the wicked becomes for the righteous the way of redemption. But our diagnosis will have delivered us from two agonizing difficulties: (i) that of believing that God wrecked his own glorious creation as an expression of his wrath against sin, either by direct action or by disowning his creation; (ii) that of attributing the martyrdom of the innocent to the diversion of much of this suffering to the wrong people. For once we commit ourselves to the view that God wills or willingly permits pain as an expression of his wrath, we represent him as responsible for everything from cancer to concentration camps. What kind of God is it who would do such things? The man in the street says, "I would not treat my worst enemy like that." Of course, in reality it is astonishing what depths the man in the street can sink to; but his indignation signifies that he cannot picture God as being responsible for such atrocities as these. Nor is he very far wrong. Sin and pain are not God's work; both of them are alike distortions of his work. But seeing that we are members one of another, the sufferings which we bring upon ourselves and each other recoil ultimately on him. "In all their afflictions he was afflicted." As we behold the ruin which sin has wrought in creation, we remember the words in the parable, "An enemy hath done this". And, says St Paul, "the last enemy that shall be destroyed is death".

Let us make no mistake. The Cross is not God's martyrdom of man; it is the revelation of man's martyrdom of God. Out of the head-on collision between Love and selfishness on the Cross the higher good is born. Thus the Christ Victorious doctrine of Professor Aulén, and satisfaction, understood as reparation, are complementary; the one is incorporated in the other. On the Cross, to quote Professor Quick, penal is turned into redemptive suffering.[14] Whether we regard penal suffering as self-incurred or divinely imposed does not alter this aspect of the case. Either way, we have loved our lives and lost them; death is the end product of our selfishness. His suffering and death are voluntary from start to finish, the supreme expression of Love in a world of selfishness. "Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life, that I may take it again. No man taketh it away from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again" (John 10. 17-18). The fruits of victory in arms are frequently bitter to the taste. But the victory of the Love of the Second Adam over the selfishness of the first spells reparation, re-union, regeneration; new values, new men and women, a new world. Here is satisfaction to rejoice a Heavenly Father's heart. To represent the Cross in terms of judicial punishment is to rob it of its true Glory.

There are no antinomies, no contradictions in the pattern of redemption understood in this way. The whole thing can be seen in miniature in a single episode that happened on the road to Calvary. One of the disciples has drawn sword and struck off Malchus' ear. "Suffer ye thus far", said Jesus, and touched his ear and healed him. Everywhere and always ours are the hands that hurt, his the hands that heal. We drive the nails through the blessed hands and feet; never one did he drive through ours. We jam the crown of thorns upon the sacred brow; he prints the sign of his Cross upon ours. We flay him and slay him who hates nothing that he has made. We call upon him to get down from his Cross; he bids us take up ours and follow him. All the wrong, the cruelty, the havoc, and the hurt that we inflict upon each other and ourselves, recoils ultimately on him. On the Cross he reveals the hurt, and through the reparation of the Cross he heals it. "We deemed him stricken, smitten of God", said Isaiah, but "by his stripes we are healed". For the Man on the Cross is also God on the Cross. In the very hour of dereliction he is fashioning, as he alone can, new values, new men, a new world. We have nothing to call our own that was not his before it was ours.

That is true of all things; most of all is it true of At-one-ment through the Cross. Man, moved to repentance, is re-united with the source of his being, and the powers of resurrection and regeneration burst through. "I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me."

Thus satisfaction and humanist theories of the Atonement are reconciled. Satisfaction understood as punishment divided them; satisfaction understood as reparation reconciles them. What form Love's self-bestowal would have taken in a sinless world we can only dimly imagine, by what we see of the Communion of Saints. In the only kind of world we know it takes the form of the Cross. Only indomitable Love could conceive so complete a reparation, and only almighty Love could bring it to pass. This is the "full, perfect, and sufficient, sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction" for the self-will of the world. Out of the clouds and thick darkness that shrouded Calvary, like precious jewels emerging from the mine, come the new spiritual values, which are love's reparation for the loss of the old values, and the inauguration of the new age. All that we so imperfectly essay, is perfected in him, and he, who is both priest and victim, the offerer and the offering, self-offered cries, "It is finished".

But the same act which is the perfect compensation for sin makes us loathe our sin. Selfishness confronted with perfect self-giving turns to self-loathing. This is the modern way of presenting the moral theory of Atonement. If the revelation of the Love and agony of God on the Cross cannot break us, nothing will. It is not the divine wrath that moves men to repentance (how right was Dean Alington to emphasize this!); it is the everlasting mercy, as Saul Kaine found out. It is not his judgement from which we flee, but the Love that will not let us go, as Francis Thompson knew in "The Hound of Heaven". As William Temple, our late Archbishop, once wrote: "In His bearing before His enemies we see how God regards us as we inflict the blow . . . We cannot go on wounding one who accepts our wounds like that; we are filled with fear, not the old craven fear of punishment, but the fear of wounding the tenderest of all hearts."[15] Devotion has sometimes discerned truth through the mists of theological mis-statement and error: " 'Tis Love, 'tis love, thou diedst for me; I hear the whisper in my heart." The harder we press the old interpretation of satisfaction as punishment, the more ground does it have to yield to the interpretation of the Cross as recompense. It is conceded that by divine wrath we mean divine revulsion against sin, that sin is self-will, and that the important

thing about the Cross is not the pain inflicted but the Love outpoured. With so much conceded there is little left to defend. The doctrine of reparation possesses the field.

How far are the results of modern inquiry incorporated as well? We have already covered much of the ground, but can summarize the contemporary situation as follows.

The first major attempt to break the deadlock between the traditional interpretation of the Cross was Moberley's *Atonement and Personality*. He showed that just as only a sinful being needs to repent, so only a sinless being can experience and exhibit the repentance which the condition of the sinful requires. On the Cross Christ is the perfect penitent for our sin. The weakness of the theory, as Dr Kirk pointed out, was its failure to supply that "something more" than apology which sin requires, and which Kirk called reparation, without defining the term. Bishop Hicks followed on with an invaluable inquiry into the subconscious motive for the biblical practice of sacrifice. This he defined as "life offered, transformed, and shared".[16] His keenest critics found difficulty in this. They affirmed that life is what all religions offer their votaries. The distinctive feature of the New Testament is life through love.[17] Dr Aulén made history by arguing convincingly that the classic doctrine of Atonement was not satisfaction at all, but Christ Victorious over those dark invaders, sin, disease, the devils, and death, while God is represented as getting the victory over his own wrath by suffering the consequences. Satisfaction ideas are incidental, and come later. Professor H. W. Clark is one of the many who acknowledge a great debt to Aulén. He defines sin as a "usurping power which causes the world purpose of God, to go slowly, to go in the wrong direction, or to go not at all".[18] A new dynamic is required to expel the invader and restore Creation to its God-ward track.[19] This new dynamic (the Holy Spirit) enters the world at Christ's birth and is universalized through his death.[20] To Dr O. C. Quick we owe the concept of penal turned into redemptive suffering, thus inaugurating the New World. Professor Hodgson, endorsing what Dr Quick says, goes further. He sees the pain which follows sin both as the expression of God's wrath and also as the raw material out of which he fashions higher good.[21] Fr Jarrett-Kerr, who oddly deprecates moral theories as "moral violence"[22] (as though that were anything to be ashamed of), sees the Atonement as the restoration of God's image in us through the marriage of the

human and the divine, after they had been alienated through sin.[23]

The doctrine of recompense is, I believe, implicit in every one of these, though explicit in none. It supplies their deficiencies, reconciles contradictions, and integrates them all. It incorporates Dr Moberley's concept of Christ, the perfect penitent, repudiating, as we have lost power to do, the sins that beset us; but it also supplies the element of reparation in terms of new values for old, which Moberley's theory lacked. It incorporates Bishop Hicks' theory of life offered, transformed, and shared, and also the insights of his critics. For if Life and Love are indivisible, it follows that only reparation through self-giving can ever restore the life that separation through selfishness destroyed. Thus, also, the nature of Christ's victory is more fully and exactly defined than it is in the classical doctrine of the Atonement, and we perceive why the new dynamic of the Spirit was given that way. For if the point of Christ's dying was nothing more than to release the new dynamic, or life, or the universal presence, then a painless death would have served as well as a painful one. But there was far more to it than that. Love's reparation for selfishness required that the worst that selfishness could do should be met at every point and "turned into material for self-giving". Hence the Agony and Bloody Sweat of him who for us men and for our salvation came down from Heaven. Hence Good Friday, Easter Day, and Pentecost are to be viewed not simply as successive events, but as inseparable events. Given the first the rest was inevitable. God's image is restored in us, and the whole creation which had been involved in the fall shares the blessings of redemption.

The sevenfold pattern of redemption may now be conceived as follows:

(i) *Restitution.* The self-giving of the One, all the way from the Manger to the Cross, is Love's recompense for the self-will of the Many.[24] "We are accepted in the Beloved."

(ii) *Repentance.* Christ's self-giving for our self-will turns us against our self-will, and inspires repentance.

(iii) *Reconciliation* results wherever recompense and repentance meet, and *regeneration* results from re-union with the source of our being. Regeneration begins with:

(iv) *Release* of the dynamic of the Spirit, which breaks the power of sin, and "restores creation to its God-ward track". This effects:

(v) The *Restoration* of God's image in us.

(vi) The *Resurrection* from the Dead, or Life restored through Love.

(vii) The *Renewal* of the Natural Order.

"Then cometh the end when he shall have delivered up the Kingdom to God, even the Father", from whom all things come, to whom through Christ all must return.

These aspects of the sevenfold activity of redemption must ever be conceived as occurring simultaneously, not successively. They are as indivisible as the thinking, feeling, and willing of a living man. But the mainspring of the whole action is Christ's perfect work on Calvary. Recompense met by repentance effects our re-union with God, and through re-union the regeneration of our nature, and finally the restoration of all things.

Such a concept is as rich as it is simple. The children in our midst enact before our eyes their own little drama of reparation day by day. They know as well as scripture does that, "if I have wronged any man", I should "restore unto him fourfold". They are not slow to see that new values, new hearts, new worlds are the only fit recompense to God for those that selfishness has spoiled. They can be taught that the cry from Calvary, "It is finished", referred immediately to Love's great act of reparation for the self-will of the world, and prophetically to the day when Love will have finished his work in us, and restored the Kingdom to God, even the Father from whom it came.

The failure of the old satisfaction theology to discern any essential unity between salvation and sanctification is remedied in the new. The oft re-iterated, "It has all been done for us", inspired the attitude in faith and practice that there was nothing left for a man to do. In the new satisfaction theology Christ's self-giving for us has to be met by ours to him, and his Cross avails nothing for those who will not bear their own (cf. 1 Thess. 3. 10). Even the busy world accurately discerns this much spiritual truth, for to those who profess to be of Christ, it says: "Except I see the prints of the nails, I will not believe." Nowhere has the relation between Christ's act of restitution for us, through us, and in us, been more finely expressed than in the words of one whose whole life has been a restitution, and with whose words we conclude:

> He comes to us as of old by the lakeside. He came to those men who knew Him not. He commands and to those who obey He will reveal Himself in the toils, the conflicts, the sufferings which they

shall pass through in His fellowship, and as an ineffable mystery, they shall learn in their own experience who He is.[25]

It is the only way. Maranatha. Even so Lord Jesus, Come.

Note.—Considerations of space forbid the incorporation or addition of the numerous scripture references and allusions which can be identified with the help of a Concordance. The identification of sin with self-will, and of self-giving with sacrifice, is assumed to have been so well established in the authors cited below that little more seemed needed for this thesis than some indications of chapter and verse. Proceeding from these premisses it has been my task to show that At-one-ment means not simply Reunion, but Reunion through a loving, willing act or process of compensation for the wrong done and directly related to it. The principle on which every penitent child acts in its relations with the family is the same as that upon which the One acts in atoning for the sins of the Many.

1 K. E. Kirk, "The Atonement", *Essays Catholic and Critical*, p. 264.

2 E.g., W. Temple, *Devotional Readings in St John's Gospel*, p. 92.

3 Leonard Hodgson, *The Doctrine of the Atonement*, p. 4 (Synopsis of Chapter 4).

4 Since this paragraph was first written, Professor Lampe's *Reconciliation in Christ* has appeared, taking the same standpoint. See *View-Review*, Nov. 1956, p. 10.

5 Royce, *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. I, pp. 322, 307-8.

6 O. C. Quick, *The Gospel of the New World*, pp. 27, 30ff.

7 Hodgson, op. cit., pp. 88-9.

8 Ibid., p. 7 (Synopsis of Chapter 4).

9 C. S. Lewis, *Beyond Personality*, p. 32.

10 Hodgson, op. cit., p. 75.

11 G. Aulén, *Christus Victor*, pp. 123-4.

12 Ibid., p. 130.

13 Hodgson, op. cit., p. 7 (Synopsis of Chapter 4).

14 Quick, op. cit., p. 101.

15 W. Temple, *The Faith and Modern Thought*, quoted in Hodgson, op. cit., p. 80.

16 F. C. N. Hicks, *The Fulness of Sacrifice*. This is the thesis of the entire work.

17 R. S. Franks, *The Atonement*, p. xv.

18 H. W. Clark, *The Cross and the Eternal Order*, p. 27.

[19] Ibid., pp. 46ff.

[20] Ibid., p. 98.

[21] Hodgson, op. cit., p. 87.

[22] M. Jarrett-Kerr, *Christ in us, the Hope of Glory*, p. 77. But cf. *Church Quarterly Review*, Jan.—Mar. 1953, p. 121.

[23] M. Jarrett-Kerr, op. cit., p. 119.

[24] H. E. W. Turner, *The Patristic Doctrine of Redemption*, pp. 63-6. The "Recapitulatio" is very relevant to this.

[25] A. Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, p. 401.

DOES GOD SUFFER?

O. T. OWEN

DOES God suffer? Contemporary emphasis in theology seems to by-pass such a question as this. That a question of this kind still requires consideration, however, is illustrated not only by the spontaneous speculations of ordinary folk in their joys and troubles but also, more particularly, in an interesting little dramatic piece published some two years ago in this Review.[1] For, as he deals with the crucifixion of our Lord and its relationship to the purpose of God, the author represents John, the Beloved Disciple, as saying:

> . . . even God his Father suffers now. He loves our master, and love in suffering shares. Are they not one? Did he not tell us so? And as our master in his agony leans upon God, he only finds an equal and his own great agony—so came that dreadful cry. But if God lived apart and knew not pain, how could we say, "Our Father"?

Does God then suffer? This short drama replies with an emphatic "Yes". But Christian orthodoxy has consistently answered "No", and has thereby tried to maintain the qualitative difference between the Creator and his creatures.

When the presuppositions underlying any question are the same as those inspiring the answer, the nature of the answer is found to be determined by the nature of the question. The terms used in the answer are the terms used in the question, and the answer results in no real acquisition of knowledge by the enquirer but merely in a convenient re-arrangement of the presuppositions. Thus the question, "Does God suffer?" might be asked by many, presupposing in the word "suffer" the all too familiar human experiences. Then, these experiences, inspiring the answer, would prompt either "Yes" or "No" according to whether God is regarded as a Being primarily concerned with the welfare of his creatures, or as One whose majesty removes him far from the affairs of this world. Each answer, "Yes" and "No", would be produced by emphasizing one attribute of God at the expense of another (sympathy at the expense of majesty and *vice versa*). From question to answer, the presuppositions underlying the word "suffer" would

be imported complete. Therefore, as a preliminary to investigating this question, and that we may discover whether or not suffering is an experience peculiar to man, the characteristics of suffering in human experience must be noted. For there to be suffering, the following conditions must be fulfilled.

1. There must be an organism capable of receiving and of being sensitive to a deleterious stimulus. The stimulus may be either physical or mental—these distinctions are purely arbitrary, since a physical stimulus produces mental repercussions, the converse being just as true.

2. Given suitable circumstances, the organism must be capable of anticipating a deleterious action and of initiating an attempt to avoid it.

3. The organism must be capable of remembering the deleterious stimulus and, thus being conscious of a changed condition in itself, must be able to initiate a process by which the effect of the stimulus is mitigated.

This very brief survey reveals that an inevitable accompaniment of human suffering is frustration, followed either by triumph, when the suffering ceases, or by despair, when it continues. That suffering, in this sense, may be predicated of God, even in an analogical manner, is difficult to believe.

A further and more potent difficulty is presented by the doctrine of God in Christian tradition. Traditionally, the Christian doctrine of God appears as the confluence of the speculations of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, on the one side, with the revelation of the Old and New Testaments on the other. For Christianity is a religion in search of a metaphysic—to borrow a remark of Dr Whitehead. The facts are first, and their metaphysical explanation follows. To the Greek mind, the fundamental attribute of God was immutability and the complete absence of any form of human passion. From this derived the Christian doctrine of the impassibility of God: the doctrine that, God being perfect, nothing can affect the divine nature. The same doctrine was expressed by St Thomas Aquinas in the words "*actus purus*"—pure actuality—which mean that God is the Being for whom nothing is unaccomplished. But this point of view does not remain unchallenged and its opponents press the following formidable criticisms:

1. *God and Creation.* It is contended that the act of creation must involve a self-limitation on the part of God and therefore a volun-

tarily accepted passibility. For the creation, in God's image, of free willing beings must be a source of suffering to his goodness, since his relationship to what he has created is continuous and reciprocal.

2. *The Incarnation.* A doctrine of God's impassibility does not do justice to the facts of the Incarnation. This is the viewpoint ably propounded by the author of "Altar Piece", to which reference has already been made. Surely, in human flesh, God entered into a new relationship with his creation and suffered, during his lifetime, the pains of torture and disappointment. There is no difficulty in discovering examples of pain in the Gospel record. Of disappointment, Matt. 23. 37 affords an apt illustration:

> O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, which killeth the prophets, and stoneth them that are sent unto her! how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not!

3. *Prayer.* Lastly, prayer presupposes a relationship between God and his creatures by means of which men may presume to address God through the Sacrifice of Jesus Christ. The fact of prayer implies, or rather demands, it is contended, a Being on whom prayer will produce an effect.

These are weighty objections and yet, in spite of their seeming worth, the doctrine that God suffers, in any way akin to that in which humanity suffers, is completely untenable. None of the characteristics of suffering, already noted, may reasonably be predicated of a deity believed to be omniscient and omnipotent. Indeed, the idea that God suffers seems to rest on an anthropomorphic alternative: "Either God sympathizes and then he suffers, or God does not suffer and then he does not sympathize or care."[2] This alternative, in turn, rests on that ubiquitous error with which all metaphysical thinking is tainted but not necessarily vitiated—despite the fulminations of Dr Barth. And the error is: the human proclivity for projecting human concepts into the Being of God. But with this sort of problem, the present discussion began. The way out of the vicious circle is to consider closely what statements can be made about God without contradiction and, for this purpose, the three major objections to the doctrine of impassibility shall be used as a basis.

1. *God and Creation.* The God of Christian theism is infinite and eternal. In his act of creation, he cannot be conceived as constructing the world out of materials already to hand, as a potter models

clay, for thus God's infinity would be circumscribed by the co-existence with him of matter. Since God is, by hypothesis, infinite (and a god that is, in some sense, finite cannot be the Original Cause because his finitude points to something beyond), the creation of the world cannot add to existence. Therefore the world is, in some mysterious way, included in the infinite Being of God. The point can be aptly illustrated by invoking the mathematical concept of infinity. For just as it is good mathematics to say that infinity plus or minus one still equals infinity, or that one minus infinity is nothing—indeed is meaningless; so also it is good theology to believe that God plus or minus the world is still God, whereas the world minus God is an impossible concept.[3]

Now, although human knowledge is conditioned by time and space, mankind is enabled imperfectly to transcend these limitations and to know himself a creature on whom the image of eternity is stamped. Man is a creature of two spheres. But by far the greater portion of his being is immersed in the created world. This means that man is prone to interpret the promptings of eternity in terms of those spatio-temporal categories with which he has previously endowed God. An example of this, germane to the present discussion, is the persistence with which creation is implied to be something "over against" God. Time then becomes a sort of linear arrangement, along which a vertical space rushes, parallel to a remote eternity. Many diverse theories amount only to this: time is treated as some sort of absolute, merely because space is accepted axiomatically as having existence prior to that of everything else. And since events occur in space, there must be a time process in which they can happen. The illogicality of this view point is revealed when it is realized that space is known only because of *material boundaries* and that time is experienced only through the *movement of material particles*. In other words, space and time are the *aspects under which matter is known* to the human mind. They are properties of matter and, although for the purpose of convenience and argument, these properties may be abstracted, yet apart from matter, they can be neither known nor assessed. Apprehension of this fact is easy in regard to space, but the past and the future are concepts so valuable for the regulation of human life that time comes to be accepted as an entity of independent existence. But to realize that time is that aspect under which matter is known in activity, the human mind has only to reflect that, in

sleep, it is unconscious of temporal change and that, on waking, it would be just as unenlightened if it did not infer "a passage of time" from the movement undergone by other entities. (For example—while a man sleeps in his chair, the fire burns low.) That time passes, sometimes quickly and sometimes slowly, is a commonplace of human experience. Now each individual person is a dynamic pattern conscious of his own change, a self-conscious system of moving particles. The rate of particle movement varies with the metabolic state of the organism and the variation in both movement and metabolic state is responsible for the individual's varying experience of the speed with which time passes.[4]

To dispel those vague, but potent, ideas about God and creation which end by opposing eternity to time, it has been necessary to labour the point that time and space are properties of matter and not entities of independent existence. Eternity and time are not opposites nor are they of equal rank. As Genesis 1 shows, the only opposition there can be is between eternity and matter, with time and space as derivatives of the latter. This does not imply that eternity and matter are of equal rank. The word "opposition" is to be understood in the sense of balancing the only two possible extremes: eternity (= the realm of God) and matter. Certainly *not* eternity and time.

At a period when the most bizarre theories about the status of time and space are being canvassed, by both philosophers and scientists,[5] that theologian does well who, cherishing his theological simplicity, sees the ultimate problem of creation neither in the existence of space nor in the existence of time but in the existence of *matter in motion*. From this it follows that the material world is included in the eternal realm and is sustained and motivated by God. Thus the mystery to be solved, by the idea of God's voluntary limitation of himself, no longer requires this solution. Indeed the apparent validity of the solution depends on the confusion of thought involved in the false antithesis: eternity and time. The mystery of creation remains, and will always remain, but surely need no longer be complicated by the doctrine of a limited deity. For that system which is included in and sustained by a greater can in no way be regarded as limiting the parent system. Similarly the creation which is included in and sustained by the eternal Being of God can in no way be regarded as limiting him. On the contrary, the creation is a particular manifestation of God's

omnipotence. The question so frequently posed: "Why this type of world and not another?" is meaningless, not only because the ramifications leading to God's purpose can never be completely understood (hence the ample room and need for the exercise of faith in all departments of human life) but also because the existence of other creations, unknown to man, is quite probable. Here speculation is profitless.

Perhaps a little more ought to be said at this juncture about the alternative above mentioned: "Either God sympathizes and then he suffers, or God does not suffer and then he does not sympathize or care." That the love of God implies his suffering, by reason of his sympathy with his creatures, is an objection that sustains itself by a sentimental exaggeration of one attribute of God at the expense of another (the exaggeration of love at the expense of omniscience). But God possesses the attribute of omniscience, and a consideration of this reveals the invalidity of the objection. Omniscience means not only knowledge of everything but the most perfect kind of knowledge. Now, in human experience there are three kinds of knowledge:

(*a*) There is knowledge *of* something—by which is meant that the knower has experience of what he knows. A convenient example is murder. The murderer, because he has actually murdered someone, has empirical knowledge of murder and, to that extent, can sympathize with the feelings of another murderer.

(*b*) There is knowledge *about* something—by which is meant that the knower has abstract information about what he knows. Because of his study of the psychology of murder, the criminologist has abstract knowledge about murder but is not thereby equipped to sympathize with the feelings of a murderer.

(*c*) There is the *imaginative* knowledge of the artist by which he is enabled to know what requires neither direct experience nor abstract information. Nobody has yet suggested as an explanation of the king's speech in *Hamlet*, Act III, Scene 3, where guilt and remorse battle for mastery, that Shakespeare had either experience of or abstract information about murder. But his knowledge transcended mere information and mere experience and, guided by imagination, produced the very replica of murderer in Hamlet's guilty and fearful uncle. In the same way, yet infinitely more, the perfect knowledge of the omnipotent God may be supposed to transcend experience and information so that he knows intimately

the most harrowing depths of suffering without himself suffering. Just as Shakespeare no doubt sympathized with his creatures of the mind, so God can fully sympathize with his creatures of the world and can yet be exempt from their sorrows.

2. *The Incarnation.* Even although the cogency of previous arguments is not denied, there yet remains the objection of the Incarnation of Jesus Christ to the doctrine of God's impassibility. Here surely, one Person of the Trinity suffered and, by suffering, took sorrow into the Being of Almighty God. But men are creatures and their judgements are set in this world. God is eternal and his judgements are set in eternity. Human suffering, no matter how slight, produces an effect that men call lasting because it endures, if only in memory, for the whole of temporal life. And men therefore, with their temporal judgements, see in Christ the sublime sufferer because he was rejected by his own, tortured and murdered. This is the right judgement—as far as the world can, by its own standards, judge what is, in reality, beyond its scope. For can suffering be suffering when its temporal effects are completely obliterated by the judgement of eternity? That is what happened in the Resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ. The pains and sorrows of his earthly life were made radiant by God. Even death was swallowed up in the victory of the Resurrection. God's purpose for all men was revealed and he, who in the world had been the Man of Sorrows, became in eternity the King of Glory.

3. *Prayer.* The last objection noted against the impassibility of God is that this doctrine is inconsistent with the practice of prayer, because prayer seeks for God's intervention in the affairs of creation. Is this a true description of the principle of Christian prayer? The ever present, all pervading Holy Spirit works in creation and, by the faith of men in the life and death of Jesus Christ, brings Christians, in their prayers, to acknowledge, before Almighty God, their unworthiness and to make themselves fitter for the grace of the Holy Spirit. Prayer is not the action of men on God. Prayer is the result of the overflowing love of God acting on men through the Holy Spirit, by virtue of their faith in the life and death of Jesus Christ. Prior to all other prayer is the prayer of God on the lips of men: "Thy will be done; in earth as it is in heaven."

The late Dr A. E. Taylor once wrote[6] that the various modern theories of a finite or limited deity are incompatible with theism. For a deity limited by a limitation arising outside his own nature, is

not omnipotent and is therefore not God in the theistic sense. But further a deity limited by a self-limitation due to his own nature, must be either defective or not defective. In the former case, the deity is again not God in the theistic sense at all. In the latter case, when the presence of a self-limitation is not a defect, there is no sense in using the word limitation because the absence of limitation then constitutes a defect. To the opponents of rational theology, this great thinker's succinct disposal of the problem must seem a species of verbal jugglery. Yet even the theological rationalists may wonder why the problem, so expertly dismissed, should continue to be the subject of so much thought. The reason is not only that theology, as a developing science, is in a continuous process of trying to perfect its systematic approach, but that the questions asked by theologians have a wider reference than is contained in the immediate answers. Fundamentally this is true of all knowledge. The question asked by the biologist might be the business of the physicist to solve. Only in theology, however, is the wider reference of all questions unceasingly to the fore. This means that the old problems are forever new as they are incorporated into different schemes of thought. For this reason, among others, we have to realize that God does not suffer. To think of the eternal sufferings of God is, at first, to participate in the inspiration of high tragedy. But eventually, to think thus is to make of God a triviality—a broken superman not unlike the discredited gods of Greek and Norse mythology. To say that God does not suffer safeguards his transcendence, satisfies the tests of coherence, and places, in correct perspective, the life of Christ; neither giving to suffering an eternal significance nor abandoning man to a concept of a God for whom sorrow can have no meaning.

1 John Searle, "Altar Piece". *Church Quarterly Review*, No. 317, Vol. CLV, October-December 1954.

2 Quoted from an essay entitled "Suffering and God" by Baron Friedrich von Hügel published in his *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion* (Second Series), Dent, 1926. The present writer regards the Baron's essay as the "last word" on the subject, and would urge all who value religious truth to ponder the Baron's moving utterance.

3 See William Temple, *Nature, Man and God*, p. 435, and E. L. Mascall, *He Who Is*, p. 97.

[4] For an amusing extravaganza on this subject, see Dr Julian Huxley's essay "Philosophic Ants", included in *Essays of a Biologist*, Pelican Books, 1939. (First published, 1923.)

[5] See for example, *An Experiment With Time* by J. W. Dunne, whose "pioneer endeavour" has surely now been superseded by the more exact experiments and cautious theorizing of J. B. Rhine. (See for example, *New World of the Mind*, Faber and Faber, 1954.)

[6] Article, "Theism", *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.*

A MODERN CONCEPTION OF THE DEMONIC

RONALD GRIMSLEY

If the demonic were considered solely in relation to some of the simpler concrete symbols through which it has been at various times expressed, it might seem to be little more than, as Kierkegaard once put it, "a great horned owl at which one shudders and thereupon puts out of mind with the reflection that it is many centuries since it was seen in the world".[1] Philosophers and theologians, however, have tended to hold that these different forms retain a sufficiently stable structure for it to be permissible to speak of a basic demonic principle. It will, therefore, be useful—before attempting to discuss some modern forms—to recall briefly the main components of the traditional demonic attitude. The demonic, it would seem, presupposes at least four characteristic features. In the first place, it suggests a negativing, destructive element which seeks to overcome the "good" (however defined). At the same time this negation emerges as an act of defiance which affirms the actual superiority of the demonic principle; evil is definitely asserted to be of higher value than good. Thirdly, this defiance involves the elevation of some purely relative or finite aspect of reality into an absolute, unconditional value. The particular aspects of reality selected for this purpose may vary, although they frequently involve one of the vital, instinctual parts of man's biological and psychological make-up—hence the frequent association of demonic forces with animal powers. In fact, however, any part of the human personality can be made an occasion for demonic pride. Don Juan, Faust, and Ahasuerus (The Wandering Jew) may be taken as symbols of the demonic possibilities lying in the three spheres of body, mind, and spirit.[2] Finally, although the demonic expresses itself through man's will and consciousness, it is usually held to involve an element which is in some sense independent of the human personality. Hence there arises the idea of "possession" by "alien powers" and of course the personification of these powers in the Devil and his servants. This last point constitutes the ambiguity of

the demonic—that it appears to be related to factors outside man's control and yet involves his complicity and responsibility.[3]

In view of the persistent preoccupation of Christian thinkers with the idea of the demonic it may at first sight seem strange that it has received such scant attention from modern European philosophers. An examination of Cartesian and post-Cartesian thought reveals, however, that it rests upon a rational, scientific, and impersonal outlook which looks for truth in the realm of "clear and distinct ideas" and so leaves little room for an ambiguous and apparently irrational concept like the demonic. The Cartesian tradition with its methodological and metaphysical insistence on the idea of rational certainty assumes the presence of a reality which is in the last resort intelligible to the human mind, so that the concrete aspects of individual existence are subordinated to principles of universal order. Even the eighteenth-century empiricist protest against rationalist metaphysics is imbued with many elements of the Cartesian mentality and not least of all with its optimistic search for rational clarity; even when it becomes entangled with "subjective" problems and dissolves the self into atomistic "sensations" and "feelings", it remains strongly intellectual and assumes a psychology of consciousness which leaves untouched the deeper and perhaps darker aspects of the human personality. Thus both the rationalist and empiricist views rest upon a very circumscribed conception of human existence. Even the pressure of more dynamic concepts in the thought of a Leibniz, Hegel, and Schelling still allows the particular features of the individual life to be absorbed into the wider principles of the Absolute. In a more general way the whole philosophy of the Enlightenment reflects a fundamental optimism which shows itself in the eighteenth-century belief in man's essential goodness and perfectibility. The checks to human progress are essentially external and accidental (it is thought) and can be removed by the gradual amelioration of man's environment.

No doubt hostility to excessively intellectual philosophies had always been present in European culture, as Professor Tillich insists. Before Descartes' time Luther and Böhme had been seriously concerned with the problem of the demonic, whilst Protestant pietism and various forms of Illuminism often raised the same question. Yet the impact of these dissidents upon the main development of European thought had not been great, perhaps because, even when the question of the demonic principle was raised by later writers, it emerged in a very attenuated form.[4] Indeed it is significant that

two of the ablest nineteenth-century thinkers who took seriously (though in radically different ways) the problem of the demonic (Kierkegaard and Nietzsche) were ignored by "orthodox" philosophers. Nevertheless, the arrival of Romanticism did help to create a climate of opinion which eventually proved to be more favourable to a discussion of the demonic because it sought to exalt feeling at the expense of reason, and so prepared the way for a renewed interest in the aspirations of the human personality considered in its affective and irrational rather than its intellectual aspects. It was not until the grip of rational, universal principles had been loosened that the deeper and more disturbing forces of the human self could rise to the surface of consciousness. As raised by the Romantics themselves, the problem of human personality remained obscure, perhaps because their already confusing emotionalism still remained bound to a search for non-human objects (like Nature, or God) capable of stilling their inner disquiet. A more thorough philosophical understanding of the demonic could come only from critics who, while admitting the positive contributions of Romanticism to the cultural situation, had already started to move away from the extreme Romantic position. (Hence the most valuable aspects of Romantic influence upon the idea of the demonic will not be located in the rhetoric and rodomontade of Byronic satanism.) As long as Europe remained under the spell of metaphysical idealism, it could not escape the influence of the older philosophical bias (as is shown by the enormous prestige of Hegel during the Romantic era). Nevertheless the very fact that Romanticism helped ultimately to provide the basis for a fresh approach to the problem of personal existence gives it a prominent place among the influences which led to the appearance of the demonic as an important cultural phenomenon.

One of the subtlest and ablest attempts to understand the meaning of the demonic as it began to emerge at this time was undoubtedly that of Kierkegaard, for, though his analysis starts with certain characteristically Romantic phenomena, it actually constitutes a radical criticism of the Romantic position and points beyond it to an uncompromising Christian viewpoint. Kierkegaard's discussion is of particular interest to us here because of the way in which it anticipates certain forms of the demonic. He defines the demonic as "shut-upness unfreely revealed"[5]; the demonic man is he who remains immured in his own unfreedom, incapable of that expansive movement towards God which is the mark of the truly

religious life. Whereas real inwardness is an enriching quality derived from man's free relationship to eternity, shut-upness means isolation and imprisonment within the finite. Although defiant isolation is present in all forms of the demonic, it is here linked to an introspective absorption of the self in its own inner state of mind. Such an attitude is "dread of the good", because what the individual fears is not evil but "freedom, redemption, salvation". In other words, in order to find salvation, the self would have to be shaken free from an egocentric preoccupation with its own despairing helplessness. Whilst perhaps professing a desire to attain the religious ideal, it nevertheless remains bound to the earthly, since it finds a secret satisfaction in its own unhappiness and clings fast to a torment which it will not let go.

Whereas the earlier forms of the demonic had been aggressively destructive of conventional values, actively identifying the meaning of the individual existence with a glorification of instinct (Don Juan), intellect (Faust), or spiritual defiance (Ahasuerus), which tried to break through the limits set for man by God and so strove to divinize man through the absolute affirmation of his own finitude, the modern form of the demonic is rooted in a *mood* or diffused state of feeling which is ostensibly contrite since it begins with a melancholy and *ennui* that bemoan the individual's incapacity to reach the infinite. For all its plaintive self-depreciation, however, such an attitude really conceals a form of demonic pride, since it expresses itself in a way that suggests that this feeling is the prerogative of superior minds. Such was the fundamental Romantic position—that only the exceptional man, especially the artist or poet, was really capable of feeling this helpless yearning for the absolute. Because this revelation was granted to him alone the artist or the Romantic hero might consider himself to be an instrument of fate; it was his "destiny" that he should suffer in this way.[6] For Kierkegaard this attitude remains demonic because it provides the exceptional man with an excuse for not transforming himself in accordance with the religious demand. Whereas Christianity demands first of all a humbling of the self—an inner qualitative transformation of the whole of a man's inner being, a "rebirth" which is initiated by the recognition of man's dependence on God—the Romantic view implies that the exceptional man is in some way absolved from carrying out this task since he has within himself an absolute criterion which enables him to create and determine his

own attitude towards the world. Whatever the particular form assumed by such an attitude, it constitutes a demonic rejection of the religious spirit because it is really a defiant refusal to abandon the plane of a natural emotion which has not yet come alive to the call of ethical and religious values.

Often, of course, the refusal to take the religious seriously may assume a more sinister form, especially when the individual exploits in an inhuman way his imprisonment within his own moods. He may, for example, make the erotic an occasion for the practice of seduction. Such is the case with Johannes the Seducer, the character created by Kierkegaard in the first part of *Either/Or;* he is the modern Don Juan whose delight lies in the cultivation of a secret, isolated self which admits of no ultimate value other than the enjoyment of its own refined desires.[7] Even the "poetic existence" may itself be a form of the demonic, especially when the poet uses his capacity to transfigure the world and replace reality by dazzling fictions as a means of preventing himself and others from effecting the spiritual transformation of the inner self.

Yet all these various forms of demonic repudiation of spirit are associated with what Kierkegaard calls the "reflective" personality. Many of the older forms of the demonic preserved a certain naïvely primitive quality which explains their artistic expression in epic and myth. The modern form of the demonic has lost this simplicity, for it is a subtle, sophisticated attitude which often refuses to come into open conflict with good. In all cases, however, the self does in fact remain defiantly immured within the contemplation of its own state of mind, finding ultimate pleasure in a reflection on its moods and emotions. Whereas the older view always had an explicit objective reference in the sense that it was unmistakably directed against God, the modern demonic is more secretive and hermetic. The older demonries were of course only too well aware of the presence of God, even though it was treated as a hateful, much feared reality. Now this objective reference seems to be lacking; the external element has in some sense been internalized. The vociferous screaming of the old demons has been replaced by a silent defiance which seems to move in a world from which God is absent.

To some extent, of course, this reflective form of the demonic is derived from its own valid protest against another implicitly demonic attitude—the overweening pretensions of a philosophic

rationalism which mutilated the spiritual life of the individual by absorbing him into an abstract, impersonal system of thought. Even when it sought to be most "subjective" (as in the case of Cartesian doubt), such an attitude was really seeking for a pre-established rational certainty. Since it did not accept the serious possibility of non-Being, intellectual doubt never reached the stage of losing itself in existential despair. Although it rejected this intellectualism, Romanticism fell into another error. If it sought to avoid an undue preoccupation with the realm of intellect, it remained imprisoned in its own moods, so that even when it seemed to escape from subjectivism into some reality greater than itself, it was actually seeking an object which would serve the primary purpose of satisfying its personal desires. Because external reality was seen through the screen of subjective emotional impulse the few attempts that were made to conceptualize it inevitably lacked an adequate philosophical basis. Likewise thinking about the human person ignored the distinctions presupposed by the deeper forms of ethical and religious striving for the sake of an emotionalism which overflowed all boundaries.

Although many Romantic principles have now vanished or assumed different cultural forms, certain implications of the underlying "reflective" demonic attitude have persisted to our own day. The sense of isolation and imprisonment within the self, which is observable in so much contemporary culture and which often expresses itself in nightmarish and anguishing forms, may not unreasonably be treated as a prolongation of Romantic subjectivity; it has of course been intensified by the growing incompatibility between the standards of "civilization" and the religious demands of the human spirit—an incompatibility which was first indicated by Romanticism itself. Nevertheless, the reflective attitude, which offers a kind of passive resistance to the religious sphere, cannot be accepted as a permanent solution even to the specific problem with which it seeks to deal.

Kierkegaard himself already saw that, if Romanticism had exposed the spiritual limitations of rationalism and empiricism, it also ran the risk of falling into a complacent, demonic absorption in its own melancholy and *ennui*. In stressing the unique significance of the "existing" individual Kierkegaard not only called attention to the weakness of all speculative attempts to construct a complete and coherent metaphysical system, but also to the dangers of a

vague emotional protest against such a viewpoint. For him truth is to be found in neither of these attitudes, since it is the individual himself who, through his passionate striving and free choices, helps to create the truth which is "subjectivity". In his opinion this subjectivity is rescued from mere subjectivism by the essential fact that it forms only one element of a polarity which also includes God. If the individual refuses to identify himself with a purely "objective" truth, it is because such a view can make no effective claim upon a spiritually awakened personality that submits itself unconditionally to God alone. Precisely because the relationship with God is the only absolute truth that the individual can recognize as valid for himself, all impersonal forms of truth can have only relative or approximate value. Whereas reason seeks coherence and unity on a single plane of being, the individual as "the child of the finite and the infinite" has to acknowledge that he is torn by inner contradictions which cannot be resolved by means of rational speculation, but only through an existential "leap" which actually transforms his inward nature by impelling it into religious faith. Whilst reason has presupposed unity and harmony, "existence" means tension and discontinuity. Yet this break with the self is intended solely as a means of driving the individual into Christianity, for—according to Kierkegaard—it is only in the person of Christ, the God-Man, accepted as the supreme Paradox of existence, that man can overcome the difficulties and contradictions of his earthly existence.

Yet when such an attitude lacks the absolute religious basis provided for it by a Kierkegaard, it opens up demonic possibilities of a particularly intense kind. A very acute and earnest sense of individuality, which seeks to transcend the limits of personal existence without actually going beyond the realm of the natural man, may well lead to the demonic irrationalism and madness of a Nietzsche.[8] In the case of a more "reflective" temperament the "leap" is constantly beset by the temptations implicit in the very difficulty which it seeks to overcome. In other words, while *seeming* to escape from melancholy and inertia, the "existential" attitude may *in fact* remain tied to certain philosophical presuppositions of this mood. Now it is very easy to see how a state of melancholy boredom, which is purely subjective and personal, can be transformed into an attitude claiming wider philosophical validity. The individual's experience of inner emptiness and frustration may easily tempt him to affirm

that objective reality is itself empty and meaningless; if he cannot see significance in the world, it is simply because the world lacks significance. No doubt Romanticism itself did not actually take this extreme step because its rejection of "society" was partly inspired by an optimistic belief in the deeper meaning of a reality hidden from the gaze of the multitude. Yet because such optimism was an emotional impulse rather than a reasoned conviction, it could not stand up to a sustained critical attack. As a personal attitude Romanticism rapidly yielded to the claims of a scientific and positivist philosophy or else gave way to the champions of "art for art's sake"; it was also powerless to prevent a movement towards the acceptance of some religious or political absolute embodied in a purely earthly authority—whether Church or State. The more spiritually awakened personality, whose honesty made it impossible for him any longer to give his allegiance to various forms of Romantic escapism, and who was yet unable to accept any of the other solutions just indicated, was thrust still further back into himself and became filled with an anguished awareness that his deepest aspirations lacked all external metaphysical support. Incapable of finding satisfaction in the objective world, he was also too clear-sighted to seek a purely solipsist solution to his difficulty since the actual existence of the world seemed undeniable. The self, therefore, remained imprisoned within a world that was felt to be incommensurable with its highest aspirations.

It is in certain forms of modern existentialism that this cultural situation has found its most interesting philosophical expression. For most existentialist thinkers the world is an irrefragable, brute fact which in some ways incarnates the "absurd" and "gratuitous" character of Being itself. Yet the loss of objective meaning is accompanied by an intense desire to find some kind of absolute though subjective truth for human life, and it is in a tormenting awareness of man's *freedom* that the supreme possibility of existence is felt to lie. But what can be the meaning of a freedom which is cut off from God and external reality? Must it not ultimately appear as "absurd" as Being itself? The difficulty is increased by the fact that man as a free being must always express himself in a concrete situation. Freedom cannot remain an abstract possibility; it must realize itself in action. The meaning of freedom is thus bound up with the existential act itself; it is in the process of actual self-realization that man confers significance upon his life.

The demonic implications of this attitude are apparent in an atheistic philosopher like Sartre, who defines man as "desire to be God"—God here being identified with a kind of self-sufficient, self-caused form of Being which would be its own justification and its own basis. Yet this absolute ideal, which expresses itself in man's desire to attain coincidence with himself, remains an impossible one, not only because (for Sartre) God does not exist, but also because the very act of freedom through which man becomes man is essentially a negativing activity which separates him from his own ideal. To use a homely simile employed by Sartre himself, we may compare the human being to a donkey impelled forward by his desire to catch the carrot which is dangling before his nose; but because the carrot is tied to a stick which is also fixed to the shafts of his cart, every effort to seize it drives him on without ever bringing him any nearer to the desired goal. Man thus remains imprisoned within his irrational freedom, achieving only a momentary escape through the existential moment itself and unable to achieve more than a series of discrete acts which—because of their refusal to take eternity seriously—are condemned perpetually to confront man with the fact of his helpless immersion in time.

Although such an attitude remains demonic in its effort to interpret human nature as pure finitude, it does acknowledge man's uniqueness in so far as it refuses to assimilate his freedom to anything other than itself. While barring the way to a genuinely spiritual interpretation of that freedom, the existentialist viewpoint shows a sincere concern for one of the basic factors of any genuinely Christian view of life. To confine ourselves to the standpoint of the preceding observations, we may conclude that even the demonic aspects of the existentialist attitude are far more complex and subtle than crude attempts to divinize man through the glorification of his instincts; they show quite clearly that modern man has—as Karl Jaspers says somewhere—lost his naïveté. The demonic possibility that is here in question presents a certain ambiguity since it is the result of a valid protest against the various forms of intellectual, emotional, and social tyranny which have sought to quieten man's unrest at the cost of his spiritual integrity. If the protest itself has been unable to discover a constructive solution to the problem it raises, it is probably because of its failure to understand the full implications of the existential anguish which first gave rise to its own desire for sincerity.

[1] Cf. *The Concept of Dread*, trans. W. Lowrie (O.U.P., 1946), p. 121.

[2] Cf. *The Journals of S. Kierkegaard*, ed. and trans. Alexander Dru (O.U.P., 1938), p. 26, Entry no. 49 (1836).

[3] Professor Tillich, in his essay on the demonic (included in his book *The Interpretation of History*, Scribner's, London, 1936, p. 90), insists also upon the idea of "an ecstatic, overpowering, creative quality, the power of bursting the limits of the personality". That this element is frequently present in manifestations of the demonic—and always present in its violent, Promethean forms—is certain, but as it does not seem to have the same importance for the "reflective" type of demonic attitude, which forms the particular object of the present study, I have not included it in the preceding definition. It may also not be inapposite to recall that this definition of the demonic is merely descriptive and not explanatory; in speaking of the "objective" aspect, I wish simply to call attention to a characteristic that is associated with the phenomenon by those who experience it (whether such an attribution is actually justified or not).

Since what follows does not take the concept of the demonic beyond the limits just indicated, it may be useful to point out that the demonic includes less than "sin" but more than the "satanic". I shall not therefore be concerned with the question of the existence of demons or a personal "Devil". For a recent discussion of the state of modern opinion on this point I refer the reader to a short article in the *Expository Times* by J. M. Ross, "The Decline of the Devil" (Vol. LXVI, No. 2, Nov. 1954, pp. 58-61).

[4] Thus most forms of Illuminism were imbued with a vague mystical fervour which aspired towards universal unity and the interpenetration of physical and spiritual realms, the former often being but a symbolic expression of the latter. Mr Ross (in the article referred to above) points out that Swedenborg (one of the great influences upon Illuminism) thought of devils as having a "visionary" rather than a "real" existence.

[5] Cf. *The Concept of Dread* (edition quoted), pp. 110ff.

[6] This viewpoint gains some force from the fact that it arises from a valid protest against an environment which, dominated by the social and cultural values of bourgeois industrialism, is itself demonic in so far as its preoccupation with money and its desire to achieve security through material possessions are treated as the absolute goal of human existence. In such a society spiritual life is weakened or annihilated. When the economic forces are transformed into a means of attaining power they may assume an even more destructive form.

[7] We have discussed in greater detail this aspect of Kierkegaard in an article, "The Don Juan theme in Molière and Kierkegaard", in *Comparative Literature* (University of Oregon Press), Vol. VI, No. 4 (1954), pp. 316-34.

[8] If this more violent form of the demonic is not insisted upon here, it is not of course because of any desire to minimize its importance. The cultural history of the last hundred years provides an all too obvious proof of its virulence. I am here concerned with isolating one aspect—the "reflective" aspect—of a phenomenon which can assume, as has already been indicated, a great variety of forms. For the more "ecstatic" demonic impulse see the interesting book by the late Stefan Zweig, *Kleist, Hölderlin und Nietzsche* (Leipzig, 1926). More recently this type of demonic attitude has been discussed in general terms in the important work by Hans Zehrer, *Man in this World* (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1952).

THE PASTORAL CARE OF THE "RE-MARRIED"

H. COOPER

THERE is, possibly always has been, and perhaps always will be much argument about the theology and the legalities of divorce and re-marriage, and the admission of the re-married[1] to the full communion of the Church. It is clear that even when there is full agreement about the theology, and at the moment there is not, despite the emphatic words of our Lord in the Gospels and the terms of the Book of Common Prayer, there will always be great difficulties about facts. Moral theologians agree that a defective intention, for instance, makes a marriage of such sort that it ought to have been declared null and void from the beginning; but defective intention is very difficult to prove. They would also agree that there can be invincible (i.e. unblameworthy) ignorance when some people divorce and re-marry, and that it is, therefore, possible for them to do either in good faith; but good faith has largely to be believed upon the word of the most interested party.

Such considerations as these make the problem of the care of the re-married of great complexity, for legality pulls one way and charity the other; concern for those who are struggling, often with heroic efforts, to keep their marriage vows militates with concern for those who have broken them. But a pastor of souls, whether bishop or parish priest, cannot be indifferent, and in their wisdom the Bishops of the Upper House of Canterbury are seeking to regularize what has been their custom for the past ten years. It is, simply, that each case must be referred to the Diocesan, who will judge it on its merits, or, rather, as a rule, on its demerits. We are not concerned here to make a criticism of either the principles upon which the Bishops make their decisions, nor the accuracy of their judgement in applying those principles to individual cases, nor even their wisdom in assessing the circumstances in each parish, for it is

[1] The word "re-married" used throughout does not imply that a second union whilst a partner of an original marriage is still living is a real marriage, but it is difficult to find any other convenient term.

clear that the Diocesan normally accepts the view of the parish priest and in any case takes it fully into account.

The great advantage of this system from the local pastor's point of view is obvious. The decision is made by one in higher authority who normally could have no personal interest or bias in the case, and who has not to answer local critics of his judgement. It would be quite intolerable for the parish priest to have to explain to his congregation why Mr A was admitted to Holy Communion again, and why Mrs B could not be confirmed. But in any case it is the system which at present obtains and we had best start from there. The purpose of this essay is to examine the position of those who through matrimonial irregularities need the special spiritual care of the parish priest. It is not meant to give advice to our Fathers-in-God.

THE APPROACH

Sometimes the parish priest makes first contact with the person who has been re-married after divorce in the course of his pastoral visiting. Frequently, the matter is brought to his notice when there is a child to be confirmed. Sometimes a neighbour brings one to church, and occasionally a man or woman is desperately sorry for himself or herself at being denied the grace of Holy Communion and longs for that grace to be restored—or, at worst, to escape the odium of being excommunicate. For, although such a person may not be legally excommunicate, and it is said that if a case were brought to the courts a priest would be censured for repelling such a person from Holy Communion, since he cannot be an "open and notorious evil-liver" for something done under the express sanction of the law of the land, yet the combined effect of conscience and public Christian opinion, as well as the clear teaching of our Lord and of the Marriage Service, make him virtually excommunicate, and if he were not so there would be no point in the Bishop's permission to be readmitted to the Altar. But however the matter comes to him, the parish priest cannot escape his difficult responsibility for the soul concerned, whether good or bad.

In many cases, of course, there is no desire for a spiritual benefit, or for reinstatement into Church life, and the priest has simply to urge, as he does with other back-sliders, that attendance at church and daily prayers are required of all who call themselves Christians.

If he is successful in his exhortation the deeper problem is likely to arise later. In other cases there is an arrogant demand for rights thought to be denied, and a deep and often bitter resentment that the Church should have any discipline at all. But in yet other cases, and in the writer's experience in the majority of those which go beyond the initial stages, there is a real desire to be right again with God and his Church, to become a normal Christian, and to receive the grace of Holy Communion which was not appreciated until it was lost. Of course, motives are mixed. The spiritual state of a person in this position is not likely to be of the highest, and possibly the sin or error would not have been committed by one who had reached an advanced state, although human capacity for sin is very great. There is, therefore, much to be done in bringing such a person face to face with God, and face to face with himself, in full honesty.

The priest, therefore, naturally prays with the person, or, what is rarely possible, the persons. This is quite different from the absurd suggestion which has been made of a semi-private service of prayer in a church after a re-marriage, which seeks to uphold the sanctity of the Marriage Service which has been defiled by offering instead a pale substitute for the Solemnization, which will almost certainly be misunderstood and could not possibly satisfy. The prayer will be simple, the spontaneous and natural prayer of a pastor with one of his flock, in no way different from the sort of prayer he prays constantly with his people in their homes as he visits them. Its burden will be laying the matter before God, and asking that his will, *whatever it is*, may be done. It will seek to induce a lowly, humble, penitent frame of mind by expressing awe and obedience, but at the same time a deep sense of assurance towards a Father who loves, who *cares*, and will act whatever the sin of any may be. A good priest would not seriously begin to discuss the matter of taking action until there has been prayer of this sort, and until the person has come to some kind of trust in God and some intention of accepting his will. Failures with people, as the writer bitterly recollects from experience, come when the approach has been purely theological or legalistic or practical. No other proper approach can be made but the approach of penitents in prayer. To make any other is to court failure.

After due prayer the matter can be discussed. It may be that there is some loophole, some defect of intention, some genuine ignorance, a lack of Christian upbringing, or a clear error in good faith; but in

the majority of cases it becomes clear that there was a real and complete first marriage, which was wilfully broken up, and second union was embarked upon in the knowledge that it was wrong in the eyes of the Church and of God.

In many such cases the priest will have gently to say that he can see no possibility of the Bishop granting a dispensation to return to the Sacraments, and must advise the person not to apply for one. But where there is some uncertainty, or where he thinks a dispensation is likely to be granted (although he ought to be very careful not to prejudge the Bishop's decision) the priest ought to see that certain conditions are fulfilled before the application is made. These conditions are the same as those for any and every sacrament; penitence, faith, and charity.

Penitence is a very plain thing, but it admits of degrees, and it is not to be expected that full and complete penitence could be required of anyone at this stage, for full and complete penitence belongs only to the saint, and few of us achieve it, if any. But there must be the admission of wrong-doing, whether or not the person is the so-called "innocent party", for that has nothing to do with the re-marriage, and is often enough applied to the wrong partner. It is impossible here to describe the pastor's methods of inducing penitence, for they must clearly vary with each individual, and the operation is a delicate and personal one in which the character of the priest counts for much. It need not be said that his attitude must be that of a fellow penitent or he will have little chance of success.

Charity is the condition often forgotten for the Sacraments. There is often a deep-seated bitterness towards, or hatred of, the person whose sins in part caused the break-up of the marriage. There is also sometimes a bitterness towards the Church, and against the real or fancied self-righteousness of clergy or people, or against society at large. Examples of the charity of our Lord, say, the Woman at the Well, or the Woman taken in Adultery, can sometimes with profit be referred to, but, here again, methods and language will be varied and a wide and deep charity on the part of the pastor must be present.

Faith, however, is a difficult and complicated thing to most people, because it has been so cheapened in popular sects, although it is in itself as simple as the relation of a child to a parent, if that be simple. It must be the sort of trust that is prepared to accept the judgement of God *whatever it is*, and to see that judgement of God

expressed in the decision of the Bishop, whether or no that decision is in itself logical, just, or charitable. It is, so far as the person is concerned, an external judgement which must be accepted, and, therefore, is for that person for the time being the will of God. This attitude of simple trust must be based upon the belief that God loves and cares, God knows all and is wise, God gives always what is ultimately best for us, and the person concerned is a part of his whole pattern and plan and purpose. The acceptance of discipline is not very congenial to our age, and the idea of penance is almost wholly absent. It is the watering-down of the concept of faith, faith in a God who knows best, that has brought this about.

THE BISHOP'S DECISION

We shall assume that the parish priest agrees that an application for re-admission to the Sacraments can be made to the Bishop. He may or may not himself be prepared to back it, or he may be unsure, yet willing to send it forward. In due course the Bishop's answer comes, and it is normally the priest's duty to convey it to the person or persons concerned. This may give him pleasure or pain, but it is in either case a duty. The way in which he conveys an adverse decision, whether he agrees with it or not, may have tremendous consequences for good or ill. Above all he must be loyal to the Bishop, even if he strongly disagrees with him. He will not, of course, take the decision to the person without prior prayer for guidance and tact and moral courage.

If the Bishop's reply is favourable the person must now be admitted to the Sacraments whatever the parish priest thinks, and however much difficulty it causes in the parish, although one of the grounds for the Bishop's decision will have been that it will not be locally scandalous. Pastoral care is required still. Some readmitted people make communion once, and then are either satisfied that their reputation is secure and lapse immediately, or else fear to face the congregation again because they have been so self-conscious and have imagined that others are resentful of their presence in a self-righteous spirit. The former clearly need rebuke, and the latter need pastoral help of the most charitable kind.

If, however, the Bishop's reply is a refusal, the grounds will be stated. Now will be seen the extent to which the priest has been successful in his spiritual preparation of the person. It is likely that however politely the reply is received it will be a severe shock, and

there will be a struggle in the person's soul to accept it. There may arise a burning resentment and bitterness, and there may be a deep sense of injustice to be eradicated. In this, as in some bereavements, when the same feelings may be present, time heals in some degree, but the gentle concern and prayerful faith of the pastor can bring about a real acceptance of God's will. The priest may be tempted to imply in his sympathy with the unhappy and disappointed person that he really disagrees with his Bishop, but this will only make the matter worse, and in fact nothing will help more than the firm loyalty of the priest to his superior.

When at last the thing has been accepted with some degree of obedient trust there remains much to be done. It is quite essential that the person should be reassured that the deprivation that the Bishop's decision brings does not mean that God has cast him off, or that God has not still a place for him in his Church and in his Kingdom, even if in the Church it is the place of one under penance. He must be made to see that the decision is in part for the good of the whole Church, and in part for his own good, and that the penance of deprivation of sacramental grace is not merely a punishment for sin. It is as much deterrent and remedial as retributive. He or she has, we assume, decided to continue in the second union as the lesser of two evils, in the belief that to break it up would be worse than to keep it on. But it ought to be said in passing that a bishop's refusal to readmit to the sacraments may often be a call to reconsider this. There may be many re-married couples who could and ought to separate, or whilst living in the same house to cease to cohabit, even if they find this a costly sacrifice and even if they sometimes lapse into sin because of it. It is by no means necessary that the continuing of the second union is the lesser of two evils. Heroic sanctity is not likely to be found in those who have either been alienated from the Church, or who have deliberately broken her laws; but it is sometimes found, for conversion is always possible and the grace of God knows no limits. The sharing of the Cross remains, as it has always been, essential to a Christian life.

ABSOLUTION

One theological difficulty which the Bishops in Convocation have so far evaded is that of Absolution. The principle is really the same for those who resort to the confessional as for those who are content with the General Confession and receive the General Absolution

in the Service. If the readmission to Holy Communion has been on the grounds that there ought to have been, or might conceivably have been an annulment of the first union—in other words, that possibly such union never existed as a real marriage—then the point does not arise. Nor, perhaps, does it arise when there has been invincible ignorance at the time of the re-marriage, or if the person concerned was not in any real sense a conscious Christian at the time.

Yet the crucial matter for the re-married divorcee is Absolution rather than Holy Communion, and since Absolution demands the discontinuance of the sin for which it is asked, many will conclude that it is impossible for them, although they may be in good faith and have rightly chosen the lesser of two evils in continuing their second union. It would seem to be illogical and irreverent to suggest that one of the essential conditions of Holy Communion should be waived in these cases. But, so far as the parish priest is concerned, his superior has taken responsibility for this and his authority must be accepted.

It is suggested by some that since Holy Communion is a major and Absolution a minor sacrament the lesser is included in the greater, but the fact remains that Absolution is dependent, amongst other things, upon the intention to abandon the sin for which it is asked, and that the re-married in the nature of their case cannot do. No doubt those who act in good faith and use the General Confession and General Absolution in the service as the full extent of their duty and need are content, and the parish priest need not worry about the exact effect upon their souls, or whether or not they receive full Absolution validly. But it is otherwise when they come to him for auricular confession. Once their confession is started he cannot question their sincerity, it is true, and he may only make use of the matter which they adduce, but he is placed in an embarrassing position if such a person comes to him beforehand and asks him to hear a confession. Many would feel bound to refuse, for in the confessional the priest's authority is the same as the Bishop's and he has no superior on earth. Of course, in the majority of cases in the writer's experience the priest does not see who is coming to make confession and only becomes aware of the person's identity after the confession has started.

Here is a matter which it seems necessary for the Convocations to discuss, as well as for moral theologians to consider. The parish priest has little to go upon at present.

AFTER-CARE

In the Canterbury Convocation the Bishops were asked to consider the pastoral care of the person whose application for re-admission to the Sacraments had been refused by the Bishop, and who was therefore, as it were, under penance. The Lower House was asked to set up a study group to go into the matter. But neither the Upper nor the Lower House was disposed to do this, and the purpose of this article is to stimulate discussion of this urgent problem amongst the parochial clergy themselves, for it is they who must deal with it; the Bishop has simply to make a decision, and although this is without question a heart-searching thing to do, when it is done he has no more to worry about. But the parochial clergy are tempted to evade the issue, and to steer clear as far as possible of these unhappy people, or, alternatively, to treat them as if nothing had happened.

The first object of the pastor's care should be to deepen the penitence to such a depth that the person is able to achieve a truly humble acceptance of the Bishop's decision as his due, and to accept the deprivation as part of the reparation he may make, filling up what is "lacking in the afflictions of Christ in my flesh, *for his body's sake, which is the Church*". The experience of the penance, like the experience of any sort of deprivation or suffering, may sweeten and improve a character, or may embitter and spoil it. It is bound to be a trial or test that admits of either reaction. Certainly such a person cannot remain indifferent to the matter, and if the former alternative is possible, as one has seen it in fact come about, the pastor must spare no pains to help his charge to achieve it.

Then the penitent must be constantly assured that God will not deny him grace because he may not receive it through a sacrament. Sacramental grace is guaranteed grace, but God is not bound by his own ordinances. It is still possible to make what is known as *spiritual communion* (although the phrase is not very accurate, for communion is essentially of the whole person—"preserve thy body and soul unto everlasting life"). People need careful instruction about this, and the set form is the greatest possible help to most of them. Grace clearly cannot be measured, and it would be idle to set

the value of sacramental grace over against the value of grace given otherwise by God. The loss to the penitent is two-fold. He loses, first of all, the guarantee of grace which is given by the outward act of communicating, and therefore it is harder for him to assure himself that grace is really being given him, despite the age-long belief of the Church that spiritual communion is the equivalent of sacramental communion where the latter may not be had. But, secondly, he loses the sense of community with his fellow-communicants. This is, in a sense, the greater loss, for the sense of belonging to one Family, the children of one God, is our greatest psychological assurance of salvation. Such penitents, therefore, need constant attention from the clergy, who alone can give them the sense of being still a part of God's Family, and still being the object of his care.

Moreover, there is no barrier to sharing in the worship of the Church both at Holy Eucharist and at the Sunday Offices, as well as at other services. Since all worship is in essence the offering to the Father his due, and his due can only be given by his Equal, the Son himself, there is never any question of a Christian being worthy to worship, for, plainly, none by himself ever can be worthy. All that is required of any of us in this regard is membership in Christ, and erring Christians, even excommunicate Christians, still have that. Normality is difficult for anyone to achieve, and such people are almost certain to be self-conscious in their public worship. Yet they should be instructed that if they are doing what their conscience tells them is right, even if it be but the lesser of two evils, they ought to take their normal place in worship.

But there are bound to be other consequent disabilities besides the loss of sacramental communion. They cannot hold office in the Church, or take part in some activities because of the possibility of scandal. This may cause them disappointment and frequent embarrassment from the ignorant and unfeeling, but has to be accepted as part of the penance for their position. How easy it is to write this! But every pastor knows the extreme delicacy of the situation and the difficulty of speaking the truth in love about such things, and deep humility and whole-hearted reliance upon our Lord and the power of his grace conveyed in Holy Order are required if the priest is not to seem priggish or harsh or pharisaical.

Where there are children great relief is afforded to a re-married parent by the effort to train the children in the ways of God, for a good parent will accept great personal loss for the sake of the

children. The childless, or those with older children can be, in the writer's experience, helped by being given humanitarian work to do, but even so there is a loneliness which follows inevitably from the lack of the fulness of Church life, and such a person is therefore called upon to cultivate the interior life very specially. It is not impossible for one to make great advances in spirituality whilst in this state, and the parish priest finds a most rewarding work to do in aiding this process by directing prayer and reading.

CONCLUSION

There are, happily, not lacking signs of a change in public opinion about the matter of divorce and re-marriage, and there seem now to be relatively few responsible people who really want the Church to be weak in her attitude. It seems very desirable that the strict standard should be maintained and at the same time the greatest possible compassion and care shown towards the victims of human sin. This will not only help the individuals concerned but will convince the public of the Church's sincerity, and will also aid those numerous heroic souls who are striving to be true to their vows despite great hardship and provocation.

THE SACRAMENTS OF INCORPORATION

W. H. ALLCHIN

THE equanimity of modern specialists, be they psychiatric or theological, is only preserved by a rigid insularity, fortified by jargon. This present paper is a short reconnoitring attempt whereby it is hoped to point out some common ground between the two disciplines, where some useful collision of ideas might take place.

The work of Freud and Jung has begun the systematic study of unconscious mental processes and already the reverberations of these new insights into our inner life have been far-reaching. Many of these insights are painful and wounding to our consciousness and there is a natural resistance to them. Nor should we gratuitously burden each other with a greater load of consciousness than that which is necessary for healthy development and function. The process of eating and digestion on which our physical existence rests, springs to mind. For example, after swallowing we lose all concern with the foodstuffs and only many hours later do we have our attention aroused when the elimination of waste products takes place. But the sufferings which we experience due to the presence of disordered function (for any cause) have forced us to submit the whole course of digestion to careful scrutiny, with the result that, armed with new knowledge, we can sometimes intervene successfully in the attempt to restore normality. And so it is with some of our inner mental processes, which we have likewise been compelled to subject to analysis.

This concern with the inner life has had its effect on our view of religion and there is, now, less interest in moralistic systems and more in the holistic reaction of the personality to the numinous experience. It is this experience, of the world as something given, of ourselves as created beings, of God as personality and the possibility of a meaningful relationship between ourselves and God which to-day comes under examination. Indeed, from St Paul onwards the limited power of moral exhortation has been constantly

experienced. For if we are concerned with the modification or transformation of human personality and behaviour this brings us face to face with the effects of the unconscious workings of the mind. And at this point we learn the limitations of the intellectual and the rational approach. In psychiatry, too, we find that to give the patient an intellectual account (however accurate) of the genesis and rationale of his illness does not, necessarily, go any of the way towards putting matters right. By anamnesis and analysis we can perhaps construct as it were a skeleton of the neurosis. But it is in the relationship between analyst and patient that the dry bones come to life and momentum is given to the process of change which it is hoped will lead to the restoration of normal function. This dialogue, proceeding on an unconscious as well as a conscious level, is the dynamic which underlies the personality development which can take place, not only in the therapeutic situation, but in any of the interpersonal relationships which we experience. It is in this area of relationship that religious and analytical thinking seem to come close together and it is for this reason that the psycho-physical act of Holy Communion comes before us.

Now whereas the gospels describe the observations and impressions of a small number of men and women who came into contact with Jesus in Palestine at a particular time, the subsequent history of the Church shows how this personal type of relationship seems to have continued. Something of the way in which this was to happen is forecast in the gospels themselves, for in John 6 comes the amazing call to share in what appeared to be a sort of cannibalistic meal. As then, so now, many turn away, shocked and even nauseated. But to those who could not be put off or rather who knew of no other solution ("Lord, to whom then, shall we go?") the pattern and shape of this eating together was demonstrated at the Last Supper. Since that time believers have assembled together to recapitulate in their minds the events of the life and death of Jesus and concurrently to eat bread and drink wine. It is perhaps here that analytical knowledge can tell us something of the unconscious activity accompanying these events.

Analysis of both children and adults has suggested something of the way in which we take in and integrate closely objects or part-objects from the outside world and make them part of our inner world. Now often in medicine some new knowledge has come from the sudden absence or dysfunction of a part or organ whose normal

function has remained obscure and yet been taken for granted. So here some of the clearest light on the inner processes of taking in, and identifying with loved persons or objects, has come from Freud's paper on *Mourning and Melancholia*, first published in 1917.[1] This shows how the human personality reacts to the loss of a loved object by setting under way an inner work of mourning which enables the psyche to re-establish an equilibrium, accepting the reality that the object is lost, as far as the external world is concerned, and yet in some way securing it within ourselves, so that when the task of mourning is completed, relations with the outside world can be readjusted. The inner work consists of detaching bit by bit the connections with the lost object, so that the energy that was bound up in the relationship can be freed and directed to other objects. But the process does not always go smoothly and grief may become a prolonged and intensified reaction called melancholia. The relationship with the lost object is not resolved, part of the ego becomes identified with it and, the loss becoming in fact a loss within the ego itself, a profound conflict is engendered. It is here that the ambivalent nature of the relationship is revealed, the object taken in having been experienced as both good and bad. Freud shows in a later work[2] that as the ego develops, a differentiated part of it, which he calls "super-ego", is made up of the parents, chiefly the father, who have been internalized. These internal objects become focal points in the individual's psychological development; for example the child identifies with one or other of the parents and takes a step forward in its struggle for greater integration and maturity. Melanie Klein has demonstrated how the psychic economy is made up of a balanced process of taking in (introjection) and giving out (projection). She stresses the crucial importance of the first taking in by the infant. She says: "The mother, first of all her breast, is the primal object for both the infant's introjective and projective processes . . . the internalized good breast, the prototype of good internal objects . . . established in the infant's mind."[3] Around this nucleus of a good object, this strong point in the precarious development of consciousness, further maturation proceeds, both in terms of capacity to give out and further to take in. She says: "The good internalized object is thus one of the preconditions for an integrated and stable ego and for good object relations . . . A securely established good object . . . gives the ego a feeling of riches and abundance which allows for an

outpouring of libido and projection of good parts of the self into the external world without a sense of depletion arising."[4]

It will be clear now why we have chosen the sacrament of Holy Communion for study because along with the conscious rehearsal of the facts of the life and death of Jesus and with the physical act of eating and drinking, goes the unconscious activity whereby the personality of our Lord is introjected and he becomes that good object within us. And we find that the idea of Jesus being inside the believer is one with which the New Testament has made us familiar. A quotation from John 6 gives emphasis to this concept: "He who feeds on my flesh and drinks my blood possesses eternal life (and I will raise him up on the last day), for my flesh is real food and my blood is real drink. He who feeds on my flesh and drinks my blood remains within me, as I remain within him. Even as the living Father sent me and I live by the Father, so he who feeds on me will also live by me."[5]

St Augustine says: "Receive therefore and eat the body of Christ, you who are already made members of Christ within the body of Christ.Take and drink the blood of Christ. Lest you should fall apart, drink that which binds you together . . . As this when you eat and drink it, is changed into you, so you are changed into the body of Christ by an obedient and holy life."[6]

And St John Chrysostom writes: "This is the effect of the nourishment he gives us; he merges himself in us in order that he may be all one single thing, as one body, joined to one head."[7]

And from a prayer of St John Damascene: "But I in my piteousness daring to receive thy whole Body—may I not be consumed . . ."[8]

And it seems that in the measure to which he is secured inside us (and we in him) so in turn we can give out something of that relationship which binds believers together as organic parts of the great body, the Church.

In this way we can envisage an inner development, the transforming possibilities of which go far beyond that which is based on the intellectual acceptance of moral or ethical systems, however lofty. As St Paul says, the Law itself deals a death blow, for while it describes and categorizes sin, and intensifies guilt, yet by itself it can offer nothing to change the balance of forces within the personality. In contrast the relationship, some aspects of which we have been describing, can provide momentum and direction for the

transforming process. This process seems to be a slow and painful one, for although a tendency towards wholeness seems to be an inherent property of the psyche, yet it cannot work unhindered. Consciousness has always to recognize and reconcile both internal and external demands. And it is in this process that some of the psyche's potentialities must be neglected and others opposed. The believer identifies himself with Jesus in his dying and burying as well as in his resurrection and living.

It may have seemed strange to some that we should attempt to bring into contact the teachings of the early Fathers of the Church with the ideas now propounded by analysts, or to discover that St Bernard writes about the breast of the bride in language which would hardly sound unfamiliar to Mrs Klein and her co-workers. However such is the actual phenomenon, and it may be that further investigation of it would prove fruitful.

1 S. Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia" (*Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, 1917, pp. 152-70).

2 S. Freud, *The Ego and the Id* (London, 1923).

3 M. Klein, "On Identification" (*New Developments in Psycho-analysis*, 1955, p. 310).

4 M. Klein, op. cit., p. 312.

5 John 6. 54-8 (Moffatt).

6 St Augustine (quoted in Clare Coll: *The Holy Communion*, Cambridge).

7 Ibid.

8 A Prayer of St John Damascene (quoted in *A Manual of Eastern Orthodox Prayers*, London, 1945, p. 76).

CORRESPONDENCE

MIRACLES

SIR,—It seems to me that the Reverend Basil Skinner's article "Is the Age of Miracles Past?"[1] is open to criticism on a number of points.

First—a very minor point—I have always understood the late Dr Barnes' use of the phrase "the large scale uniformity of nature" to have been due to the fact that, when he wrote, the Quantum Theory had introduced a seemingly random element into the physicist's conception of matter. I do not think that he was allowing a possibility of divine intervention at the level of the genes, but only accommodating his phraseology to the physics of the time when he was writing. However, that is a very small criticism, of no moment with regard to the main argument of the article.

Secondly, and much more fundamentally, it seems to me that the article can be criticized on the basis of its conception of "miracle". Nearly 25 years ago, as a young post-graduate student, I read two papers, one to the Society of the Department of Philosophy in my university and one to the Society of the Theological Faculty. Though the arguments in the two papers were quite different, as in each case chosen for the audience to which they were directed, the thesis of both papers was the same. This thesis was based on St Augustine's dictum in *De Civitate Dei* that miracles are not contrary to nature but to what is known of nature. (I have not got the reference by me and hesitate to quote the Latin from memory, lest I should misquote.) Since those papers were written, science has been producing material which seems to me to strengthen the case I tried to make then—the work of Dr J. B. Rhine and the field of psycho-somatic medicine can be instanced in particular. The one development I would make on the thesis of 25 years ago is that I would now claim that the sphere of "miracle" is always the sphere of Personality. I think that a strong case can be made out that Grace is never *mechanical*, but always involves a relationship between *persons*, but, however that may be, it seems certain that miracle always involves a personal factor—if a mountain is removed, the *mechanism* may be telekinesis or it may be mechanical excavators, but Faith is always involved, and Faith is an attribute of *persons*; if a healing takes place, the mechanism may be explicable in terms of psycho-somatic medicine *plus* telepathy, but the healing does not take place without that Faith which is the Gift of God, *from* a Person *to* a person.

Thirdly, it seems to me that to introduce a category of "the supernatural" can lead to great dangers. I have always thought that there is

[1] *C.Q.R.* No. 325, Vol. CLVII (Oct.—Dec. 1956).

a great deal of—probably quite unconscious—Neo-Arianism about in these days. It is very prevalent in "popular" thought and utterances, but it is also to be found in the thought and utterances of those who should be conscious of the theological issues involved. Arianism was not primarily or fundamentally a *Christological* heresy—Arius agreed with the Catholics on the relation of the Logos to the Person of Christ. The fundamental heresy of Arianism lay in making the Logos *a subordinate Divine Being*. If we substitute the modern term "Nature" for the ancient term "Logos" this is just the position which is so common to-day—"Nature" is treated as a Divine Being, subordinate indeed to God but having its own quasi-independent sphere. It is not the Father who makes the sun to rise and the rain to fall, but "Nature"; the *vis medicatrix* is *naturae*, not *Dei*; no longer is every virtue we possess his alone, but there is a *natural* milk of human kindness and a *super-natural* Caritas; and so forth. "Nature" may be treated as *homoiousios* with God, but not as *homoousios*—it is very much the same thing as the Logos of Arius. Calvin could declare that there is as much of a miracle in every shower of rain that falls as in the Stilling of the Tempest, but nowadays the shower of rain belongs to the sphere of a quasi-independent divine power called "Nature" or "Natural Law", subordinate to God, but not to be confounded with his workings such as the Stilling of the Tempest. "*Rerum, Deus, tenax vigor*" has become an Almighty Engineer who has set the cosmos going, no doubt, and who may occasionally intervene to oil the works, but who, on the whole, leaves the engine to run according to Natural Law. To confine the "super-natural" interventions to oiling the works, making running repairs, making modifications to improve the machine, etc., is to remove the ordinary running of the universe from the sphere of God and hand it over to the sphere of "Nature". All this, to me, savours of unconscious Arianism in a modern guise.

Fourthly, as an attempt to leave room for religious ideas in a "scientific" universe, the description of natural laws as "transitory formulae" is just selling the pass. Of course, scientists—like philosophers, scholars, and theologians—will always treat their latest findings as if they were final truth and be dogmatic, but this tendency is *human* and not specifically *scientific*. That new discoveries modify the formulation of "natural law" is a tenet of scientific method—the *formulation* may be "transitory", but such formulation is only the attempt to describe "natural laws", not the laws themselves. The planets moved in their courses long before Ptolemy, Copernicus, or Newton started to formulate the laws of their motion. That the formulae of Ptolemy were superseded by those of Copernicus and his by those of Newton does not mean that the planets are not guided by God in such a regular way that *some day* we may have a *perfect* formula to describe the "laws" of their motion. If there is a lawful order in God's universe, as science believes, then more and more the details of that order may progressively become known, and our formulae adjusted to the reality. To show that at the present day our formulae are transitory, does not affect the *given* reality which the formulae attempt to describe. Attempts to "defend" religious

ideas against science which involve religion in an attempt to entrench itself *at the point where science allows at any particular moment* must always lead to a subsequent retreat, as science advances. It does the cause of religion little good to take up a position from which retreat is inevitable. Still worse than the "transitory formulae" line of defence is the suggestion that there are laws "incapable of detection by laboratory techniques". Dr Rhine regards himself as the first lone pioneer in devising laboratory techniques for this very purpose. He envisages that science will shortly begin to make its next advances along the lines he has marked out. Thirty years ago everyone would have agreed that telepathy and telekinesis, if they existed, were certainly not susceptible to investigation by laboratory techniques and could never be reduced to scientific disciplines. Now it would seem that Dr Rhine's technique is duly accepted as "scientific". I think we need to be very wary about suggesting that anything is beyond the range of scientific investigation. However, all this is not relevant to the real question at issue. I need not the less believe that the planets are kept in their courses only by God because the laws of planetary motions have been established by science. No more will I cease to believe that God can heal cancer because science —in a hundred years' time—has established that prayer works according to certain laws.

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SACRAMENTAL INTENTION

Sir,—While deeply appreciative of the extended notice of my book, *Anglican Orders*, in your last issue, may I make just one point—not a controversial one—in connection with Dr Mascall's very courteous review?

I am very far indeed from holding the view of sacramental intention which Dr Mascall ascribes to me on, e.g., page 10 in his article. Dr Mascall apparently assumes that I hold a strict view of intention, a view identical with, or at least very similar to, that of Fr F. Clark. The opposite is the case; as I stress repeatedly in my book, I am, in this question, a resolute "minimizer", holding the same view as Adrian Fortesque and Dr Mascall himself, which I believe to be the view of Cardinal Bellarmin. In my discussion of the Methodist baptisms in Oceania in the pages (43-44) to which Dr Mascall refers, I do not, as he says, "distinguish this case from that of the Anglican consecrators" on the ground of intention, but on the ground of correctness of form or rite.

I hold that a sacramental rite, when properly and seriously performed, can never, except perhaps in the most improbable circumstances, be invalid (still less, be proved to be invalid) on grounds of intention. In my view, defect of intention can hardly arise except as a corollary of defect of rite. I state this "minimizing" view of intention in many places in my book, e.g., on pages 16, 18, 29, 36, 41, 42, 58, 60 and, in my *ex professo* treatment of the subject in an Appendix on Ministerial Intention, 66-68.

I suppose the misapprehension to have arisen from Dr Mascall's assuming too readily that all good Jesuits agree on all points of theology; starting with this not altogether unnatural assumption, he appears to have read into my brief discussions of intention a view almost the opposite of that which I actually hold (and, I venture to think, quite clearly express)—particularly perhaps as my short book is principally concerned with form, and only incidentally with intention. And, of course, on the main question, that of defect of form, Fr Clark and I do agree.

A. A. STEPHENSON, S.J.

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Dr Mascall writes:

I owe Fr Stephenson an apology for having misunderstood his views on sacramental intention; having re-read his book after reading Fr Clark's, I rashly assumed both writers to be in agreement on the matter. It is clear, in the light of this difference between two members of the same religious order, that theologians of the Roman Communion are as far as ever from being able unanimously to tell us the precise nature of the defect of intention which Leo XIII claimed to have discerned in Anglican orders.

May I take this opportunity of correcting two slips in my article? In note 34, lines 5 to 7 should read ". . . the view so sweepingly dismissed by Dr Messenger is now supported not only by Mgr Journet but also . . .", and Fr Bligh's Christian name should be given as John.

E. L. MASCALL

REVIEWS

SACRAMENTAL SYMBOLISM

CHRISTIANITY AND SYMBOLISM. By F. W. DILLISTONE. Collins. 21s.

THE place of the symbol in human art, thinking, and living has become an outstanding preoccupation of both the creative and the critical intelligence. Its significance for literature (the special concern of two successive occupants of the Chair of Poetry at Oxford) and for the plastic arts as they are now practised, needs no emphasis. Wittgenstein and other pioneers in the philosophical analysis of language have drawn attention to the symbolistic character of our conscious thinking; Jung and his school have gone far towards establishing the fundamental importance of archetypal images at the sub-conscious level. Theologians for their part have returned with new zest to the study of types in the Bible, and (in France at least) have thrown fresh light on the nature of sacramental signification.

The Dean of Liverpool's important book does not deal with all of these themes, nor examine any one of them exhaustively. His controlling interest is in the theology of the sacraments, and his purpose in writing is to set these against the wider background of symbolism in general, rather than to say anything particularly original about the latter. His method is synthetic rather than analytic, and aims at illuminating his subject rather than at giving a systematic account of it. In this his book succeeds admirably.

He does, for all that, produce from comparison of his chosen authorities a valuable classification of the various kinds of sign and symbol, and of their relation to one another and to the levels of human awareness. From it he draws the distinction, on which much of his argument depends, between the *analogical* symbol, marked by simplicity and close correspondence with its object, and the *metaphorical* symbol, always closely packed with meaning and in tension with its object. Armed with this he proceeds to examine, with special reference to Semitic and Greek world-outlooks, a number of aspects of symbolism all more or less closely related to the Christian sacraments—nature, time, language, symbolic persons, and symbolic action. Of these his treatment of language is the most open to criticism. Sacraments involve not only the use of symbolic objects and the performance of symbolic actions but the pronouncing of significant words. Recent philosophical studies have devoted much attention to the use and meaning of words, and some of their findings would have been at least as relevant to the author's main theme as the theories about the origin of language which he discusses.

The climax of the argument is his treatment of the symbolism of baptism and the Eucharist. His masterly account of the varieties of water-symbolism—water the source of life, water the purifier, water the adversary to be overcome, water the barrier to be passed over—and their significance for, and application to, Christian Baptism, is remarkably suggestive and illuminating. On the Eucharist he is not quite so uniformly successful. He sees clearly that its fundamental symbolism is that of sacrifice, and it is a new pleasure to find a writer in the evangelical tradition who has read with such care and profit the eucharistic writing of Masure. But he is, for all that, less than fair to Masure at one point, when he takes him to task for emphasizing man's part in sacrificial activity at the expense of God's. Now Masure does not deny the initiative of God in creation and redemption; he assumes it. But his theme is sacrifice as found in human experience, which is, whether its emphasis be on the gift or the communion, a God-directed activity of *men*. If indeed it was only the Son of *God* who could offer himself without spot to the Father, he had still to become *man* in order to be able to make the oblation. It should not be assumed that the concept of sacrifice covers the entire range of the God-man relationship.

Dr Dillistone's criticism of the Roman tradition in eucharistic theology, as owing too much to the sacrificial practice of pagan Rome (in which the actual feeding on the elements offered was unimportant and indeed comparatively rare) certainly deserves further investigation. But he does not do justice to the real strength of that tradition, which is the care with which it has worked out the relation of sacramental signification to sacrifice. It is a pity that he should at this point abandon the wise guidance of Masure for that of a C.T.S. tract. The interpretation of the eucharistic symbolism which Dr Dillistone himself, following Calvin, favours lays all the weight upon the action of breaking the bread, which he relates to the breaking of the flask in Jeremiah 19. But this is to ignore (*a*) the inferior MS. authority for "my body . . . broken for you" in 1 Cor. 11. 24; (*b*) that the breaking was only one in a series of actions; and (*c*) that all of these were already familiar to those who shared in Jewish table-fellowship. What was new was not the choice of elements, nor what was done with them, but what they were declared to be. It may be noted that the conclusions of Professor Jeremias are at one with the Roman tradition in finding the sacrificial implications of the rite in the association of *body* with *blood*—the new meaning imparted by the spoken word to the old ritual.

This has some bearing on Dr Dillistone's provocative final chapter in which he raises the question how far Christian symbols have become outmoded. He finds side by side in the Christian sacraments, as the Church has administered them, an aspect which is essential and unchanging, and one (or more) which adapts itself to the imaginative capacity of a particular generation. Thus in baptism the former aspect is the water-ritual; the latter he suggests might be supplied for our times by the enrolment of the candidate's name (he does not make it clear how far, if at all, he would be prepared to dispense with the water-ritual

altogether). Turning to the Eucharist, he argues that the symbolism of bread is the permanent element, while the cup as symbol of covenant-relationship might in theory be replaced by something else (though he does not claim to know what). This is to make the cup-ritual less essential to the Eucharist than the bread-ritual, a view which accords readily enough with Dr Dillistone's own interpretation of it, but which implies either that it formed no part of the original institution (a theory no longer as fashionable as it was in the heyday of the liberal period thirty wears ago), or that the contemporary Church is qualified to sit in judgement on and, if need be, to alter the Lord's own prescription. Few orthodox Christians would be prepared to go as far as this, and the finality of the declared will of Christ in fact supplies the only criterion by which the permanence or transience of any aspect of Christian symbolism can safely be tested.

It would not be right to end on a note of criticism. Dr Dillistone has put us all in his debt by a study of the highest relevance both for the Church in the contemporary world and for the ecumenical discourse of Christians.

HUMPHREY GREEN

SYMBOLS IN STONES

ARCHITECTURAL SYMBOLISM OF IMPERIAL ROME AND THE MIDDLE AGES. By E. BALDWIN SMITH. Princeton University Press. 60s.

NO ONE can fail to be impressed with this beautifully produced book. Princeton University Press has a high standard in format and typography. The sixteen pages of illustrations containing 175 reproductions of plans, pictures, and coins in miniature, come at the end of the book and are clearly and conveniently arranged to supplement the text. Still more impressive is Professor Smith's enthusiasm for his subject. In his introduction he freely confesses that there can be no specific proof of his thesis, nothing but accumulation of evidence will secure conviction. And so he batters away, with close-packed argument supported by a diffuse scholarship, indefatigable from the first page to the last. The ecclesiastical symbolism of Victorian days has long been exploded—nobody now thinks that a church with a crooked axis symbolizes the drooping head of the Crucified—so that one comes to this book with some scepticism. But even a sceptic has to confess that Professor Smith has something here.

His thesis is that the buildings of the Ancient World and the Middle Age did not acquire the shape they have because it was useful, or because it was thought beautiful, but because it meant something. It had symbolic value. The form of the architecture was intended to convey ideas and to strengthen popular beliefs. It would almost be true to say

that the rulers of antiquity used their buildings for political propaganda. The city gate, for instance, with its archway and flanking towers, or the free-standing Triumphal Arch, built by the shrewd Augustus to impress the provincials with the majesty and power of Rome, conveyed more than that to folk who inherited a conviction that the ruler was, in some sense, divine. And when the Roman Emperors courted apotheosis, no one was in the least surprised. After all, even in England, it took a long time before Christianity, nationalism, and representative government were able to divest the monarch of his relationship to God. And so, to the unlearned at any rate, the arched gateway was the gate of Heaven, the towered façade was the wall of the Heavenly City, and the arcaded balcony above the gate was the gallery where the ruler appeared at his Epiphany. Other imperial and celestial symbols made their appearance as Hellenistic ideas came in from the East, and Professor Smith examines at length the significance of the imperial ciborium, the baldachin, and the domical vestibule and hall. At the end of the Empire all this symbolism had become sacred and inextricably interwoven with ideas of imperial and ecclesiastical domination.

The Carolingian rulers in the ninth century, wanting an architecture which would embody their ideas and express their admiration for everything Roman, found it ready to their hand. Such churches as the Abbey of St Denis and Centula were provided with a "westwerk" or advanced narthex, which, besides the traditional symbolic features of imperial rule, contained a royal chapel often (as at Aachen) dedicated to St Saviour, "intended to be seen as a monumental expression of the Saviour-like nature of the ruler". In fact, it is contended, the desires and needs of the western Emperors for domination were such that they readily adopted both the political claims and divine aspirations of their pagan predecessors. To express and publish them they made use of the ancient imperial architectural symbolism. "It is no longer possible", says Professor Smith of the Carolingian period, "to explain the square towers flanking the entrance and the round towers which rise up so high at both ends of the early churches, as merely bell towers or a means of access to the upper galleries or chapels; because they were seen and thought of, regardless of their functions, as symbols of the *palatium* and heavenly *castrum*."

When Professor Smith attempts to extend the continuity of these ideas and their architectural expression into the Norman period, he seems to be less convincing. The Normans undoubtedly copied building conventions which had originated from Rome, but there is no likelihood that these features brought with them into Normandy and England the old imperial and celestial ideas. At any rate the comments made on the buildings of Christ Church, Canterbury, (from a twelfth century drawing) belong to the realm of fantasy. The "Paradise Chamber" near the gateway was no more than a special bedroom for a distinguished guest—like "Jerusalem" at Westminster—and neither a "royal oratory" nor of any heavenly import. And surely it is a little far-fetched to conclude that the King of England was received at Canterbury as the "Royal

Christus" because the gable of the main gateway was surmounted by an orb "as on the gables of the palace of Herod".

Though the argument of symbolic meaning seems sometimes to be pressed too far, the book is a valuable contribution to that evergreen controversy about art forms—should they be functional or ideological. Professor Smith is strong for ideological architecture, and next time I look at the towered western façade of Rochester Cathedral, or Norwich, or Wells, I shall find myself saying, "Now what did Gundulf, or Losinga, or Jocelin mean by that?"

SEIRIOL EVANS

PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT

CONTEMPORARY BRITISH PHILOSOPHY: Third Series. Edited by H. D. LEWIS. George Allen and Unwin. 35s.

THERE are philosophers who seek to provide systematic answers to the great problems: there are philosophers who argue only about words. There are constructive philosophers and philosophers who merely analyse the assertions of others. There are philosophers who are not afraid to fashion a technical vocabulary to express what ordinary speech cannot express: there are philosophers who make a fetish of ordinary speech and refuse to tamper with it in any way. There are metaphysicians; and (alas) there are anti-metaphysicians.

This is at least how the situation looks to many non-philosophers to-day. But in fact it is immensely more complex. This excellent new volume of essays shows most vividly just how complex it is. For here we have linguistic analysts and metaphysicians cheek by jowl; philosophers whose thought has been indelibly marked by positivism and the developments from it, and others who have more or less by-passed those trends. And yet the set of slick antitheses which I began by stating above quite fails to sort them out into two clear factions.

For example: Stuart Hampshire ("Identification and Existence") opts for neither the positivists' over-simple equation, "meaning = verification", or its over-hospitable successor, "if the word has a use, its meaning is sound". Instead, he takes as his key question: "Can one *single out* whatever is being spoken about *for identification*? Are there clear or confused criteria for applying the concept in particular situations?" Hampshire's empiricism is not a system-denying philosophy. He even claims that more may be learned from Leibniz than from Hume, where we look for enlightenment on the interrelations between our fundamental notions.

Again, F. Waismann, whose views intersect with Wittgenstein's at many points, is far from regarding the results of metaphysics as so much speculative junk. Metaphysics can profoundly illuminate the way

language works: it may jerk us sharply out of the complacency with which we let ordinary speech dictate our vision of the world. There need be no embargoes on attempts to alter, transform, or break ordinary language, provided consistency is observed in the innovations. The good philosopher must learn to think "up-speech" as the good swimmer learns to swim up-stream.

But statements like these ought not to suggest that the philosophy of language is in retreat before the triumphant traditional metaphysicians. Granted that linguistic philosophers have in fact constantly pursued several of the activities which Fr Copleston in his article wants to call metaphysics (e.g. drawing unnoticed implications of the familiar into the light), there are still deep differences of approach between linguistic analysts and others in the handling of classical metaphysical questions. It is *partly* a matter of caution. The philosopher who has repeatedly seen how apparently straightforward questions can be shown up as confused and muddled, requiring not to be solved but *dis*solved, approaches a question like Dr Ewing's ("Does causality have much in common with logical entailment?") or one of Fr Copleston's ("What is the purpose of human existence and human history?") far more cautiously than those authors do, expecting that the question may have to suffer radical transformation before it can even be seen clearly as "askable" at all—far less answerable.

Perhaps the axle on which the greater part of those differences revolves is the problem (recurrent in this volume) of the relation between language itself and what language is used to talk about. To summon philosophy back to "reality" from the ivory tower of language is tempting but futile: for the way we *apprehend* that reality is quite inescapably moulded by the structure of the language used in speaking of it. There seems no doubt that the writers who see furthest here are those who have learned most from Wittgenstein, and that there is bound to be a certain shallowness in the pronouncements of those others who have not had that discipline. This anthology again presents an accurate microcosm of present-day responses to that problem.

Most of the contributors have a two-fold aim: to deal with some specific philosophical problem, and to handle it in a way that makes clear their conception of proper philosophical method. R. I. Aaron quarrels with the dichotomy "rational-empirical". Fundamental logical truths, he believes, *do* reflect very general features of the world we live in. H. B. Acton makes a painstaking survey of forms of argument used in justifying political obedience and disobedience. The nature of philosophical scepticism is A. J. Ayer's theme. Ayer is not satisfied with the short way with sceptics—the appeal to common sense. With characteristic neatness, he draws a small scale map of an intricate piece of philosophical terrain—plotting the many different points at which the sceptic may be challenged and what those challenges amount to. On sensing and sense-data, two papers can profitably be held alongside one another: Gilbert Ryle denies that sense-impressions need be invoked as the raw material from which we think our way to recognition of

things and people: W. H. F. Barnes uses Rylean methods to attack Rylean strongholds. C. A. Campbell (on "Self-activity and its Modes") sees philosophy far more like a task for hard introspection—in striking contrast to the Wittgensteinian insistence that nothing is hidden, that our difficulties are intricate "surface" confusions. Fr Copleston's denial that rigorous proofs are possible for a metaphysics may be usefully compared with Waismann's (superficially) similar claim, that philosophers can only bring into relief the neglected aspect, the alternative "slant". Yet in the detailed treatment of actual problems their ways would diverge dramatically.

J. N. Findlay writes interestingly on ways of talking about time, assessing their relative adequacy. H. A. Hodges and the Editor tackle problems in the philosophy of religion: Hodges covering perhaps too much ground in too little detail, despite exciting patches; Lewis characterizing well the differences between idolatry and worship. J. D. Mabbott contributes a most valuable criticism of the recent defences of deterministic and utilitarian accounts of punishment and responsibility. His paper raises fascinating questions about the relation between philosophical theories and *practical* moral living, a topic also discussed by L. J. Russell from a different viewpoint. K. R. Popper militates effectively against a popular theory of science. In a gem of a study, H. H. Price criticizes the often used argument from the "illusion" of perspectival change in the appearance of objects. On "Ethical Intuition" D. M. MacKinnon well expresses what makes intuitionists so reluctant to capitulate under the heavy recent linguistic fire. We experience a tension between seeing morality as something we create and as something we discover or recognize. W. C. Kneale contributes a well-turned logician's piece, H. J. Paton a philosophical autobiography.

Younger philosophers, the Editor hopes, will have a chance to feature in a possible further volume in the same series. From the names cited in this review, it is obvious that his choice of authors has in this volume been neither one-sided nor arbitrary.

RONALD W. HEPBURN

PACIFIC MISSIONS

BETWEEN TWO MIRACLES. By STUART CRAIG. Independent Press. 6s.

HERE we have a brightly written and highly "factual" record of the evangelization of the Pacific Isles by the emissaries of the London Missionary Society. The story covers well over a hundred years. Mr Stuart Craig recently spent seven months *in situ*, studying the problems and appreciating the achievements of the Christian groups which stem from the Apostolic work of John Williams and his associates.

Williams was a Tottenham ironmonger, a man in the same tradition as St Francis Xavier, William Carey, and Henry Martin—on fire to spread

the Gospel as he knew it. Sent out to the Society Islands, some twenty years after the efforts of the first missionaries had issued in failure, this young man acquired a knowledge of the native tongues in an amazingly short time; was instrumental in turning a murderous and barbaric group of tribes into peace-loving folk; drew up codes of laws for them on a Christian basis, ordained a Civil administration, built with his own hands a 60-foot sea-worthy ship, and both translated and had printed the New Testament Scriptures in the Rarotonga language. He taught a Congregational polity, which became the "established church" in the eight main groups of islands. Welcomed almost wherever he went, Williams sailed as far as the West Hebrides, where he was murdered by cannibals when visiting Rurtangan in 1839, at the age of 43.

By reason of his outstanding work and martyr's death, Williams is the principal figure in the work of this mission, but there were many others who gave their lives. As has so often happened, the work of the missionaries was hampered by the brutality of traders and sailors—not for the most part Britishers. Many native Christians were captured and carried into slavery by "blackbirders", to Peru.

In most of the Pacific Islands Congregationalism reigns supreme, but this is not so in Samoa, where the Methodists have proved an unwelcome intrusion, followed by the inevitable American "fancy" sects. This has involved rivalry, and though the headquarters of the different communions may encourage a drawing together, "non-theological factors", says Mr Craig, "dominate the situation".

The book is called "Between two Miracles". The first miracle was the fact that no less than thirty men responded to the call of the L.M.S. to volunteer for the South Sea Isles, and sailed from the Thames in the *Duff* in 1796. "The records reveal a costly obedience and a desperate urgency for the saving of souls which bring us in our day sharply under judgement", says the writer. The second Miracle is yet to come. "Demas hath forsaken me, having loved this present world", is the cry of evangelists the world over. After the first enthusiasm of the Gospel message has died down the appeal of the old gods supervenes. Conventional Christianity is dominant, but what ultimate value lies in that? "The difficulties are greatly increased by the tightness of the Communities' hold on the individual in these Island cultures. What is so desperately needed is moral power in individual lives." That, says our writer, will be the second Miracle.

The book is full of shrewd judgements, and Churchmen will learn much from its perusal.

T. Dilworth-Harrison

CHRISTIAN MUSLIM ENCOUNTER

THE CALL OF THE MINARET. By KENNETH CRAGG. Oxford University Press. London: Cumberlege. 38s.

THE question of the nature of the meeting between the Christian and the man of another faith is exercising the minds of a small but increasing number of Christians. It was the concern of a group consultation at Davos in 1955 between departments of the World Council of Churches and the International Missionary Council, leading to the formation of a continuative committee to work out and set going a scheme of study. It is hoped that this work will be closely linked with the study centres which are being formed in different parts of the world. The author of this book in September 1956 entered upon a field of exploration in Jerusalem towards seeking a new level of understanding and relationship between Christians and Muslims as a prelude to a genuine encounter.

This book is concerned with just this question of the relationship between Christianity and Islam. It is divided into three parts. The first presents the contemporary setting of the Islamic world and brings us face to face with the problems Muslims are facing. The second is a study of Islam based upon the theme-pattern of the *adhan*, the Call to Prayer, and asks to what this invitation invites the Muslim. In short but penetrating studies Dr Cragg considers the problems Islam has to face over its beliefs in the one God, the apostleship of Muhammad, the ritual of prayer, and the Islamic ordering of society, which must be maintained throughout change if Islam is to retain its unique identity. The fundamental principles of Islam in Church and State are considered historically in its development in accordance with its own inner principles, leading up to the questions which these pose to the Muslim of to-day. The great merit of the treatment is that it approaches these themes, not along stereotyped textbook lines, but from a new and, so far as the Christian of informed understanding and sympathy can do this, interior viewpoint. It is based upon the conviction that the purely academic and detached approach and attitude of the scholar, to-day increasingly specialist, fails to do justice to Islam. This is only too evident in most introductory textbooks. Those who are prepared to go further, as Dr Cragg shows, are too often motivated by utilitarian attitudes to convey any real apprehension of the heart of Islam, whilst converts to Islam have, in general, proved least able to mediate its spirit. The scholarly preparation is a necessary preliminary, but with that as a background the way is open for a more imaginative approach, that of intuitive understanding and insight.

Such an approach calls for a similar response from the Muslim side to understand Christianity, for only a few Muslims have shown any sign of a constructive approach, and to the limitations of these few Dr Cragg refers. It also calls for a new encounter. We and they, Christians and Muslims, must seek for a sanctified relationship, each bringing to the encounter the faith in which we ourselves live.

Whilst the second part is concerned with what the Call has to say to the Muslim, an essay towards the Christian understanding of Islam, the third part asks and seeks to answer what the Call has to say to the Christian. It is necessary for Christians to understand what are the barriers to communication, what lies behind the traditional Muslim attitude to Christianity, Islam's sense of unique community and consequent otherness, and the need for reparation on both sides. The tenth chapter, for instance, brings out the great contrasts: revelation in Christianity and in Islam (the foundation of Christianity is the Word become flesh, that of Islam is the Word become book); or, the relationship between God and man in Christianity is that of Father and son, in Islam of Master and slave. It shows the Muslim objections to Christianity in relation to the Scriptures, the person of Christ, the scandal of the Cross, the Trinity, and the nature of the Christian society. In short, it brings out the main problems of Christian interpretation to Muslims and of the whole Christian mission to Islam.

Dr Cragg rightly says that "to hold back from the fullest meeting with Muslims would be to refrain from the fullest discipleship to Christ." True, but we cannot plunge into that without a long and patient preparing of the way. The last chapter is entitled significantly "The Call to Patience", for a new level of mutual understanding and mediation must be reached first. His book is a step towards this. It is written in the spirit of one who invites to conversation, not controversy, and for Christians who are seeking the change from Monologue to Dialogue marks an advance in Christian understanding. The author points out that a great danger facing religions in physical contact is that they become incommunicative and introverted in their religious life and expression. Some Christians, for instance, in abandoning the old attitudes have adopted a negative one which avoids contact at any vital level. The encounter of faiths is an inescapable obligation if they are to keep alive and offer guidance to their adherents to-day. But before there can be any question of a genuine encounter the way must be prepared. That means the approach of sympathy and understanding. Mission is not just a one-way process. Islam has a mission to Christianity as well as Christianity to Islam.

One of the difficulties of this confrontation lies in the fact that Christians are too largely concerned with it on an intellectual level, but that is only one aspect. Communication means the transmitting of something which belongs to us in our whole being, and, as Dr Cragg affirms, "what we are concerned first to communicate is not a doctrine but the experience which made it", that is, the inner reality of a religion which transforms the lives of Christians and Muslims. What has to be sought is an encounter between Christianity as a living fact and Islam as a living fact. So far as Christianity is concerned the plain fact is that the Gospel has proved incommunicable to Muslims, and the fault is not on one side only. The Christian message we believe to have its relevance to all men in all situations, but what missions do not face is the fact that Christianity has no "power" (in the Pauline sense).

Where the reviewer would take issue is over the assumption that Christian missionary work should continue to follow much the same lines as in the past. One questions whether the latter part brings out sufficiently the changing climate about missionary work, interior as well as external, a change which is surely implicit from all the preceding study at reaching a new understanding. In the contemporary setting, to attempt to win converts, for instance, does not help. We are called to be ambassadors of reconciliation, not of division (although we admit that the Gospel necessarily creates conflict and is therefore divisive, but the Gospel we have already said is at present incommunicable). Muslims are facing a spiritual and cultural crisis. The so-called "resurgence of Islam" must not be equated with a spiritual revival of Islam. Little sign can be discerned of any genuine spiritual awakening. The stress placed upon Islam in different ways by the Islamic nations is based upon their need to assert their distinctive cultural and religious basis, and any reformulation of Islam to suit the needs of Muslims living in a new age must be upon that basis. Should not Christians to-day seek simply to atone for the crimes of their governments and help in the immediate situation? If they cannot now communicate the insights of the Gospel, should they not help Islam to reconstitute itself to provide the basis of life for the millions who are born into its fold?

This book which has stimulated these questions is so important that it may be recommended as the best that has been written to help all who have these issues at heart.

J. S. Trimingham

OLD TESTAMENT STUDIES. I

The Faith of Israel. By H. H. Rowley. S.C.M. Press. 18s.

Old Testament theology is nowadays at a discount. No one seems particularly eager to engage in it. Gone are the days of Davidson when it was still both possible and attractive to present the Faith of Israel in systematic terms. Wheeler Robinson died before he could complete his task. Eichrodt has been translated only in one or two small sections, Procksch's work remains unknown. This melancholy scene is not due to the laziness of indolent scholars. The difficulties are objective and enormous. How is the theologian to write a theology when form-critical doubts assail him on every side? How is he to accommodate the vast parallels of religio-historical concern? Can he, for instance, present a dogma of the being of God without presenting the endless beings of the gods of the Near East? Can YHWH stand alone, and, if so, must not his relationship to the pagan pantheon confuse the work at every step? No wonder, then, that most scholars become almost unconsciously theological positivists and even say openly that a linguistic analysis of the Old Testament must suffice. Doctrine is, after all, somewhat metaphysical and therefore suspect. But greater still is the one and abiding

obstacle that the Old Testament is a Jewish book. Should it be interpreted in such a manner which ignores the fulfilment in Christ, or may the Lord Jesus well and truly govern its interpretation? Jews will have none of it, for the Faith of Israel, they say, does not include belief in Jesus. Catholics will have it in no other way, for the Faith of Israel is no true faith at all except for the Church's authority to say what it was in view of what it became. But the Protestant theologian parts company with both views. He has no authority except that which his own conscience believes the evidence to state in its own terms.

This must be said to show how much we owe to Professor Rowley in giving us his book, not on the theology of the Old Testament, but, cautiously worded, on some aspects of the Faith of Israel. He does not write as if Jesus had not come at the end, nor as if traditional Church dogma guided his pen. He is one of those few who, knowing all the critical questions of the present age. are still bold enough to draw conclusions which concern the Faith of Israel and not only the transmission or language of the text. The present work arose out of lectures, given at short notice at Richmond, Virginia, in 1955. Although the author draws on material previously published the book is perhaps his most comprehensive attempt to "theologize".

He begins with a study of Revelation and its Media. A quick survey of the tools of divination and the higher forms of prophetic inspiration leads up to his thesis that none of these were unique in themselves. Revelation "through a complex of personality and event in certain moments of special significance" (p. 40) is the truly Biblical contribution. In this connection he gives pride of place to Moses and the Exodus, and indeed throughout the book it is refreshing to find that he fully accepts the tradition that Moses occupies the highest position in the Faith of Israel.

Next Dr Rowley turns to the Nature of God. This leads to a condensed discussion of the names of God in the Old Testament. How did YHWH become the *Elohim* of Israel? The secret still remains well guarded despite all etymological attempts to trace the origins of the YHWH tradition. Between Ras Shamra and Egypt lies the Midianite desert, and there Moses was chosen and in his call YHWH made himself known as LORD. His moral attributes, which are personal, are more significant than his qualities of power and glory. They underlie the loving covenant-relationship which continues despite Israel's sin. The Nature and Need of Man, which concern us next, are directly dependent upon God's will. Man does not live as if God did not exist. His spiritual kinship with God, in which God's image may be found, solicits a deep fellowship with the Creator. Morality and culture are no ends in themselves, though they may become that, even in Israel; both the cultus and personal example, as of the Servant, are destined to save Israel, not only from foreign bondage but on all levels of its political and moral existence. But what is Israel? A lecture about "Individual and Community" discusses the very involved problem of man and society, as mirrored in the Old Testament. "In the true faith of Israel every man

was his brother's keeper, and his brother was every man" (p. 123); for the Bible affirms life as ultimately good and desirable for all men. "The good life", as the goal of existence, lies behind the social and liturgical institutions, which are studied next. Problems like the rise of the synagogue are primarily historical, but the institution itself is also a theological witness that life on earth can be lived in the Presence of God. But how can life reflect the goodness of God when men perish and die? "Death and Beyond" and "The Day of the Lord", the last two lectures, deal with those eschatological issues which Judaism is so often loath to discuss. The Old Testament has a "less sure embrace of the hope of any satisfying life after death" than the rich, though not clearly defined, faith of the New Testament. The reasons for this eschatological reticence are discussed in connection with some important passages, such as Job 19. 25ff. The "meagre gleaning" from the Old Testament is not to be slurred over; it testifies to the "reaching out" after the faith rather than the faith itself. But the forward look is there and with its Messianic direction it must comprehend the whole world: "The Davidic leader, the Son of Man, the Suffering Servant, all in different ways are linked with the coming of the day when men's hearts shall be changed and brought into harmony with God's will, and universal peace and righteousness come amongst men" (p. 199).

The book may be especially recommended to all who, as teachers and preachers, wish to be adequately informed about recent data of scholarship and to see how these may be harnessed to theological discussion. Dr Rowley's views are always balanced and fully documented. Flights of fancy are foreign to him; indeed it may sometimes be questioned whether the *rational* approach can ever do full justice to something essentially *irrational*. It is certainly true that the demonic element and the revelatory mystery cannot find the fullest expression in a work which is deliberately linked to problems of history. But this observation merely reiterates the groan which concerns all contemporary theology, as stated at the beginning of this review.

U. E. Simon

OLD TESTAMENT STUDIES. II

The Old Testament in Modern Research. By Herbert F. Hahn. S.C.M. Press. 16s.

Not many years ago a Rural Dean said, *à propos* of a lecture on the Old Testament: "Ah, of course, our old friends J, E, D, P, and H! I wonder if they are still alive." His inquiry has been echoed often, not without a rather malicious and condescending benevolence extended to the whole of Old Testament scholarship. Its presupposition was always that, of course, J, E, D, P, and H *were* Old Testament scholarship. The effect of this view has been serious for the Church as a whole, for it has

widened the gulf between the Bible and the Pulpit: few preachers will preach a really good expository sermon on the Old Testament; no wonder the laity are bewildered by the Gospel before the Gospel.

Dr Hahn's book is, therefore, to be welcomed with more than usual politeness, for it answers to a real need and I hope it will be widely read. The author endeavours to give a brief panorama of the whole work of scholars engaged on the Old Testament during the past century (except the text and language). This may sound rather alarming, and in a way it is: his condensation of the material makes at times for somewhat heavy going. The first chapter on literary criticism is particularly taut in structure and would have profited from illustrative passages. The ghost of Wellhausen haunts us still and demands fuller treatment to appease the shades of J, E, D, P, and H. To this end the reader may be advised to turn to C. R. North's article in *The Old Testament and Modern Study* (1951), which is, in any case, a necessary companion volume to Dr Hahn's work.

The author is at his best in his discussion of methodology. He shows how these methods were largely chosen because they were "in the air" elsewhere. Thus the anthropological and religio-historical approaches, so typical of the turn of the century, provided scientific respectability for Old Testament scholarship. The results were far-reaching and often most suggestive. They freed the Hebrews from the isolation of Biblicism. No one would ever wish to study the subject apart from comparative cultural and social data. At last literary analysis had been presented with worthy scientific foes: from now on the documents were not to be studied apart from the world in which they had been composed and transmitted. Dr Hahn's chapter on Form-Criticism is perhaps a little disappointing, but then the subject demands a whole book for itself. His summing-up of the archaeological contribution is quite masterly, as one would expect from an American writer. Would that all the old and time-honoured clichés (such as "primitive Hebrews", "unhistorical Patriarchs", "progressive revelation", "If Moses had not existed it would have been necessary to invent him") might die a natural death in the light of scientific evidence!

The main merit of this book is that it will send the student to more specific studies on selected subjects; e.g. the excellent discussion of the date of the Exodus asks for more, such as H. H. Rowley's *From Joseph to Joshua*. His only justified complaint may be the charge that insufficient account is taken of Catholic scholarship. Thus, for example, the really important work of the Dominicans (as given in the periodical *Revue Biblique*) goes by default. This is a pity, especially in connection with the theological approach. But, then, the Old Testament encompasses a huge orbit. Even in the two years which have passed since this book appeared in America much has been done. Hence the need for a good guide such as Dr Hahn to the history of criticism as a preparation for further discoveries.

U. E. Simon

OLD TESTAMENT STUDIES. III

EARLY ISRAEL IN RECENT HISTORY WRITING (Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 19). By JOHN BRIGHT. S.C.M. Press. 9s. 6d.

THE MESSIAH IN THE OLD TESTAMENT. (Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 18). By HELMER RINGGREN. S.C.M. Press. 7s. 6d.

PROFESSOR BRIGHT has written an important and stimulating book which should do much good in focusing attention on the real theological problem which is created by the general lack of agreement as to the extent of our knowledge of the early history of Israel. Opinion varies from a full acceptance of the historicity of the Biblical traditions to their complete rejection and a denial of the very existence of Moses. All too often, the positions taken up by scholars of all schools seem to have been reached not on the basis of historical judgements at all, but doctrinal and philosophic preconceptions have determined just what was and what was not history. Such confusion distorts, if it does not destroy, the real meaning of the Old Testament because the Old Testament, no less than the New, claims to be based in history. The message of the Scriptures is one, that God stands revealed in historical events as the loving Father who by his saving and electing activity declares his purpose for the world. If the New Testament theologians only make sense in the light of the historic event of Calvary and the empty tomb, no less does the meaning of the prophets depend on the historic events of the Red Sea crossing and the Covenant at Sinai. We can doubt the history and still learn much from them of religion as an academic study. We cannot, however, doubt the history and share their faith, and the sole purpose of their writing was to offer this faith.

Different historical reconstructions, therefore, lead to different theologies, and the great confusion regarding the actual content of the history of early Israel leads to extreme disagreement about the nature and function of every part of the Old Testament. Professor Bright, then, sets out to examine the methodology that underlies recent work on the history of early Israel, in the hope that thereby he will find the true criteria whereby the historical worth of the Old Testament traditions may be evaluated. His first aim is to make the nature of the problem clear, and in this he succeeds. In fact he does much more, for he demonstrates the inadequacy of many of the methods now in use and lays down clear principles for the future historian to observe.

This is accomplished by a careful examination of two recent major works on the history of Israel. Both these histories, the work of the German scholar Noth on the one hand, and of the Israeli scholar Yehezkel Kaufmann on the other, are attempts to overcome the problem left by the work of Wellhausen: that the literary sources of the Pentateuch are so many hundreds of years later in time than the events that they purport to narrate that it is very difficult to disentangle history from legend. Noth, a disciple of the school of Alt, resolves the problem by applying the methods of Form-Criticism to the documents and finds

at the end that the history is almost negligible. Kaufmann, by maintaining that the philosophy of the Deuteronomic school is much earlier than the reign of Josiah, moves the documents much nearer to the events they describe and finds that they are substantially historical. Professor Bright can accept neither of these conclusions. He rejects both the scepticism of Noth and the inadequate Source-Criticism of Kaufmann, but the careful criticism which leads him to these conclusions does enable him to formulate the methodological principles which ought to govern the writing of the history of early Israel. The most important of these is that before history can be adequately written its subject must be truly defined. The subject in question is the people of Israel, and the one factor which made Israel a people was not common language or experience but common faith. Any history of Israel, therefore, must be a history of Israel's faith. This is a principle which has long needed stating and it is good to see it established so clearly and cogently here. A part of Professor Bright's work which has importance and value beyond the confines of his present subject, and not least in the criticism of the New Testament, is his original and devastating examination of the methods of radical Form-Criticism.

The relationship between theology and history is in one sense, too, the concern of Professor Ringgren. He sets out to examine the Messianic passages of the Old Testament and remarks, in the introduction to his book, that many passages which have traditionally been regarded as Messianic prophecies whose fulfilment is to be seen in the life of Jesus Christ, can no longer be so regarded in the light of modern Biblical criticism. There have arisen two quite different interpretations of the Messianic texts, the historical and the theological. The purpose of his book is to demonstrate that history and theology may not be as far apart as they have generally been supposed to be. Professor Ringgren is an upholder of the "Myth—Ritual" interpretation of Hebrew religion and reinterprets his texts against the background of an annual Enthronement Festival and a divine kingship ideology. His book is too brief to allow him to argue this thesis; it is almost entirely exposition. For this reason it is only likely to carry all the way with it those who are already converted. Nevertheless it has many interesting things to say and is, no less than Professor Bright's work, a real contribution to Biblical Theology.

J. Robinson

REASON OR REVELATION

The Religious Philosophy of Dean Mansel. By W. R. Matthews. Oxford University Press. London: Cumberlege. (For the Friends of Dr Williams' Library.) 3s. 6d.

Matthews, Mansel, Maurice—these are the three key-words for the appreciation of this important Lecture. Dr W. R. Matthews, the present

Dean of St Paul's, gave it. Dr H. L. Mansel, a former Dean of St Paul's, delivered the Bampton Lectures in 1858, *The Limits of Religious Thought Examined*, with which Dean Matthews is dealing. Frederick Denison Maurice engaged in a long and on the whole unsuccessful attempt to answer Mansel. He "regarded his controversy with Mansel as the most important of his life", Dean Matthews says, and goes on to remark that "it is the more unfortunate that he conducted it very badly. . . . The controversy resembles what one might imagine to have taken place had a discussion ever happened between Aristotle and one of the Minor Prophets, except that Mansel wrote much better than Aristotle and Maurice more copiously than any Minor Prophet" (p. 18).

Mansel did indeed write very well. He was a metaphysician, and it is difficult to think that any Bampton Lectures were ever more metaphysical than his. But although any metaphysics worth the name will always make hard reading, the Lectures are at any rate perfectly lucid and sometimes eloquent. The following from Lecture III is a fair example:

> If there is one dream of a godless philosophy to which, beyond all others, every moment of our consciousness gives the lie, it is that which subordinates the individual to the universal, the person to the species; which deifies kinds and realizes classifications; which sees Being in generalization, and Appearance in limitation; which regards the living and conscious man as a wave on the ocean of the unconscious infinite; his life, a momentary tossing to and fro on the shifting tide; his destiny, to be swallowed up in the formless and boundless universe. The final conclusion of this philosophy, in direct antagonism to the voice of consciousness, is "I think; therefore I am not".

But Mansel did not only write well; he had an interesting thesis to maintain. Dr Matthews says: "Mansel's purpose could be simply described as the destruction of the reason in its application to religious ideas in order to establish the sole authority of revelation" (p. 9). For him "the nature of human consciousness is such that it cannot exist, at least it cannot know, without distinguishing, one object from another. When therefore we are concerned with the Infinite we are unable to form any concept of it, because directly we distinguish it from anything it ceases to be infinite" (p. 13). "In short we know that the Infinite is, but we have no conception what it is" (p. 14). The consequence of this must be to force us back upon Revelation as the means to religious truth, and this is a position which Mansel fully accepted. But here, Dr Matthews tells us, "Mansel is at his weakest". As sometimes happens with a series of lectures, he has erected a tremendous sub-structure only to crown it with an insecurely poised image of the truth. Incidentally, Dr Matthews suggests, "he unwittingly prepared the way for Herbert Spencer's Agnosticism and furnished the philosophy of the unknowable with all its more respectable arguments" (p. 6).

Nevertheless the Dean characterizes the work as "a masterly performance" (p. 9), and with the great renewal of interest in Maurice as a

prophet for our times there might well be a renewal of interest in his great rival also. *The Religious Philosophy of Dean Mansel* makes an excellent introduction to *The Limits of Religious Thought Examined*. The writer of this review has been led on by the small work to read the great one with pleasure and admiration alike.

ADAM FOX

VIEWS ON REVELATION

THE IDEA OF REVELATION IN RECENT THOUGHT. By JOHN BAILLIE. Oxford University Press. London: Cumberlege. 15s.

THE discussion as to the nature of revelation still goes on. Echoes of the Barth-Brunner controversy have, it is true, grown a little faint on this side of the channel and hardly disturb us. We are left at peace to pursue our more placid enquiries and to adjust our more delicate balances. In such an exercise Dr John Baillie's book will be a great help. He traces the changes in thought on the subject from the seventeenth century to the present day, and so gives us plenty of opportunity for clearing our own minds and visualizing the issues more distinctly.

In the main the movement has been away from the view that revelation is given in a series of dogmatic pronouncements, through the suggestion that it comes as the fruit of contact between personalities, to the belief that it is to be found in a series of events. On the whole the progression appears to meet with Dr Baillie's approval. "Our study has led us to the conclusion that revelation is always given us through events; yet not through all events, but only through such as appear as God's mighty works." Leaving out of sight the *differentia* of "God's mighty works" this still does not tell us what the revelation is, but only how it is given. If we have to draw our own conclusions from the events, do we not need divine guidance in doing so, and will not that be revelation too? Further, if revelation is given only through events, is there no revelation in the Wisdom Literature of the Old Testament, the Epistles of the New, or for the matter of that in the teaching of our Lord? It is not without significance that continental writers are sometimes guilty of using language that suggests that the Old Testament is more obviously a book of revelation than the New. It is no doubt valuable to say that what is revealed is God himself, not propositions about him. Yet if the revelation is of a real person we ought to be able to use some propositions in description of him, and if the propositions are equally real and true it is difficult to say that they are not in any sense part of the revelation.

We need not quarrel with the statement that "if what is directly revealed is God himself rather than truths about God, then faith must be primarily trust rather than assent". But we should be very unwilling to agree that the former is wholly characteristic of the Church of the New

Testament and the latter wholly characteristic of the Ancient Catholic Church, as if the two were necessarily antithetical. The fact is that in faith there is and always has been both trust and assent, and that the truth to which faith is given is both a person and a proposition. "I am Jesus whom thou persecutest" and "Jesus is Lord" are both New Testament expressions, and no one can wholeheartedly repeat the latter unless it has been first revealed to him by the Holy Spirit.

Dr Baillie himself seems to come to much the same conclusion when he accepts the view that the completed act of divine revelation consists in "the intercourse of event and interpretation". It is to the extent that it is a divinely inspired interpretation of the event that the Bible is a book of revelation.

W.W.

THE BASIS OF COMPREHENSION

VIA MEDIA. By E. L. MASCALL. Longmans, Green and Co. 12s. 6d.

THE title makes one think of the Church of England, and the sub-title, "An Essay in Theological Synthesis", adds hope to the supposition. Actually, however, Dr Mascall does not have the divisions within Anglicanism directly in view. He is dealing with the fundamental theological questions that lie behind them. Consequently the book should be studied by all theologically minded Anglicans. If the conclusions reached by the author are accepted, the ground will be well prepared for a fresh understanding of the comprehensive Anglican position.

The differences that reach their climax in the opposition, Catholic v. Evangelical, are seen to lie far back in the main Christian doctrines of Creation, Trinity, Incarnation, and Grace. In each case "orthodoxy consists in holding together two notions which, though not in fact incompatible, at first might appear to be so." Thus in the first instance, although there appears to be a gulf (a term whose use in this connection Dr Mascall strongly deprecates) between the Creator and the created, God is actually in all his creatures by essence, presence, and power, a fact which allows them a genuine though dependent reality.

Similarly in the second instance the two apparently contradictory notions of unity and trinity in relation to the being of God were both preserved in the orthodox creed as the result of the struggle with Arianism in the fourth century, the solvent being the notion of "derived equality" as applied to the Second and Third Persons. Again in the Incarnation the apparent impossibility of the conjunction of perfect God and perfect man in the person of Jesus Christ is overcome by the notion of "unconfused union". Finally the difficulty of showing how the grace of God can work in what appears to be the alien material of creaturely manhood is met by the notion of "deified creaturehood".

It is probably the last chapter that will give rise to most discussion. Happily the author translates Athanasius' "God became man in order that we might become God" literally, and is prepared to stand by the doctrine thus expressed. He brings plenty of evidence to support his view of deified creaturehood, but to summarize his treatment would spoil the impression of a chapter which deserves specially careful reading. The fact that a leading Anglican theologian can take such a view of redemption goes far to explain why we have not yet been swept off our feet by current continental theology.

One or two minor points deserve mention. Page 86: a note should perhaps explain whether the epithet "pluralistic" is to be applied to the Antiochene doctrine of the Trinity or of the Incarnation or both. Page 88: Dr Mascall is nearly as cautious as Dr Sellers in applying the charge of heresy to the Monophysites. Page 91: the Tome of Leo may have been "a refreshing western breeze" in the overheated atmosphere of eastern controversy, but the fathers of Chalcedon did better than the Pope in their attempt to define Christological doctrine (as indeed Dr Mascall himself seems to agree, p. 94). Page 117: Dr Mascall very properly emphasizes the intractable nature of the problem of the mental life and consciousness of the Incarnate Lord, but nothing will prevent us from probing into it until "we know as we are known".

This book cannot be too highly recommended. It is to be hoped that its significance for the Anglican synthesis will be fully perceived and that its eirenic intention will meet with the response it so amply deserves. But its importance for personal religion is even greater. It will recognize no unbridgeable gap between the divine and the human, but gives the sinner the comforting assurance that through the infinite compassion of God he may yet share in the vitality of his Redeemer.

W.W.

THE NEW GIFFORDS

FOR FAITH AND FREEDOM. The Gifford Lectures, 1955-7, Vol. I. By LEONARD HODGSON. Basil Blackwell. 21s.

THESE lectures, "printed precisely as they were written for delivery", comprise the first part only of Dr Hodgson's course, and are in the field of Natural Theology. Volume II will contain Christian Theology.

Whereas Lord Gifford wished the lecturers "to treat this subject as a strictly natural science . . . without reference to or reliance upon any supposed special exceptional or so called miraculous revelation", the author seeks to expose the idea of revelation which was held at the time either by those who "sought to secure the basis of theology by substituting discovery by human reason for the acceptance of supernatural revelation"; or by those for whom, in reaction against them, the acceptance of revelation involved the rejection of natural theology. "All

theology", for Dr Hodgson, "is both natural and revealed, such distinction is no longer tenable."

Having claimed thus much for his own freedom, the author argues for his own traditional and modern faith.

In the first two lectures he gives a most interesting historical survey of the movement of thought, theological and philosophical, from Bernard Bosanquet before the 1914 war, to the present day.

In the eighth lecture he comes to the "centre piece of the whole series" in explaining what he means by freedom, "its origin, nature and prospects as I see them".

He emphasizes the distinction between freedom thought of as that which distinguishes spiritual from material, because the spiritual being is able to act on purpose, while the material can only respond willy nilly to stimulus; and freedom where the free agent in the former sense is able in fact to exercise his freedom. He asserts his faith in the reality of the former while admitting that our experience of freedom in the latter sense is only in a very imperfect form.

What then is our freedom for? The summary answer . . . is "that it is the pursuit of those ends which give promise of uniting men in fellowship as citizens of the City of God. If we want to make sense of the universe of our experience we must think of it not only as the matrix of our individual personal existence, but also as the environment in which we are given opportunities of growing in the exercise of our freedom towards a perfection which can only be ours as citizens of that city. We must remember that when we use the phrase 'make sense' we must give its full force to the word 'make'." Things "must be changed indeed in order to become transparent to thought. We can only make sense of the universe if we treat it as a challenge to action as well as to thought."

In a closing lecture Dr Hodgson gives a hint of what is to come. While the Christian revelation should not be thought of "as a system of divinely communicated truths to be accepted on authority as a complement to what we can learn by our own study of what actually exists and happens. It comes by taking certain events in the history of the world as of unique and supreme significance for our understanding of all things. This involves, indeed, the seeing of these events with the eye of faith. But so do all attempts at making sense of the universe of our experience." For a Christian to do so "with the historic Church as his key . . . is as much a matter of natural theology as for a Marxist to take as his key the interplay of economic forces."

It is for the philosopher to examine closely the subtleties of the author's argument at many points; the more general reader will be grateful for the cogent reasoning and virile exercise of a faith hard won, hard held by facing facts and giving patient attention to every kind of view critical or destructive that is held in a changing world by a perplexed generation.

J. S. Brewis

CRADLE OF CHRISTIANITY

GALILEAN CHRISTIANITY. By L. E. ELLIOTT-BINNS. S.C.M. Press. 7s. 6d.

THIS is a useful addition to the paper-backed S.C.M. series "Studies in Biblical Theology" (No. 16): in it the author sets out the evidence for the character and beliefs of the Christian disciples in Galilee during and after the time of our Lord. The subject is an important but puzzling one—why has the New Testament so little to say about the Galilean element in the early Church?—and it is good to have the known facts clearly marshalled in accessible form. Dr Elliott-Binns never writes except after exhaustive study of his subject, and in this case he has ranged over an enormous field in the course of writing a commentary on the Epistle of St James; the present volume, he tells us, grew out of what was originally intended as an essay appended to the commentary. When he asked himself to what sort of readers the Epistle was originally directed, he was gradually led to the conclusion that it was people who had followed Jesus in Galilee during his lifetime and had subsequently continued to stand rather apart from the Jewish Christians in Jerusalem and from those associated with the name of St Paul. They remained, he thinks, a fairly distinct group, more within the Jewish fold than other Christians, "faithful to the simple teaching they had received from Jesus" (p. 7), placing great emphasis on obedience to his teaching and having no very developed theories about Christology or the doctrine of redemption. With great learning and persuasiveness he lays before us the case for the growth and continued existence of such a group, who, he thinks, may eventually have developed into what we know as the Ebionites.

The thesis is an interesting one and, as Dr Eliott-Binns himself points out, it gains support from the fact that rather similar conclusions have been independently arrived at by other scholars, especially Windisch and Lohmeyer. But the fact that Dr Elliott-Binns knows their work makes it perhaps rather puzzling that he has not said more about it, and compared and contrasted it with his own. Lohmeyer especially, while agreeing that there was a distinctive Galilean element in the primitive Church, attributes to it a rather different outlook from that suggested in this book. In particular, he ascribes to the Galilean Christians the very high *Son of Man* Christology which he believes to go back to Jesus himself, who regarded himself primarily as the Galilean Saviour, the Son of Man, rather than as the Davidic Messiah expected in the South. All this, if true, is clearly of great importance, and Mowinckel's newly translated book (*He that Cometh*) may be thought to lend a certain amount of support to it. It is all the more to be regretted that Dr Elliott-Binns, who has made himself so much the master of this field, has not devoted any discussion to it. It is surely not unimportant for his work on St James, and it is clearly a vital matter; why does Dr Elliott-Binns think it was a "simple" teaching that the earliest Galilean disciples received from Jesus, and in what sense does he use the word "simple" in this context? It would indeed be good if we could tempt him to further discussion of the matter.

D. E. NINEHAM

EPISTLE TO THE EPHESIANS

A Paraphrase of Ephesians. By S. C. Carpenter. A. R. Mowbray and Co. 3s.

This is a sequel to the author's earlier well-known paraphrases of Philippians and Romans. The whole idea is an interesting one and it is perhaps surprising that it has not been more widely taken up, for, as Dr Carpenter himself hints, the paraphrase is probably the best form of commentary for a certain sort of reader. But it is a method not without its dangers; for when you are paraphrasing as fully and freely as this (Dr Carpenter has expanded the fulness of his treatment in this volume to something like six words for every word of the original), seeking to render the original not only into modern English, but into modern idiom in every sense of the word, then it becomes very easy to pass beyond legitimate expansion, necessary to bring out the meaning of the original, and to use the original as a peg on which to hang reflections which, however true and edifying, were not in the original author's mind at all. The line between "paraphrase *of*" and "meditation *on*" is perilously thin. How far Dr Carpenter has succeeded in keeping on the right side of the line is a question on which opinions will no doubt differ; to the present reviewer it seems that he has succeeded better in some places than in others. His version of chapter 3, for example, on the whole brings out admirably the drift, and excitement, of the original. Yet even in the third chapter, would not the author have been rather surprised to find the following significance discovered in the 12th verse? "There are among us different schools of thought. Some love to feel that there is 'nothing between God and me', or 'I can kneel down and be in immediate contact with the Lord of heaven and earth'. This happy boldness is wholly justifiable. Another will say, 'I like to approach along some ordered road, to use the means of grace'. This kind of access, too, is good, and freely available. The answer to many seeming problems of alternatives is often 'Both'. The quality of faith varies from man to man, and each believer has faith after his own kind. But for all of us at the far end is He who changeth not, and therefore we, the sons of men, are not consumed." To some readers this edifying, "improving", (and rather specifically Anglican,) gilding of the lily will seem to strike a rather jarring note. It may be replied that it is surely legitimate to give expression to the useful meditations with which one is inspired by reading the Scriptures. Of course it is, but then the resulting book is hardly a paraphrase, and certainly not the sort of paraphrase that can be used in lieu of a commentary.

The three page introduction, which is devoted almost entirely to the question of authorship, is disappointing. It may be questioned whether in a work of this kind it was necessary to raise the question of authorship at all, but if it is raised, then it should be fully and properly treated, and the fact should be made clear that many, if not most, of the modern scholars who have really gone into the matter (e.g. Dibelius, Goodspeed, W. L. Knox, Mitton) have become convinced that Ephesians is not a

Pauline letter. Against the mass of careful work they have done one short quotation from Dr Sanday cannot have the decisive significance which Dr Carpenter attributes to it. And as for the suggestion of Dr Selwyn, (who incidentally is *not* "the latest editor of the First Epistle of St Peter",) that peculiarities of style in 1 Peter were due to an amanuensis, it has been very far from winning general support in the case of 1 Peter; its application to Ephesians would hardly be plausible, as Dr Carpenter himself half admits.

But the review must not end without an expression of gratitude to Dr Carpenter for a thought-provoking little book, in which the preacher will find much material, and for continuing to pioneer along an important line of development.

D. E. Nineham

APOSTOLIC LEADER

Saint Peter. By John Lowe. Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press. 10s. 6d.

It is always refreshing to read what the Dean of Christ Church writes. His combination of wide and exact scholarship, open-mindedness, and robust commonsense makes one regret that heavy administrative duties have so largely claimed him from the field of New Testament studies. This little book is in his usual vein. It comprises three lectures delivered in New York in 1955 on the William Copley Winslow Memorial Foundation, and in them the Dean has attempted "to put together in brief compass the historical facts and probabilities about St Peter on the basis of the earliest evidence". In the first lecture the main New Testament evidence is surveyed and discussed, and the conclusion is "that Peter occupied a leading if not dominant position among the disciples of Jesus during the ministry and was given the significant surname of 'Rock', and that to him was vouchsafed the first vision of the risen Lord, and that he was the *de facto* leader of the primitive Jerusalem Church", though this position later devolved on James when Peter went off to lead the Jewish mission.

The second lecture, which for most readers will break more new ground, deals with the traditional account of Peter's last days in Rome and with the literary, liturgical, and archaeological evidence for it. The Dean concludes: "A combination of the literary and the archaeological evidence, and mainly the former, makes it appear highly probable to my mind (I would almost say 'morally sure') that Peter did come to Rome, suffered there as a martyr, and most likely in the Vatican district." But he is doubtful whether the recent archaeological work in Rome warrants the firm assertion that the burial place of the Apostle has been found. "It may be so," he says, "but it is going too far to say that it is proved"; and he likewise enters certain *caveats* about the widely held theory of the translation of the bodies of Peter and Paul in A.D. 258.

The last lecture is devoted to the question whether Peter's admitted leadership rested on an explicit commission of the Lord. The argument largely turns on the interpretation of Matt. 16. 18, 19, and here the Dean freely confesses to a change of mind; in the light of recent work on the Church in the New Testament (particularly that of Kattenbusch and K. L. Schmidt,) he now sees no reason why this passage should not be authentic, though its present context in the Gospel cannot be original. A careful discussion of its bearing reveals that much of what traditional Catholic theology has said about it is fully justified, though the Dean adds at once: "Where they [*sc.* the Roman Catholic exegetes] go wrong . . . is in the assumption that the commission given Peter includes successors, and a very limited line of successors at that. There is, so far as I can see, no justification whatever for that assumption. . . . On the contrary it is definitely ruled out."

That may suffice to show the quality and scope of the work. But the treatment is inevitably very slight, and, as so often with the Dean, one finishes with a strong appetite for more. Fortunately in this case the appetite can to some extent be satisfied even by those who read no German; for the book by Professor Oscar Cullmann, on which the Dean has considerably, though by no means solely or slavishly, relied, is now available in an English translation. It may be confidently predicted that the Dean's little book will send many interested readers in search of that and other larger works.

D. E. Nineham

GREAT WORDS

Some Christian Words. By W. R. Matthews. George Allen and Unwin. 7s. 6d.

It is one of the encouraging signs about modern theological publishing that so many popular books are being published which deal with the great Christian words and themes. This one differs from some others that have appeared in being frankly homiletical. It is not limited to expounding what the great words have meant historically, in the Bible and traditional Christian usage, but, starting in each case from a careful consideration of the Biblical and traditional usage, it seeks to show something of their meaning for to-day and to clear up some of the difficulties and misunderstandings that are commonly felt about them. Twelve key terms ("holy", "sin", "forgiveness", "the Cross", etc.) are dealt with in this way, and there is also a sort of appendix, containing three short talks on "Jesus' Thought about Himself". Each chapter originated as the script of a broadcast address and all alike display the Dean's remarkable gift for language and for clear, honest, and what I can only describe as "patient", thinking. There is perhaps nothing particularly novel in the book, but novelty is not the aim of a book

addressed to such a clientèle, and there is no lack of freshness of approach. One other point should be made: in so brief a compass the Dean could only gain space for his homiletical application by forgoing any attempt at exhaustive treatment. Thus in some cases, particularly perhaps in the chapter on the Cross, what we have is not so much a brief statement of the *total* meaning of the word in Christian usage, as a meditation on *certain aspects* of its significance for Christians. The Dean himself is quite aware of this limitation; for example in the chapter on the Cross he writes: "We have no time now to plunge into the deep places of theology, so let us be very practical and see what the cross means in the life of the Christian." This is not a criticism; it is simply meant to warn would-be buyers, or givers, that the book cannot quite be regarded as a "word book of the Bible", even of an elementary kind.

As to the concluding three talks, there is much that is well said in them and little with which anyone will seriously want to quarrel, though no doubt many younger theologians may feel that they would themselves have put some of it rather differently. Altogether a little book which admirably fulfils its purpose.

D. E. Nineham

CHRISTIAN ETHICS

A Short Introduction to Moral Theology. By Lindsay Dewar. A. R. Mowbray and Co. 3s. 6d.

You and your Conduct. By Marcus Donovan. Faith Press. 6s.

These two paper-backed books contain material which makes them, at their modest price, of use both to clergy and laity. Both authors write out of considerable experience in pastoral work. Canon Lindsay Dewar's book is based upon three lectures delivered to priests, and is aimed at providing them with a brief introduction to a large subject. The Reverend Marcus Donovan writes at a more popular level, and addresses himself to the plain man. Both authors write with a firmness and certainty which comes out of strong convictions.

Of the two, Canon Lindsay Dewar's little book is likely to be the more valuable. His three chapters are arranged under titles which indicate the scope of his book. They are—the place of law in the Christian religion, the Christian doctrine of conscience, and Christian casuistry. He considers the view that Christian morality is positive, internal, and based upon principles, and then shows that none of these characteristics of Christian ethics is incompatible with the existence of Christian moral laws. "Yet there is real difference between the attitude of the Jew to his Law and the attitude of the Christian to the Christian Law. The former was confronted with something apparently 'ab extra' making upon him demands which he must do the utmost to fulfil. The latter has within him a hidden Power to enable him to perceive and know what things he

ought to do and to have grace and power to fulfil the same." Of conscience he writes: "As a result of centuries of Christian tradition in this country many people take the doctrine of the inviolability of the individual conscience for granted. It cannot be taken for granted. It is based upon Christian theology and it would not long survive its overthrow." Frequent quotations from Jeremy Taylor indicate the line of Anglican moral theology with which Canon Lindsay Dewar is sympathetic. There is inevitably in all such discussions a certain coldness, for law has little place for emotion. But if law and liberty are in fact not enemies, but mutually support one another, then there is a need for moral theology and Canon Lindsay Dewar's introduction is likely to promote clearer thought upon it.

Mr Donovan does not write specifically as a moral theologian, although much of what he says would come under that topic. His aim is to state Christian beliefs accurately and to show their relevance to life and behaviour. The book is broken up into more than thirty short essays, the connection between which it is not always easy to see, and there is some repetition. The first part of the book is a study of man himself, his nature, character, and destiny, leading on to consideration of worship, Church membership, and obligation; with finally a number of short chapters on such matters as speech, recreation, money, marriage, world peace. Some of these in isolation are admirable, and in particular that on superstition is excellent. There is a traditionalism and rigidity about much of what Mr Donovan has to say, which means that here and there he seems to take up a position which is more severe than the mind of the Anglican Church. He lacks sympathy with persons who do not share his own interpretation of the Christian faith. In seeking to meet people where they are Mr Donovan follows a good principle, but are people where he thinks they are? On problems of Christian behaviour in a complex, scientific, technical age of mass communications he shows too little awareness, and one wonders what a young man or woman at the University would make of this sincere desire to help them. There is a lack of clear guidance in such matters as gambling, and a failure to call attention to overseas missions, Christian unity, and racial questions. At the same time there are wise and true things to be found in this book for which readers may be grateful. But surely it is a little unkind to describe Kierkegaard as a "cynical philosopher" on page ix? It is this kind of superficiality which betrays Mr Donovan's views too often in these pages.

M. Knight

PROTESTANTISM RE-EXAMINED

The Protestant Way. By Kenneth Hamilton. Epworth Press. 21s.

Mr Hamilton is a Congregational Minister, still under forty years of age, who after a distinguished academic career went out to Canada in

1952. He is now at Elmsdale, Nova Scotia. He is one of those Protestant thinkers who have been much influenced by recent work on Luther and Kierkegaard, and by the writings of Barth and Tillich. He has written a book which is solid and learned, in which he combines not only an awareness of the European Protestant tradition but also of the atmosphere of thought on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.

Mr Hamilton is at pains to define Protestantism with all the accuracy he can command. It is a word into which people tend to inject emotional meaning. It has become involved in a "we" and "they" controversy; to suggest a way which is in opposition to what is included in the word "catholic", as the name for a rival way of worship, tradition, and churchmanship. Mr Hamilton would like to break away from the controversial background and to emphasize that within the Catholic tradition itself there has always been a Protestant way, a way of being faithful to the Gospel. He holds that this was implicit within the Catholic Church from the first century, and that the Reformers rediscovered and re-emphasized it. If a difference is to be found, it lies in the fact that the Catholic tends to emphasize form beyond content and the Protestant content beyond form. The Catholic looks for the marks of the Church as the guarantee of faithfulness to the Gospel; the Protestant sees the form discovering itself in liberty where Christian believers are faithful to the Gospel. Protestantism is for Mr Hamilton a way of discovering certain values and of being faithful to them within a society. The way he emphasizes is a way of faith, which is a response to the Acts of God revealed in history and supremely in the Act of God in the Incarnation.

Successive chapters show how Mr Hamilton works out the implications of his thesis by examining Protestant doubt, the freedom to be wrong, the sacred and the secular, and Protestant morality. His emphasis throughout is upon dialogue—the dialogue which God enters into with man, the dialogue between man and man, the dialogue between Protestant and Catholic. Throughout his book Mr Hamilton seeks to be fair and sympathetic, so that he is both able to commend Catholicism for its deeper sense of mystery in religion and for its encouragement of the virtue of humility, and in considering Protestantism under judgement to admit its tendency towards Pharisaism, its fissiparous effort to seek the pure Church, its danger of thinking that men are moved by argument rather than by emotion.

His emphasis upon dialogue makes it difficult for Mr Hamilton to be very sympathetic with Anglicanism. On which side of the dialogue is it to be set? "Is it possible", he asks, "for a Church to be both truly Protestant and Catholic while standing over against the professed representatives of each?" The difficulty of answering this and similar questions is increased, he thinks, because no clear answer can be obtained from Anglicanism itself, where the widest divergence of opinion exists and to some extent always has existed. "What is the idea represented by the complex called Anglicanism?"

Were he more familiar with Anglican theology he might find answers to his questions. Of one famous theologian, Hooker, he has harsh words.

Hooker made some severe criticisms of the Puritan movement, and Mr Hamilton says of Hooker: "Here are all the chief assumptions of the rationalist theologian; faith an ally of irrationalism, culture in jeopardy from unreason, and reason the inspector required to certify faith's credentials." This verdict on Hooker indicates that in large measure Mr Hamilton dislikes rational theologians.

His emphasis upon dialogue makes him no supporter of quick ways to Christian unity. Non-episcopal ministries do not mean the same thing as episcopal, and there is a very definite theology behind the Protestant ministry. Let no one pretend that we all think the same things after all. We must clearly perceive that our differences extend from non-theological party prejudices to head-on conflict about the basic presuppositions of theological thought. But this very clarity of difference is accompanied by a belief in the value of dialogue and in the creative possibilities which dialogue opens . . . "the theological spade work to be done before unity is achieved is intimidating".

It will be seen that this book is a contribution to the sharpening of issues and the separation of traditions. The either/or distinctions are made with more rigidity than comprehensiveness, seeking to answer the question—What does it mean to be a Protestant in this day and age? The surgeon's knife is always at work, but not without charity.

Most of Mr Hamilton's statements are carefully formed expressions of opinion, but surely he is in error in one of them: "In all the large European countries now under dictatorships or menaced by large totalitarian movements Catholic teaching (Roman or Orthodox), was predominant until recent times." The word "now" may be precautionary, but Nazism arose in a country of which this was not true, and if so the verdict needs qualification.

M. KNIGHT

ROMANCE AND MARRIAGE

PASSION AND SOCIETY. By DENIS DE ROUGEMONT. Faber and Faber. 30s.

IT WOULD require much more space than is available here to give any sufficient account—to say nothing of critique—of the nature and content of this remarkable book. This is perhaps the less necessary, however, since it appears now as a revised and expanded edition of a volume which, published in 1940, received then a good deal of notice, even despite the urgent preoccupations of that year. The author defines its "central purpose" as being "to describe the inescapable conflict in the West between passion and marriage", which "cannot be founded on a fine ardour". But "happy love has no history. Romance only comes into existence when love is fatal, frowned upon and doomed by life itself." De Rougemont sees the origin of this perilous and destructive idea crystallized in the twelfth century in the "myth" of "Tristan and Iseult"

—"a kind of archtype of our most complex feelings of unrest". His book is founded upon an elaborate and penetrating analysis of this "romance", and traces its influence on religion, literature, and warfare right through European history, down to our own day. Some of his treatment of the theme may seem extravagant and unconvincing; it never ceases to be immensely absorbing and challenging. It leads up finally to an examination and vindication of the Christian doctrine of Marriage.

A reader without the time or energy to go through the whole book could no doubt extract the essence of it by reading its first twenty-five and last fifty pages. Yet he would miss very much if he did. In particular he would miss the searching examination into the origins and nature of the Catharist heresy, which, with perhaps only Arianism excepted, has represented the most dangerous challenge that the Church has had to meet; this explains, if it does not justify, the savagery with which it was met. Catharism, according to de Rougemont, was the *mystique* behind the *cortezia* (love as "courtesy") of the troubadors with whom European poetry took its rise. It inspired the "Chivalry" which was opposed to Feudalism, substituting the "Lady" for the lord and a fruitless love for marriage. The Tristan myth implicitly recognized the claims of both, while yet defying them. But its fundamental link with Catharism is revealed by its "death wish", its more or less explicit declaration that there is no "cure" for passion but the escape from separate personality out of a world which belongs not to God but the devil.

The perilous implications of this myth, which in degraded forms still exercises its influence to-day, is powerfully suggested in the last two sections of the book. De Rougemont does not claim to "resolve" the conflict between passion and marriage, which in some sense he believes to be inescapable. The clue, he suggests, is to rescue and give a positive significance to the ideal of Fidelity, which under the influence of "romantic" notions now appears to most people something merely spiritless, timid, and conventional. Yet "the pledge exchanged in marriage is the very type of a *serious* act, because it is a pledge given once and for all". The question arises whether Christian orthodoxy requires us to surrender the whole idea of romantic love in defence of *agapé*. Those who have learnt much from the work of Charles Williams will hardly be ready to do so, nor do I think that de Rougemont's argument really demands this, though his language suggests it. He himself says that "to choose a marriage partner is to *wager*"; it is essentially a decision: "It is you that I choose to share my life with me and that is the only evidence there can be that I love you." All this recalls to one reader at any rate the challenging phrase of a great Christian romantic, Chesterton: "Marriage is a duel to the death which no man of honour should decline." This surely is romance indeed.[1]

MAURICE B. RECKITT

[1] Compare with this the contemporary outlook, widespread throughout Europe, well illustrated by a speaker in Parliament recently who told the House that he had found the Report of the Royal Commission on Divorce on sale in Venice, but classified not as sociology but as "romance"!

MEDIEVAL DOCUMENTS

A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham (Library of Christian Classics, Vol. X). Edited and translated by Eugene R. Fairweather. S.C.M. Press. 35s.

To present a representative selection of the works of the medieval Latin scholastics together with adequate explanatory matter all within the space of 450 pages might well seem to be an impossible task, even when the writings of St Thomas Aquinas have been relegated to a separate volume, but Dr Fairweather has achieved an amazing degree of success. His General Introduction on the intellectual achievement of Medieval Christendom provides as penetrating and informative an account as could be found anywhere of both the strength and the weakness of the whole scholastic movement, and is a brilliant refutation of the not yet entirely extinct illusion that medieval thought was always crude and incompetent and is now a mere museum piece. Faced by the formidable mass of the available material, Dr Fairweather has wisely decided to be representative rather than comprehensive in his selection. He begins with a solid slab of St Anselm, prefaced by a brilliant introduction; he prints in full the *Proslogion* and the *Cur Deus homo*. Then, again with an introduction, he gives us a large group of excerpts from the theologians of the twelfth century; Ivo of Chartres, John of Salisbury, Abelard, the Victorines, Peter Lombard, and Stephen Langton find their place here among others. Finally we are introduced to the theologians of the thirteenth century and after; Bonaventure, Matthew of Aquasparta, Duns Scotus, and Ockham are the chosen representatives here.

Any reviewer is bound to bewail the omission of thinkers who, in his view, are at least as important as some of those that are included; we look in vain for the Angelic Doctor's great predecessor Albertus Magnus or that fascinating and original figure Henry of Ghent. It is, however, no use to demand the impossible, and the marvel is that Dr Fairweather and his collaborators have done their work in such a way that no one who reads the texts which they have provided can fail, after carefully studying the introductory matter, to get a vivid and accurate impression of the tremendously varied and at the same time coherent character of the great adventure of the Christian intellect which we know as Latin scholasticism. Perhaps the admittedly outstanding stature of the Angelic Doctor has tended to give the general reader a somewhat monochrome, if monumental, image of medieval Christian thought; as good a way as any of correcting such an impression would be to read the book now under review. As with all the books in this series, the production is admirable, but when so many of them are so good one could tolerate a little less luxury for the sake of a lower price.

E. L. Mascall

PAPAL UTTERANCES

CATHOLIC DOCUMENTS, XXI. Salesian Press. 2s. 6d.

IN A brief foreword the new Archbishop of Westminster introduces this number of Catholic Documents, which thus "attains its majority". It contains the Pope's address to the World Medical Association, his Encyclical *Musicae Sacrae Disciplina* on Sacred Music, his address to Workmen in 1955, together with some less important utterances, an address to some bereaved persons from South Africa, an Easter Sunday address, and an address of welcome to an American Commission. It includes also a letter from Mgr Dell' Acqua on the Pope's behalf to mark the 42nd Social Week in France in 1955.

The present Pope has been indefatigable in his addresses and allocutions in Rome. The introduction to the address to the Eighth Assembly of the World Medical Association informs us that

> following the example of what certain other groups of scientists and professional men have done in recent years on the occasion of their respective Congresses, the President, in presenting his request for an Audience, added "an earnest petition to be permitted to hear from the lips of the Holy Father his views on the ethical problems connected with medicine, with special regard to the attitude to be adopted by doctors towards atomic and bacteriological warfare and the carrying out of experiments on human beings".

This the Pope duly did. We are often told that the Pope's infallibility is not oracular, but it would seem that there is some semblance of recourse to an oracle in this modern tendency. Newman, who complained that the operation of *Propaganda* deprived him of the freedom of private judgement, would hardly have welcomed this extreme centralization. For a loyal son of the Church will hardly wish to contradict the Holy Father, yet when he expresses views in so many different spheres, loyalty must be strained sometimes.

The oracle is not always consistent. On the subject of A.B.C. warfare the pope had previously said that "a doctor cannot cooperate in it" (p. 8), but this is qualified in the present address (p. 3). There is much sound sense in these utterances, but inevitably they often have a somewhat platitudinous ring about them. On the subject of church music, Gregorian choral chant is especially commended, though popular music may be used outside the liturgy. Vernacular hymns during Solemn Mass are only tolerated exceptionally.

There are too many misprints in this booklet of 42 pages, and the translation is often abominable. The American Commission for Cultural Exchanges with Italy is told that

> its very name clears the air of oppressive preponderance of what is only material, and bids for the mutual interest of nations in the achievement of the human spirit (p. 41).

St Gregory is said to have "studiously collected . . . all that had been handed down from posterity" (p. 19), and the present Pope deplores "the cheap saying, *All that helps for nothing*" (p. 39). English Roman

Catholics might well consider whether such translation does credit to their cause.

KENNETH N. ROSS

CHURCH AND THE WELFARE STATE

PARSONS MEET WELFARE WORKERS. By HAROLD LEES. St Anne's Press. 3s. 6d.

ALL the clergy will find it useful. It confronts the resources of the Welfare State with the needs of the people, and shows up the main difficulties—the breaking up of the family by treating its individuals separately, and the need of co-ordination amongst the many agents commissioned to carry out the Welfare State's orders. "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?", and who would co-ordinate the co-ordinators?

Behind these problems lies a tendency of agents to become purely professional, and of people to be helped towards dependence instead of a new life. It is clear from these various papers and discussions that if the clergy are to help towards unity and humanity in the work of the Welfare State they will have to know the agents personally and meet with them from time to time for mutual discussion such as we find in this book. It is good to know that so much purely voluntary work is being done; and here again the parish priest (with all the need for workers in his own parish) must be prepared to tell his congregation of their duty to the community as a whole.

This little book would gain by being a bit longer and rather more explanatory. First readers are not in the happy secrets of those who enjoyed the conference *tête à tête*. "Sceptophonic" on p. 51 (unless the British Council has started a new psychology) should read "schizophrenic". On p. 50 a question is asked: "How can clergy help neurotics who come to talk to them?" The answer is given: "Probably all they can do is to produce happier people." The happy fellowship of a parish is indeed of great curative value to neurotics by joining them to the congregation; but such people are always in need of personal encouragement and fellowship, and this the clergy should be able to give while at the same time co-ordinating their ministry with the doctor and psychiatrist.

GEORGE M. BOSWORTH

INTRODUCTION TO LECTIONS

HEADINGS FOR THE LESSONS. By HENRY DE CANDOLE. A. R. Mowbray and Co. 3s. 6d.

"THERE is a book, who runs may read . . ." But he ought to run some way through the new lectionary before attempting to assess or criticize

how much the congregation are edified by the Bishop of Knaresborough's notes.

This sensible handbook is attractively produced, and the selection of passages to be read faces squarely the needs of modern congregations.

A parish priest will give an unreserved welcome to the foreword and introduction. At last there is recognition that common sense demands that the announcement of the *book* of the Bible should come first; then the chapter and verse. (The Religious Department of the B.B.C. have, of course, practised this for years, but how slowly has their lead been followed.) Before long, perhaps, we may hope to see the suggestion that the announcement might be prefaced with the number of the page in the Bibles in the pews of the congregation. Thus the practice adopted in some few churches might spread; and the reading of the Bible, which this handbook aims to assist, might be further encouraged.

G. E. REINDORP

FAMILY PRAYERS

WALKING WITH CHRIST. By C. M. CHAVASSE. S.P.C.K. 1s. 6d.

A HUMAN family as a worshipping unit within the Christian family was fairly common in the Victorian era. Recently the Church of England has launched a campaign to stimulate evangelistic effort directed to the individual family as a unit.

Family prayers formed part of the Victorian pattern in many homes, and it would be an admirable thing if such daily common worship could be revived. However, it is doubtful whether family prayers were part of the life of more than a section of Victorian England. In a middle-class home with adequate domestic help and in many ways a more leisured kind of life, it was easy to gather the family together before breakfast, and (less often) in the evening.

But life is very different to-day. The early morning in most households is far from leisurely, and there is usually no domestic help. Children leave at various times for their scattered schools, and mother is busy all the time getting the various members of the family off. But perhaps with a little determined planning a brief period for family prayer can be found.

If so, the Bishop of Rochester's scheme and selection of prayers will be helpful within limits. The book consists of short fixed forms of prayer for morning and evening together with variable matter for each day of the week. A considerable part of the prayers follows the wording of the Book of Common Prayer. The rest of the prayers either come from well proved manuals of prayer, or are original.

Yet successful though this book is in many ways, it does not fully meet the needs of "family" prayer. It lacks sufficient emphasis on worship of a simple character, and very few of the prayers are suitable

for use with children under 10-12 years of age. It is all to the good to accustom children to the liturgical language of the Prayer Book, but this needs supplementing by simple prayers with words which a child readily understands, and which can be used for the whole family to say together intelligently.

S. A. H. Eley

THE CURE OF SOULS

Pastoral Theology: A Reorientation. By Martin Thornton, O.G.S. S.P.C.K. 25s.

Any book that helps us to think out afresh our pastoral methods is especially to be welcomed at the outset of this atomic age. More particularly will welcome be accorded to a book so filled with devout zeal and wide learning as this.

Put briefly the author's thesis appears to be that in the immediate past we have spread our butter much too thin over too many acres of bread. What we should do is to canalize our efforts, concentrate on the faithful nucleus and make them better witnesses of that sainthood which is the goal of the Christian life. To support this thesis he employs the doctrine of the "remnant" with considerable effect. He is quite certain that there is enough in the ordered life of the Church of England to build up our own remnant according to the desired pattern. If we can only get them to use the divine mysteries and the daily office fully they will become models of the Christian life and their example will have a greater converting effect on others than any amount of missions and evangelistic campaigns.

The book has the virtue of being intensely Anglican, but it displays so extensive a knowledge of ascetic literature from widely different Christian sources that it might almost be taken as a text-book of the cure of souls. Certainly no library for ordinands will be complete without it.

But we wonder whether the emphasis is not too one-sided. After all the work of the Church is not only to build up saints but to save sinners. In the latter task the saints, lay as well as clerical, have a share. It is not merely by the witness of their lives that they will perform that task but by their actual efforts to win others. It will be a great mistake if the Church falls into the habit of looking in too much upon itself. The gaze must always be directed outward upon that world which its Master came to save and which must always be the goal of its own evangelistic efforts. "This ought you to have done and not to have left the other undone." If we concentrate upon the nucleus of the faithful it must be in order to make them the spear-head of the Church's attack upon the dull, the listless, the indifferent, the apathetic, and the lapsed.

W.W.

UTOPIA

THE GOLDEN AGE. By ARCHIBALD CRAIG. Richard R. Smith, Publisher, Inc., New Hampshire. $3.00.

THIS book is, in more senses than one, a *mess* of pottage. It is hardly possible to believe that an author could concoct, and a publisher promote, such an unappetizing dish. Smatterings of anthropological reading are generously added to by no means *new*-laid theological eggs—and yet another attempt (even more conspicuously unconvincing than most) is made to divide the teaching of Jesus and Paul like the separation of an egg's yolk from the white. The mixture is garnished with the once progressive political theories of the nineteen-thirties; and the whole, having been stirred by an awakened but unenlightened social conscience, has been left to simmer far too long in a sunless room before being served.

The result is a tasteless and indigestible confection. Nothing new is said in the book; and anything useful it does say has been said better elsewhere. Mr Craig looks back nostalgically to a Golden Age when, he believes, primitive people lived happily together in unbroken peace and harmony. They were the food gatherers. Things went wrong when as a result of civilization they became food producers and, later, food hoarders. Jesus came to attack the food hoarders and all they stood for, and to bring people back to their primitive brotherhood. But Paul conveniently ignored this teaching about human behaviour and, by a cunning concentration on Christ's Death and Resurrection, cleverly excluded the social implications of his life and message.

No one will dispute that there is much to learn in Holy Scripture about the necessity of mutual responsibility and interdependence among people, both materially and economically. But he who bothers to read this book will, alas receive no help from its pages.

American readers may find the chapter that tells, very sketchily, the story of the rise of the Co-operative movement in Britain of some value. But I doubt it—for it is hard to take Mr Craig seriously. He apparently equates "the Co-op" with the Kingdom of God: and even the movement's best friends and supporters are unlikely to press such a claim! Robert Owen deserves (and has, of course, often been given) better treatment than this.

The Golden Age is, however, useful in one way: it is a good example of how *not* to attempt a modern interpretation of the Bible's social teaching.

✠ JOOST STEPNEY

ECCLESIASTICAL ECONOMICS

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE CHURCH: From Archbishop Whitgift to the Long Parliament. By CHRISTOPHER HILL. Oxford University Press. London: Cumberlege. 42s.

"THE object of this book is to try to throw fresh light on the part played by religion in preparing for the seventeenth-century revolution, and by implication on the relations between Puritanism and capitalism" (p. ix).

"The object of this book has been to throw some light on the connexions between the economic life and ideas about religion and Church organization" (p. 338).

These two sentences are quoted respectively from the Introduction and Conclusion to Mr Hill's book, and it should be said at once that he is more successful in the achievement of the aim set out in the Conclusion than in that with which he began. It should also be said that the book is of great interest, and will assist the student of the period (1583-1640) as well as interest the general reader.

Mr Hill does not really increase our understanding of the part played by religion in preparing for the events of the Civil War or the Restoration, although he does bring out many aspects of the inter-play of Puritan thought and developing capitalism. From the starting point of the dissolution of the monasteries to the ultimately abortive Laudian financial reforms, the economic ills of the Church, which necessarily mean largely the material condition of the clergy, are described fully and fairly. The author is careful to set these ills against the background of the society in which they existed, and to relate them to the ways of thought of contemporary minds, and does not lose sight of the fact that an economic history faces the danger which always besets an abstraction, that of distortion by a one-sided emphasis.

To the present-day reader there is a certain wry interest in the fact that the chief cause of difficulty in Church finance in the first part of the seventeenth-century was inflation, which seems to have been even more distressing in its effects then than it is three hundred years later. The habit of holders of ecclesiastical estates of benefiting themselves and their families, to the detriment of their successors, by granting leases at large premiums and small rents greatly aggravated the effect of rising prices, and the Elizabethan dealings with the lands of vacant sees, and the exactions made in return for episcopal promotion, left even bishoprics to some extent impoverished at the turn of the century. At the same time, the existence of unquestionably large estates belonging to sees and Cathedral Chapters led some of the Puritans to hold out the possibility of their spoliation as bait for support from the growing class of wealthy traders and business men anxious to become landed proprietors.

The breaking up of monastic estates had in any event led to many livings being in the gift of Puritans, for the advowsons passed with the

land, and the hold of the Crown and the Bishops over ecclesiastical patronage had been seriously weakened.

The effect of these things, in both the spiritual effectiveness and the political outlook of the parochial clergy, is well described, but perhaps the most telling chapter of the book is that concerned with Tithe. In a simple agricultural community, the system of setting aside one-tenth of the natural increase, either of crops or animals, for the priest of the village could work well, but by the beginning of the seventeenth century the operation of the tithe system meant that ministers of parishes were not receiving an appropriate share of the increased national wealth and were in many cases reduced to unendurable poverty. This led to a grave weakening of their spiritual force, for they were compelled to follow secular occupations, to be pluralists, or to be entirely dependent on a local magnate. Many benefices were unfilled and some occupied by men so ignorant and unsuitable that they were unable to preach, and some apparently were able to read only with difficulty.

The factors, which are convincingly and clearly dealt with by the author, causing this actual or relative poverty were:

1. The manner in which tithe had come to be calculated and assessed either by agreement or custom.
2. The effect of enclosures and impropriations of tithe and in particular the reservation of Great Tithes to the (lay) rector.
3. The inadequacy of the system to deal with an age in which to an increasing extent wealth was being accumulated by a "market economy", by mineral extraction and the beginnings of industry.

The disastrous effect of clerical poverty at a time when a preaching ministry, calling for an educated clergy, was expected and demanded as a consequence of the Reformation with its greater emphasis on Word than on Sacrament, is made clear.

"In both church and state a drastic financial reorganization was necessary: the Civil War was fought to decide which element in society should control and profit by that reorganization." As a statement of the causes of the Civil War, this is obviously inadequate, and in the context is not intended as such, but Mr Hill so handles his material as to make the statement both illuminating and convincing.

The dilemma in which the new propertied class found itself is also well handled; "attacks on church property produced attacks on property as such. . . . the logic of events ultimately led the men of property to support the restoration of church and king. . . ."

The limitation of the book to the year 1640 results in a somewhat unsatisfactory and inadequate treatment of Laud; so, obviously, does the restriction to economic problems, but nevertheless readers will have cause to be grateful to Mr Hill for his marshalling of facts and his clear, and sometimes entertaining, interpretation of them within the limits he has set himself.

Here and there the picture is over-drawn; if the condition of the clergy was quite as the author describes it, it is difficult to understand the influence of the Church and the loyalty it inspired. Also it is perhaps

unwise for an economic historian to make moral judgements. The statements, "one can therefore condemn Laud without accepting the standards of his opponents as any more eternally valid than Laud's own. . . . We cannot consider individual morality without taking into account its implications for the whole of society", will not meet with general acceptance.

M. M. HODGINS

SACRED MUSIC. I

CANTICUM SACRUM. By IGOR STRAVINSKY. Boosey and Hawkes. Pocket score (H.P.S. 691), 8s.; vocal score, 10s.; full score, 25s.

THIS work consists of a short dedication and five movements, comprising settings of words taken from the Vulgate, for tenor and baritone solo, mixed chorus, organ, and a large orchestra, including a bass trumpet, but without clarinet, horns, violins, or 'cellos.

I have not yet heard the work, and the piano score contains no indication of orchestration. Any judgement must therefore be tentative. But the basic structure of the work and the originality of its design are apparent, and the intellectual austerity of the texture, so characteristic of late Stravinsky, has a distinctive beauty. The tonal organization is of particular interest. This is partly in terms of the composer's individual use of key-tonality, and partly by the adoption of 12-tone techniques. The way in which these two methods are welded together into a satisfying work of art illustrates Stravinsky's flair for absorbing the most varied processes into his personal style.

The short dedication on, "Urbi Venetiae, in Laude Sancti sui Presidis, Beati Marci Apostoli", is set for the two soloists to a simple 2-voice orchestral accompaniment. The first movement is a setting of Mark 16. 15 for full chorus and orchestra, the texture being mainly harmonic, and the key alternating between D and B flat. The second movement, for tenor solo and orchestra, is a setting of the Song of Songs 4. 16—5. 1, and is perhaps the most immediately appealing section. The texture is light and open, and is based on a 12-tone series in various transformations. All 12 tones appear in the three opening 4-part chords, the first of which comprises the notes B A C H !

The third central movement divides into three sections, punctuated by a ritornello for the orchestra, and portrays the theological virtues. The order is Caritas (Deuteronomy 6. 5 and 1 John 4. 7), Spes (Psalms 125. 1 and 130. 5, 6), and Fides (Psalm 116. 10). The first section is a 3-voice chorus which, together with a single instrumental line, forms a recondite and fascinating 4-part canon by inversion and augmentation. The canon is based upon a tone series exposed in the ritornello. In the second section, solo voices and chorus alternate in 2-part vocal writing, and the third section (Fides) resumes the Canonic choral writing, giving an impressive formal unity to the whole.

Part Four is a setting of Mark 9. 23, 24 for baritone solo and chorus, and is founded upon the same tone-row as the third movement. The texture is mainly harmonic, though the middle section is a further 4-part vocal Canon (Più agitato) which culminates in a return to the solo voice singing "Credo, Domine: adjuva incredulitatem meam", one of the most moving passages in the work.

The final movement (Mark 16. 20) rounds off the work by a return to the material of the first movement, freely treated in retrograde motion, opening with the chord with which the first movement ends. Thus, the work as a whole is a highly integrated formal unity, with the third movement as its centre.

Canticum Sacrum, which takes only about 17 minutes to perform, is, as far as an examination of the vocal score can reveal, an exciting and characteristic example of the spare and unadorned beauty of Stravinsky's later music.

N. E. Wallbank

SACRED MUSIC. II

Antiphon. Words by George Herbert, music by Benjamin Britten. Boosey and Hawkes. 1s. 6d.

Antiphon is a setting by Benjamin Britten, for four-part choir, optional treble soloists, and organ, of one of the two poems in Herbert's *Temple* bearing this title. The poem chosen is the one that opens:

Chorus. Praisèd be the God of Love
Man. Here below,
Angels. And here above . . .

The antiphonal structure of the verse is faithfully reflected throughout the setting, the lines marked "man" being assigned to male voices, and the angels being represented by treble solo or semichorus.

The music, while not of extreme difficulty by twentieth-century standards, is rather tricky as regards both rhythm and interval, and is probably beyond the abilities of the average English church choir. It may be added that it is well worth the trouble and discipline of learning, and should be exciting to perform.

The work was written to commemorate the centenary of St Michael's College, Tenbury, and admirably serves its purpose. The style, as might be expected from the composer's other works in this medium, is distinctive and refreshingly lacking in that "phoney" reverence which vulgarizes all but the very best Church music written since 1800. It also exemplifies that unique quality of youth and innocence which is characteristic of much of Britten's best work, a strangely moving and childlike simplicity, which recalls the poems of Blake and the pictures of Paul Klee. The texture is largely harmonic, but this is contrasted by some lively imitative writing for the chorus.

Cathedrals and the more adventurous parish church choirs would be well advised to add *Antiphon* to their music lists.

N. E. WALLBANK

VISIT TO RUSSIA

RUSSIAN HOLIDAY. By ALLAN CHAPPELOW. George G. Harrap and Co. 18s.

IN THE summer of 1954 a party of students went on holiday to Russia whilst a similar party came to England. The cost was £95 per head. Mr Chappelow has written a very full account of the visit. His book would benefit by some pruning, and it suffers from a profusion of brackets and exclamation marks. One wishes, too, that it was less expensive, but no doubt the inclusion of many excellent photographs partly accounts for the price. The author can be congratulated on producing a book packed with information, sincerely written without a trace of bias.

This whirlwind tour ranged from the great cities of Moscow, Stalingrad, and Leningrad to a seaside resort on the Black Sea and a lake in the Caucasus Mountains. The students saw a great deal and talked with innumerable people on almost every conceivable subject.

Comments on religion range from the opinion of the Stalingrad city architect—their one church was adequate for the population of 600,000 and would soon be obsolete—to the remark of the monk at Zagorsk, "Our faith will live always". The author tells us that "there are no fewer than fifty churches open in Moscow", but does not add that the population is four or five millions. We can hardly agree that there is some analogy between the one political view which colours everything taught in school and the compulsory religious teaching in England. But his lasting impression seems to be that "religion in Russia will be a major force once more".

There have been tremendous achievements in Russia. Education and the social services are good, consumer goods are more plentiful, and the people are happy and believe in the system which rules their lives. The real Iron Curtain is ignorance. They do not know, and cannot be convinced, that conditions in England are different from the time of Dickens; nor do they believe that the intentions of the West are peaceful. On the other hand, "Russia has given help where help was needed in other countries, but has never taken anything from them", said an intelligent girl who spoke excellent English.

These exchange visits, and books about them, can do much good. But there are dark spots in Russia which the visitors did not see. Nor must we forget that the system is seen very differently in the satellite countries. Even on a brief visit to Prague the author caught this impression, for he remarks, "Life in some of the satellite countries appears to be somewhat different from Russia itself". He now knows, as all the world does, that his impression was correct.

✠ GEORGE WILLESDEN

PAROCHIAL REVOLUTION

THE PARISH COMES ALIVE. By E. W. SOUTHCOTT. A. R. Mowbray and Co. 10s. 6d.

SINCE the first world war Christian attention has been drawn in various countries to the need to evangelize afresh one's own countrymen. The rapid growth of atheism and paganism in France, for example, led to notable experiments like the Young Workers and factory priests and to new conceptions of parish life such as that set out by the Abbé Michonneau in *Revolution in a City Parish*. Canon Southcott has already told us of some of his enterprises in *The House Church* (British Council of Churches, 1s.) and *Receive this Child* (Mowbrays, 3s.), and so this new, longer book dealing with the life of his parish over twelve years is very welcome.

Canon Southcott sees a parish ideally as a microcosm of the whole Church. If the Church is to be real to people it must be local, showing on the spot, in miniature, all its main characteristics. The parish must not merely support missions, it must be a mission; not merely stand for social truth, but have its members taking part in public life; not only hear and pray about reunion, but be seen to care for all kinds of Christians in its neighbourhood. In this new unfolding of parish life Canon Southcott emphasizes the need for parishes to be interested in each other and to work together. This is very timely advice, and would be more accepted if Ruridecanal Chapters spent less time in odds and ends of business and more in hearing about the actual work of their clergy.

He does not regard the House Church as just an aid, but as the key to the situation. There is nothing new in the House Church idea: Hindus and Jews practise it; it is writ large in the New Testament and the Early Church; it is plain to see in the Prayer Book (Baptism and Communion in private homes with a suitable congregation), and was taken for granted when family prayers were widespread. It is the use of it for evangelistic purposes which is new and invigorating. The outsider considers the Church as a local building: he is to be led to see it as a world-wide fellowship which is being constantly presented to him—his children do not go to Sunday School at St Mary's, they go to Sunday School at Mrs Smith's over the way; and he actually sees his neighbours congregating not at St Mary's but at a flat below his, for Communion.

This book is written with a pleasing sense of urgency. Canon Southcott is not unaware of the implicit dangers, though we should like to hear more about the actual difficulties and the quality of the success attained. It is clear, too, that many parishes would have to live through many years of wise leadership before getting to this starting point. There is, however, wisdom here for all at any stage, and a splendid challenge to think out a strategy for advance.

GEORGE M. BOSWORTH

SCOTTISH CHURCH ARCHITECTURE

THE EPISCOPAL CHAPEL AT MUCHALLS. By J. P. HILL. A. R. Mowbray and Co. 16s.

KING'S COLLEGE CHAPEL, ABERDEEN. By F. C. EELES. Aberdeen University Press. 30s.

THE first of these books is, in the author's words, "a factual chronicle of the survival of Episcopacy in one small district of Scotland throughout a period which saw its total extinction in many other quarters". Muchalls is a fishing village some ten miles south of Aberdeen, and the fortunes of its Episcopalian congregation are closely linked with those of Fetteresso and Stonehaven. Together the three places survived as an island of Episcopalianism in Kincardineshire throughout the period of the Jacobite struggle and the subsequent years of depression. The ministers of the three churches were imprisoned together in the Stonehaven Tolbooth in 1748-9 (p. 17), from whence comes the famous story of the jail christenings which is well retold here.

Indeed the whole tale is admirably told and carefully documented by the present Rector who obviously possesses the gifts required for such a task—sympathy, lucidity, and diligence in research, as the Bishop of Brechin remarks in his Foreword. As an appendix, two sermons are added which were preached at Muchalls in the late eighteenth century and which reflect the Eucharistic theology of the time.

King's College Chapel, Aberdeen is a posthumous tribute to its author, Dr Francis Eeles, who died in 1954 and was widely regarded as the leading ecclesiologist of his day. The book opens appropriately with a delightful Memoir of him written by Miss Judith Scott of the Central Council for the Care of Churches, the body to which Dr Eeles devoted most of his tireless exertions, his scholarship, and his fortune.

The Introduction reminds us that the Chapel of King's College is one of the most outstanding examples of medieval architecture and art in Scotland. The body of the text is essentially a study of the building, fittings, and ornaments, and the services of the Chapel, the main interest of which for the general reader is that it preserved the typical arrangement of a medieval collegiate church more perfectly than any other now surviving.

The Chapters on the Building, the Liturgical Rules for the College Church, and the Comments on the Liturgical Rules, are the most important. Of particular interest is the unusual provision made here for the Reserved Sacrament. Among the lesser altars was "the altar of the Venerable Sacrament", and "above this altar is a place for the sacrament of pyramidal form". This "sacrament house" as it was called (the word tabernacle was never used) standing over its own altar is extremely rare at this date in England or Scotland.

The link with Muchalls is strengthened by the fact that it was the continuing Episcopalian sympathies of Aberdeen University which helped to keep alive such small Episcopalian congregations as this. The

majority of the Muchalls clergy were graduates either of King's College or of Marechal College.

The fine illustrations, wisely grouped together in a section to themselves, greatly enhance the value of the book, particularly as they include hitherto unpublished photographs of the detail of all the rich and varied carved stalls. The University Court is to be congratulated upon commissioning this worthy addition to the series of Aberdeen University Studies.

O. H. GIBBS-SMITH

A SHINING LIGHT

DUNCAN-JONES OF CHICHESTER. By S. C. CARPENTER. A. R. Mowbray and Co. 11s. 6d.

ALTHOUGH the writer does not encourage his subject's personality to well to the surface until the last chapter, he allows others to speak boldly and colourfully of him. The Reverend A. C. Blyth, characteristically frank, holds that Duncan-Jones would never have been at home in the Norfolk village of Blofield, but he and his wife did much lasting good there. Mr T. S. Eliot trenchantly comments on his clarity, fluency, and vigour in discussion, during which he became pinker in the face. Downright and blunt, he was neither quarrelsome nor offensive. Mr Justice Vaisey regarded him as largely successful in repressing a tendency to "pontificate" where he was often justified in doing so.

Dr Carpenter's scholarship shows to effect when he writes of Duncan-Jones's liturgical and musical interests. It is, of course, fitting that due weight should be given to the late Dean's chairmanship of the Alcuin Club. To have overlooked his remarkable contribution to liturgical science would have been a grave omission. But some readers may wonder if a disproportionate amount of space has been devoted to musical and liturgical matters in an essentially popular biography. They will probably feel this of the author's lengthy excursion into the now somewhat obsolete controversies surrounding the deposited Prayer Books of 1927 and 1928. At the same time, his appreciation of Percy Dearmer's liturgical work and the restoration of English ceremonial customs at Downside Abbey could hardly have been neglected.

Duncan-Jones's courage was outstanding, particularly as evidenced in the chapter on "Foreign Affairs". But this did not impair his open-mindedness: though, at the outset, he was impressed by Hitler's professions for the Church, his latest utterances evoked from that dictator the title of "one of the enemies of Germany". It is hard to believe he was put off the scent by the promise that, if the Churches kept out of politics, they would have religious freedom. It is just a little difficult to suppress a smile, when the biographer emphasizes that Duncan-Jones was a prophet, less frankly political than Isaiah or any of the Old Testament prophets. He points out, earlier, that the late Dean was "both skilful and conscientious in keeping politics out of the pulpit".

The portrait is faithfully drawn. It lacks not colour, nor is afraid of the shades of grey. The significant lines too are all there. Duncan-Jones was a great walker, possessed of social gifts, and very approachable, especially to young men. Lucid and incisive in the pulpit, he had a quiet pastoral zeal in which patience for simple people played a not inconsiderable part. He was imbued with a strong sense of justice, particularly where the smaller nations were involved. The ascetic's austerities were soon to give place to an affectionate home-life. A delightful observation, indeed, is that his wife kept him going, typing his manuscripts and keeping the accounts. Nor is there anything incompatible with his happy life being punctuated by heavy hours of depression. Perhaps only so, could he earn his tomb-stone's epithet, of *lucerna ardens et lucens.*

The book is admirably produced, and enhanced by Dorothy Colles's magnificent chalk drawing of the Dean. The photograph of Maurice Randall's painting of him is equally characteristic. Pictures of Caius College, Cambridge, and Chichester Cathedral would tone in well. This could, of course, raise the cost of the book unnecessarily. An index, and this is not just a reviewer's fetish, would help towards cross-references, and re-reading whole sections. But the biography should enable many to appreciate Duncan-Jones's contribution to the English way of life, in peace and war.

GILBERT SLATER

JOANNA SOUTHCOTT

PAST FINDING OUT: The Tragic Story of Joanna Southcott and her Successors. By G. R. BALLEINE. S.P.C.K. 15s. 6d.

AS THE gridiron to St Lawrence, and the wheel to St Catherine, so to Joanna Southcott her Box. Most people have heard of it, though very few could say anything about its contriver. Yet her story is one of great interest and considerable tragedy.

Born a Devon farmer's daughter in the year 1750, she grew up devout, hard-working, and perfectly normal. It was not until she was forty-two that her first abnormal experience occurred, when a Voice spoke and awakened her from sleep. Reluctant at first to believe, she was ultimately convinced that this was a prophetic call. From this time forward, the messages increased in frequency and many of them proved extraordinarily accurate predictions of such unexpected events as the rise of Buonaparte. Finally she began to commit them to print in a series very aptly called *The Strange Effects of Faith.* At the same time, she bombarded the Church of England, and particularly an unfortunate incumbent, Joseph Pomeroy, with the claim that she was "the Bride mentioned in Scripture".

Her jingling quatrains might well have been forgotten had not, after nine years of indifference, an unexpected audience appeared. They were

a little group of men of intelligence and substance, who had been impressed by the sweeping claims of a naval officer, Richard Brothers, who declared the British people to be the Ten Lost Tribes and himself to be "the Prince of the Hebrews". At his death, seeking a prophet, they heard of Joanna and were at once impressed.

They brought her to London, set her up in a house of her own, and accompanied her on preaching tours. Here she enrolled supporters in an unusual way. Each was given a square paper sealed with the initials I.C. and bearing the inscription "the sealed of the Lord, the elect and precious, man's redemption to inherit the Tree of Life, to be made heirs of God and joint-heirs with Jesus Christ". This seal was a certificate of membership in her movement but was often regarded as a kind of passport to Heaven.

Tragedy now followed. In her reading of the Bible, Joanna came across Gen. 49. 10: "The sceptre shall not depart from Judah until Shiloh come." The verse is one of great obscurity and variable translation. But to poor Joanna it was perfectly plain. "Shiloh" was to be the new Messiah. More, she was chosen to bear him in another Virgin Birth. The astonishing thing is that at the age of sixty-five she not only convinced herself of her pregnancy but also persuaded a substantial number of eminent doctors of its truth. And when it proved false, the shock killed her. The tragic words, "It all appears delusion", are her pathetic comment on her life's work.

Such is the pathetic story of Joanna Southcott, a woman honest in her faith, generous in her dealings with others, genuinely humble in spirit. It was these good qualities in her that have kept Southcottism alive, bedevilled though it has been by warring claimants to leadership, themselves fuddled by the Shiloh myth.

Even the kindliness of Mr Balleine finds it hard to speak well of the extraordinary cranks who stalk through the later pages of this fascinating book. Fascinating it is, not only as study of a remarkable woman, but for the question it raises as to how the Church can distinguish between false and true prophets—and for its exposure of the real danger of a subjective and self-centred approach to the Bible.

One day perhaps the sealed box containing all Joanna's prophecies will be hauled from obscurity and twenty-four bishops required to attend its opening. This admirable book will make quite clear why the twenty-four will not attend.

STEPHAN HOPKINSON

A CHEERFUL ASCETIC

FATHER CONGREVE OF COWLEY. By M. V. WOODGATE. S.P.C.K. 10s. 6d.

WHEN Father Congreve died in 1918 he was known widely for his spiritual writings and to a smaller circle as a man of transparent holiness.

In this book of ninety pages Miss Woodgate has done well to revive his memory. She tells the story of

a life-time's death in love,
Ardour and selflessness and self-surrender.

Outwardly George Congreve's life was uneventful. We are given glimpses of his boyhood in Southern Ireland in a strongly anti-Catholic atmosphere, of Oxford twenty years after the launching of the Tracts, and of thirteen delightful years as vicar of a country parish in Cheshire. Then comes the decision to join the Society of St John the Evangelist, founded seven years before by Father Benson. Apart from five or six years in South Africa his forty-five years as a Cowley Father were lived mainly at the Society's Mother House at Oxford.

Drawing upon letters to his sister and to an intimate friend, Miss Woodgate shows us something of the cost of his "death in love". From childhood he was subject to moods of sadness and depression. But he acquired the power of detaching himself from these moods and of laughing at them as he turned to his "soul's centre". "My legs refuse to be merry", he writes in old age, "and my temper is surly and snappish sometimes but my *spirit* which lives within the outer defence of my body and temper and moods is often merry within me and can chaff my brother, the Ass, a little in a friendly way."

The book is studded with charming word-pictures from Father Congreve's pen of a day among the rocks and ferns and flowers of Table Mountain, of a street scene in Calcutta, of skating on the Cherwell during the great freeze-up of 1895, of a visit to Iona, of the tortures of sea-sickness—"I would rather face 6000 miles of *fire* than those salt leagues. . . . I am a lost man physically, an agonised man mentally", of the wind at Cape Town—"there is a sound as of a pack of storm dogs outside—shrill, baying, barking, crying—a wash of wind like waves going over the house, and the house trembling and the iron roof rattling". Many lovely descriptions of natural beauty are also given, too long to illustrate by quotation. Contemplative that he was, Father Congreve saw in natural beauty a summons from God.

This book is likely to send its readers in search of Father Congreve's works, all of which are, alas, out of print. In these he shows himself the disciple of Father Benson. They contain the same deep theologically-grounded spiritual doctrine, but without the latter's fierce paradoxes and with a grace of language and a delight in nature all his own. This dependence is charmingly illustrated: when speaking of a course of sermons which he had based on notes of a retreat by Father Benson, he says of his *réchauffé* that it is "as like the original as a plate of porridge is like the live oats in the field twinkling in the sun and wind". To which Father Benson replies, "I guess the plate of porridge suits the breakfast table best". It is only necessary to add that the porridge Father Congreve serves his readers is deliciously cooked.

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